**Analysis Supporting Calculations in The Independent Agency Myth**

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This paper includes data from three primary sources. The first two sources are large-scale surveys of federal executives conducted by scholars at Georgetown, Princeton, and Vanderbilt conducted in 2014 and 2020. The third source is a dataset of presidential nominations to Senate confirmed positions. It includes a comprehensive list of all Senate-confirmed positions in 2001, 2009, and 2017.[[1]](#footnote-1) It also includes data on whether and how long it took Presidents Bush, Obama, and Trump to formally send a nominee to the Senate for each position.

**Survey on the Future of Government Service (2014, 2020)**

In 2014 and 2020 we partnered with colleagues at Princeton and Georgetown Universities and the Partnership for Public Service and Volcker Alliance to conduct the *Survey on the Future of Government Service*. We asked appointed and career executives across the executive establishment about their agencies. We targeted all appointed and career federal executives working in non-advisory agencies headed by Senate-confirmed appointees.[[2]](#footnote-2) This includes all political appointees[[3]](#footnote-3), career members of the Senior Executive Service, all senior Foreign Service officers serving domestically, and comparable managers in agencies without these appointment authorities. It also includes other high level career managers that administered programs or agencies (i.e., GS 14-15 with specific titles). We relied on Leadership Directories’ Federal Government database[[4]](#footnote-4) to provide names and contact information for our target population. This proprietary database contains contact information for department and agency heads in the executive branch, including up to 15 levels of management hierarchy within departments and agencies. The database also identifies individuals in the following types of positions: Presidential Appointments with Senate Confirmation, Presidential Appointments without Senate Confirmation, Schedule C Appointments, Non-Career Senior Executive Service positions, Career Senior Executive Service positions, and Senior Foreign Service positions.

*Differences in 2014 and 2020 samples*

The 2014 and 2020 populations are the same but the way we drew samples differs slightly. We adjusted our sample in 2020 based upon our experience in 2014. In particular, our method for selecting career managers \*not\* in the Senior Foreign Service or Senior Executive Service changed between the two surveys. Our method for selecting appointees, members of the Senior Foreign Service and Senior Executive Service remained the same (i.e., we selected them all).

2014 Sampling Procedure[[5]](#footnote-5)

To identify *other* senior executives, we took a number of steps. First, we used “job functions” defined by Leadership Directories to target high level career executives not in the Senior Executive Service or Senior Foreign Service. We selected all individuals identified as “Federal Administrators” defined in 2014 by Leadership Directories as “… key government officials who are leaders of the departments and independent agencies, as well as their large sub-agencies. This tag also applied to the department or agency’s Chief of Staff, [Chief Financial Officer], [Chief Information Officer], Inspector General, and General Counsel.”

Second, to capture high-level federal executives not identified by the criteria above, we selected persons in the database with a job title that contained the word “Director” and that had one or more of the following job functions listed in Table 1 (below). These criteria were used to target career executives at the GS-14 or GS-15 level with policymaking and management authority while keeping the target population of sufficient size that the survey could be completed within budget. Finally, we also randomly selected 300 Assistant U.S. Attorneys from the database to include in our sample.

Graphical user interface, application

Description automatically generated

From this list we excluded several categories. Members of federal advisory boards that are presidential appointees were excluded because they are generally part-time employees whose primary occupation is not public service; therefore, they are not part of the target population of the survey. Individuals with a mailing address not in the United States were excluded. Our sample can be considered a census of individuals that meet the above criteria.

This initial sample was then stratified by the bureaus and agencies we targeted. Additions were made to any targeted bureau or agency with less than 40 individuals by selecting senior individuals in the relevant organization charts listed in the online database. This was done to increase the sample size for these agencies and bureaus to improve our ability to make valid statistical inferences and to correct for any cases for which the senior management of an entity is not well represented by our initial sampling procedure. Our total sample was 14,698 appointed and career federal executives.

2020 Sampling Procedure[[6]](#footnote-6)

In 2020 *other* senior career executives that were not in the Senior Executive Service or Senior Foreign Service were identified by title. Specifically, the sample includes a census of employees whose titles are variants of Administrator, Commissioner, Secretary (e.g., Under Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Assistant Secretary), Chief or General Counsel, Chief of Staff, Chief Officers (e.g. Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer), Controller, President, Director (e.g., Deputy Director).

Heterogeneity in title usage across agencies makes it difficult to identify a set of titles that reliably identifies senior employees at every agency. Moreover, variants of Chief, Manager, and Supervisor are common among senior employees in subagencies, meaning that the titles used to construct the census sample may not produce a large enough sample to yield a sufficient number of responses to make reliable subagency-level inferences. Therefore, for EOP agencies, subagencies, and independent agencies that had at least 100 employees in the sample frame (i.e., enough potential respondents to yield a reliable agency-level estimate give our expected response rate), we executed the following sampling procedure:

For each agency with at least 100 people in the sample frame and the titles Administrator, Director, Chief, Manager, and Supervisor (in that order),

1. Calculate the number of additional respondents needed to reach a sample size of 100 for the agency
2. Select people in the sample frame not already selected by the census procedures
3. From step b, identify all individual whose title includes “Administrator”
4. If adding all individuals from step c would cause the sample size to exceed 100, take a simple random sample from the set of individuals such that the sample size for that agency will be 100 and proceed to the next agency
5. Otherwise, add all individuals from step c to the sample and repeat step c for the next title
6. If all titles have been searched and the sample size remains below 100, proceed to the next agency

In total, this procedure yielded a sample of 23,824 individuals of whom 2,984 were not part of the census sample. Names and addresses were submitted to a vendor for mail service processing. There were 22,819 records (out of 23,824) that had a mailing address or building location in the directory. About 96% of these addresses were found to be valid delivery points in the USPS delivery sequence file. Through additional editing and research, nearly all of the remaining 4% were validated. The file was also inspected for duplicate names and email addresses. Because the survey is administered online, we then eliminated individuals with no email address resulting in a final sample of 17,792 individuals.

*Survey Execution*

The Princeton Survey Research Center (PSRC) fielded the first 15-20 minute survey in the fall of 2014 (August 14, 2014 to December 15, 2014) and executed the second in the fall of 2020 (June 12, 2020 to December 31, 2020).[[7]](#footnote-7) In 2014 potential respondents received a paper letter and postcard reminders in addition to email prompts, reminders, and telephone calls. In 2020, most federal executives were working from home because of the 2020 global pandemic. This made letters and postcards infeasible since most respondents would not receive their work mail at home. The pandemic also made telephone calls difficult since most executives were working from home rather than the office. We still tried to reach executives through calls to work numbers. Most of the 2020 survey involved electronic communications.[[8]](#footnote-8)

*Response and Participation Rates*

The participation rate for the 2014 survey was 24% (3,551 out of 14,698). Out of 3,551 respondents, there were 429 political appointees (participation rate 18%; 429/2,444) and 3,122 career professionals (participation rate 25%; 3,122/ 12,254). The participation rate of the second survey, fielded during the pandemic, was 11% (1,779 full or partial completes out of 16,232).[[9]](#footnote-9) Out of 1,779 respondents, there were 125 appointees (7%; 125/1,605) and 1,654 career professionals (11%; 1,654/14,627). These rates are comparable to most public opinion surveys (response rates for Gallup telephone surveys average around 7 percent).[[10]](#footnote-10)

*Survey Weights*

All analysis includes survey weights to ensure that the answers provided by the sample of respondents are reliable and mirror those of the target population.The results reported are weighted to reduce non-response and noncoverage bias. We created post-stratification weights using iterative proportional fitting, more commonly called raking. The sample drawn from the Leadership Directories database was used to create population marginals because the sample is primarily a census sample, meaning the sample is our best estimate of the population.

The characteristics used for weighting are:

1. Whether a respondent worked in the DC area (defined as the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia).
2. Position type defined as political appointees (i.e, Presidential Appointments with Senate Confirmation, Presidential Appointments without Senate Confirmation, Schedule C Appointments, Non-Career Senior Executive Service positions), career member of the Senior Executive Service, member of the Senior Foreign Service, and career civil servant.
3. Workplace location in the executive branch defined as the Executive Office of the President, each executive department (separately), and independent agencies (as a whole).

The composite design effect for a sample of size *n* with each case having weight *wi* is:



We set = 0*.*5 and calculated the weighted margin of error as:



**Survey Data Analysis**

Two types of data are extracted from the surveys: 1) agency average responses to survey questions and 2) numerical estimates of latent agency characteristics based upon ratings provided survey respondents.[[11]](#footnote-11)

*Agency Averages*

We have responses from thousands of federal executives across the two surveys. Rather than rely on simple average responses broken down by whether the respondent works in an executive or independent agency, we use *agency averages* as the unit of analysis.[[12]](#footnote-12) In a federal workforce of more than 2 million employees, 38% work in the Department of Defense and 21% work in the Department of Veterans Affairs.[[13]](#footnote-13) If our question is how executive agencies differ from independent agencies, the unit of analysis is the agency, not the respondent. We do not want to generalize from the experience of the DOD employee to all executive agencies. Neither do we want to assume that the experience of a civil servant in a large independent agency like the Securities and Exchange Commission is the same as that of a civil servant in a smaller agency like the Federal Maritime Commission. Throughout the paper the number of observations reflects the number of agencies rather than the number of respondents. These agency averages are the average of the *weighted* responses.

To protect the privacy of survey respondents and comply with human subjects protections, we report the average responses of no agencies with fewer than 5 respondents and 30 potential respondents. Sometimes, however, data from these low-response agencies are included in the calculation of means and differences of means.

*Numerical Estimates of Agency Workforce Skill and Influence[[14]](#footnote-14)*

To avoid the potential bias associated with self-reports, we also use respondents as expert informants to tell us about agencies they work with (rather than their own agency). At the beginning, each survey instrument asks respondents identify the agencies they work with the most (other than their own). A screenshot from the 2014 survey is included in Figure A1 below. The survey subsequently includes questions about these agencies as a partial way of getting around problems inherent in self-reports. Respondents evaluated 5-8 agencies that they knew something about. The 2014 survey also asked each respondent to rate the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of Personnel Management. Online respondents were asked to also evaluate 3 other randomly selected agencies, including two other bureaus in the respondent’s executive department, if applicable. The 2020 survey included the three agencies they identified, plus 2 other randomly selected agencies, including other bureaus in the respondent’s executive department, if applicable.

**Figure A1: Question about Which Agencies Respondents Work with Most**

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Skills: To evaluate whether the independent agency design, in fact, contributes to a more expert workforce both surveys asked respondents the following question (Figure A2):

**Figure A2: Screen Shot of (Online) Agency Skill Question**

**Graphical user interface, table

Description automatically generated**

Influence: To investigate this question, we rely on estimates of influence from the 2014 survey. The survey gave respondents the following text and question (Figure A3):

**Figure A3: Screen Shot of (Online) Agency Influence Question**

Table

Description automatically generated

In two separate papers, Mark Richardson and coauthors generated numerical estimates of agency workforce skill and agency influence using a Bayesian Item Response model estimated on the 2014 data.[[15]](#footnote-15) Professor Richardson updated the workforce skill ratings for us, incorporating the new data from the 2020 survey. This is the data we report in Figure 1 and Figure 7 in the paper.

**Data Analysis: Section II**

*Skills Ratings*

The dataset of agency workforce skills in 2014 and 2020 “skills\_ratings\_2020\_2014.xls” is provided for replication. We also include a batch file in STATA replicating that analysis—“devins\_lewis\_skills\_012122.do”.

*Political Insulation Calculations*

After discussing workforce skills, we turn our attention to what federal executives say about how much influence different actors have over policy making in their agencies. We provide a screen shot of the 2020 question below (Figure A4). To conduct the analyses related to the degree of political influence, we calculated agency average responses from the individual level respondents. We then compared agency average responses by whether an agency was an executive or independent agency.

**Figure A4: Screen Shot of (Online) Agency Influence Question**



Human subjects protections prevent us from providing a dataset of agency averages that includes all agencies since we cannot include details on agencies with fewer than 5 respondents.[[16]](#footnote-16) We present the STATA code we use to generate the agency averages and difference of means tests here. We also include a Microsoft Excel file that includes the averages and the data used in Figures 2 and 3 (“figures devins project 0122122.xls”).

Here is a sample of the code that is replicated for comparing different actors (e.g., Congress, appointees, OMB, senior civil servants):

collapse (mean) policy\_white irc reg\_comm if policy\_white<5 [iweight=wt\_full], by(bureau\_acr)

ttest policy\_white, by(reg\_comm)

ttest policy\_white if reg\_comm==1, by(irc)

The first line of the code collapses the data into agency averages is the collapse command. It asks to return a mean via the “(mean)” command. This command is followed by variable names: policy\_white (White House influence), IRC (major commissions), reg\_comm (all commissions). It calculates the averages using only values reflecting those choosing “None” to “A great deal” via the “if policy\_white<5” command. The command also includes the survey weights “[iweight=wt\_full]”. The final element of the command signifies that we are asking for averages by “bureau\_acr”, respondent workplace. The next command calculates a difference of means test, dividing the sample into executive agencies and commissions. The final command calculates a difference of means test between major independents and other commissions.

The results of these difference of means calculations is included in “figures devins project 0122122.xls”. *Sheet1* includes in the top left the agency average responses for 2014. The rows include different agency types (executive agencies, major independents, small independents, all independents) and then differences among agency types—executive vs. independent, big independents vs. small independents. The columns include whether the respondent is as about the White House, Congress, OMB, political appointees or senior civil servants. The yellow box includes the p-value for the difference of means tests (e.g., G10 is the test for B10, H10 is the test for C10, and so forth). The 2020 survey results are included right below the 2014 results and follow the same format.

In Figure 4 we graph agency average responses and include only a subset of agencies, notably excluding any agencies with fewer than 5 respondents. The data that forms the basis of Figure 4 is included and is titled “whinfluence\_2020\_agency\_avg\_081321.xls”.

*Policy Stability Calculations*

After discussing the degree of insulation from politics, we turn our attention to what federal executives say about how much policy changes after elections. We provide screen shots of the questions below (Figure A5). To conduct the analyses related to the degree of political influence, we calculated agency average responses from the individual level respondents. We then compared agency average responses by whether an agency was an executive or independent agency.

**Figure A5: Screen Shot of (Online) Policy Change Question**

 



As with the previous analyses, we calculated agency average responses from the individual level respondents. We then compared agency average responses by whether an agency was an executive or independent agency. We use similar STATA commands to generate the agency average responses and conduct the difference of means tests. We include the results of these tests in the Microsoft Excel file described above (“figures devins project 0122122.xls”). In *Sheet1,* below the 2014 and 2020 analyses of political influence, we include agency average responses to the questions about agenda change and partisan disagreement. The rows, again, are different agency types (executive agencies, major independents, small independents, all independents), and then differences among agency types—executive vs. independent, big independents vs. small independents. The yellow box includes the p-value for the difference of means tests (e.g., G39 is the test for B39, G40 is the test for B40, and so forth).

In Figure 5 we graph agency average responses and include only a subset of agencies, notably excluding any agencies with fewer than 5 respondents. The data that forms the basis of Figure 5 is included and is titled “agendach\_2020\_agency\_avg\_081321.xls”.

*Unintended Consequences Calculations*

We note in the article that there are two unintended consequences associated with independent agencies, less investment by political actors and less influence in inter-agency negotiations and disputes. To investigate the effort put in by political actors to support agencies we use agency average responses to the following question (Figure A6):

**Figure A6: Screen Shot of (Online) Political Investment Question**



As with the previous analyses, we calculated agency average responses from the individual level respondents. We then compared agency average responses by whether an agency was an executive or independent agency. We use similar STATA commands to generate the agency average responses and conduct the difference of means tests. We include the results of these tests in the Microsoft Excel file described above (“figures devins project 0122122.xls”). In *Sheet1,* to the right of the 2014 analyses of political influence, we include agency average responses to the questions about effort. The rows, again, are different agency types (executive agencies, major independents, small independents, all independents), and then differences among agency types—executive vs. independent, big independents vs. small independents. The yellow box includes the p-value for the difference of means tests (e.g., T10 is the test for O10, U10 is the test for P10, and so forth).

Influence Ratings

The dataset of agency influence in 2014 “infl\_ratings\_devins\_lewis\_120221.xls” is provided for replication. We also include a batch file in STATA replicating that analysis—“devins\_lewis\_influence\_012122.do”.

**Presidential Nominations to Senate Confirmed Positions**

In Section III of the paper we include data in Figure 8 related to the pace of presidential nominations. The dataset of nominations “plum\_combined\_000816\_021921.xlsx” is provided for replication. We also include a batch file in STATA replicating that analysis—“devins\_lewis\_nominations\_analysis\_020622.do”. Given the complexity of the nominations data, we also include individual codebooks for each presidential transition:

* 2000\_Nominations\_Codebook\_070720.docx
* PAS 2008 Dataset Codebook 070720.docx
* Presidentially Appointed Positions Dataset Codebook\_2016\_115th\_Congress\_072621.docx

These codebooks carefully detail the composition of the list of Senate confirmed positions since determining a number if quite complex and about 20% of such positions are omitted from the standard source for such positions, *Policy and Supporting Positions* (i.e., the Plum Book). The codebooks also carefully explain every variable in the dataset.

The summary data for Figure 8 is included in “figures devins project 0122122.xls”. In *Sheet1,* to the bottom of the agenda change analysis, we include data on the average days to a vacant position’s first nomination and the proportion of vacant positions that receive a nominee in the first two years of a new president’s term.

Section III also includes claims about the length of time it takes presidents to appoint majorities to commissions (FN 191) and the number of vacancies at the start of each presidency. Specifically, we claim “It takes presidents 12-17 months to secure a majority of their party. If we include the smaller independent agencies omitted from the 2008 piece, the average is slightly longer, 17-20 months.” We also claim, “At the start of the last two presidencies, the average commission had two vacancies.” In the Microsoft Excel file updated\_time\_to\_maj\_data\_072021.xls[[17]](#footnote-17) and STATA file devins\_lewis\_timetomaj\_021222.do we include all the data and calculations to support these claims.

**Appendix A: Raw Output for Statistical Significance Claims in Text and Footnotes**

**Statistical Significance Claims**

* Pg 24: Skills Ratings Differences [Indcom=all independents; IRC=major independents]

“In the 2014 panel, executive agencies (Mean: -0.02) have a higher average estimated workforce skill than independent agencies, and this difference is statistically significant (Mean: -0.45; p<0.02).”

. ttest skills\_mean if year==2014, by(indcom)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Group | Obs Mean Std. err. Std. dev. [95% conf. interval]

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

0 | 136 -.0201482 .0627099 .7313173 -.1441692 .1038728

1 | 25 -.4470579 .218567 1.092835 -.898158 .0040421

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

Combined | 161 -.0864385 .063757 .8089851 -.2123522 .0394752

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

diff | .4269097 .173318 .0846074 .7692121

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

diff = mean(0) - mean(1) t = 2.4632

H0: diff = 0 Degrees of freedom = 159

Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0

Pr(T < t) = 0.9926 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0148 Pr(T > t) = 0.0074

* Pg 24: Skills Ratings Differences Between Major Independents and Other Commissions [Indcom=all independents; IRC=major independents]

“The gap between “major” independents (Mean: 0.13) and smaller independents (Mean: -0.90) is statistically significant (p< 0.02).”

. ttest skills\_mean if year==2014&indcom==1, by(irc)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Group | Obs Mean Std. err. Std. dev. [95% conf. interval]

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

0 | 14 -.8980606 .2937474 1.099102 -1.532663 -.2634579

1 | 11 .1269454 .2428366 .8053977 -.4141281 .668019

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

Combined | 25 -.4470579 .218567 1.092835 -.898158 .0040421

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

diff | -1.025006 .395762 -1.843702 -.2063101

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

diff = mean(0) - mean(1) t = -2.5900

H0: diff = 0 Degrees of freedom = 23

Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0

Pr(T < t) = 0.0082 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0164 Pr(T > t) = 0.9918

“Were we to eliminate these “major” independents, moreover, there would be an even larger statistically significant gap between independent and executive agencies (p<0.00).”

. ttest skills\_mean if year==2014&irc==0, by(indcom)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Group | Obs Mean Std. err. Std. dev. [95% conf. interval]

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

0 | 136 -.0201482 .0627099 .7313173 -.1441692 .1038728

1 | 14 -.8980606 .2937474 1.099102 -1.532663 -.2634579

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

Combined | 150 -.1020867 .0661125 .8097097 -.2327259 .0285525

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

diff | .8779124 .2163166 .4504443 1.305381

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

diff = mean(0) - mean(1) t = 4.0585

H0: diff = 0 Degrees of freedom = 148

Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0

Pr(T < t) = 1.0000 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0001 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000

* Pg 25 (FN 100): Claims about Office of Management and Budget influence over agency policy making [Indcom=all independents; IRC=major independents]

“In both years, small independents (Mean 2.33 [2014], 2.43 [2020]) report more OMB influence than big independents (Mean 1.96 [2014], 1.76 [2020]). These differences are close to statistically significant (p<0.15 and p<0.11, respectively).”

*2014 Survey Data*

. ttest policy\_omb, by(reg\_comm)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Group | Obs Mean Std. err. Std. dev. [95% conf. interval]

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

0 | 186 2.888703 .0437555 .5967454 2.802379 2.975027

1 | 40 2.220175 .1175585 .7435053 1.982391 2.45796

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

Combined | 226 2.770379 .0448206 .6738009 2.682058 2.858701

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

diff | .6685275 .1088919 .453944 .883111

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

diff = mean(0) - mean(1) t = 6.1394

H0: diff = 0 Degrees of freedom = 224

Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0

Pr(T < t) = 1.0000 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000

. ttest policy\_omb if reg\_comm==1, by(irc)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Group | Obs Mean Std. err. Std. dev. [95% conf. interval]

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

0 | 28 2.332712 .1474642 .7803074 2.030141 2.635284

1 | 12 1.957589 .1727107 .5982875 1.577455 2.337723

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

Combined | 40 2.220175 .1175585 .7435053 1.982391 2.45796

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

diff | .3751231 .2526624 -.1363652 .8866113

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

diff = mean(0) - mean(1) t = 1.4847

H0: diff = 0 Degrees of freedom = 38

Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0

Pr(T < t) = 0.9271 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1459 Pr(T > t) = 0.0729

*2020 Survey Data*

. ttest policy\_omb, by(reg\_comm)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Group | Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

0 | 161 2.831937 .0551749 .700091 2.722972 2.940902

1 | 27 2.157177 .2054392 1.067493 1.734891 2.579463

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

combined | 188 2.73503 .0580763 .796302 2.620461 2.849599

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

diff | .6747602 .1585028 .3620658 .9874545

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

diff = mean(0) - mean(1) t = 4.2571

Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 186

Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0

Pr(T < t) = 1.0000 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000

. ttest policy\_omb if reg\_comm==1, by(irc)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Group | Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

0 | 16 2.430259 .2844764 1.137906 1.823912 3.036606

1 | 11 1.759967 .2572043 .8530501 1.18688 2.333054

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

combined | 27 2.157177 .2054392 1.067493 1.734891 2.579463

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

diff | .6702917 .404768 -.1633436 1.503927

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

diff = mean(0) - mean(1) t = 1.6560

Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 25

Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0

Pr(T < t) = 0.9449 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1102 Pr(T > t) = 0.0551

* Pg 34: Levels of Support by White House for Executive vs. Independent Agencies [reg\_comm=all independent agencies; irc=major independent agencies]

“In comparing independent to executive agencies, there is a clear statistically significant difference in the levels of support from both branches. The average reported level of White House support is 1.6 out of 4 for executive agencies and 0.83 for independent agencies. This is a large and statistically significant difference (p<0.00).”

*White House*

. ttest sup\_misn\_wh, by(reg\_comm)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Group | Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

0 | 156 1.60388 .0669976 .8367996 1.471534 1.736226

1 | 25 .8310668 .1354043 .6770213 .5516062 1.110527

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

combined | 181 1.497138 .0637496 .8576632 1.371345 1.622931

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

diff | .7728134 .1760481 .4254168 1.12021

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

diff = mean(0) - mean(1) t = 4.3898

Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 179

Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0

Pr(T < t) = 1.0000 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000

*Congressional Committees*

* Pg 35: Levels of Support by Congress for Executive vs. Independent Agencies [sup\_misn\_comm=congressional committees; reg\_comm=all independent agencies]

“There is a large and statistically significant difference between congressional efforts to support executive agencies compared to independents (p<0.05).”

. ttest sup\_misn\_comm, by(reg\_comm)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Group | Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

0 | 158 2.50587 .0589783 .7413458 2.389376 2.622363

1 | 26 2.175765 .1666165 .8495806 1.832612 2.518918

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

combined | 184 2.459225 .0563089 .7638117 2.348126 2.570323

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

diff | .3301043 .1602376 .0139421 .6462665

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

diff = mean(0) - mean(1) t = 2.0601

Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 182

Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0

Pr(T < t) = 0.9796 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0408 Pr(T > t) = 0.0204

* Pg 65 (FN 258): Smaller independent agencies are less expert than executive agencies and major independent agencies. [Indcom=all independents; IRC=major independents; drop=2014 agencies that drop out of the 2020 skills ratings]

“Small independents are less expert than executive agencies (and major independents); small independents get less support from the political branches than executive agencies (and major independents). These findings are both statistically significant.”

*2014 Data*: (We use this since it includes more of the smaller independent agencies)

. ttest skills\_mean if year==2014&irc==0, by(indcom)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Group | Obs Mean Std. err. Std. dev. [95% conf. interval]

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

0 | 136 -.0201482 .0627099 .7313173 -.1441692 .1038728

1 | 14 -.8980606 .2937474 1.099102 -1.532663 -.2634579

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

Combined | 150 -.1020867 .0661125 .8097097 -.2327259 .0285525

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

diff | .8779124 .2163166 .4504443 1.305381

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

diff = mean(0) - mean(1) t = 4.0585

H0: diff = 0 Degrees of freedom = 148

Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0

Pr(T < t) = 1.0000 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0001 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000

. ttest skills\_mean if year==2014&indcom==1, by(irc)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Group | Obs Mean Std. err. Std. dev. [95% conf. interval]

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

0 | 14 -.8980606 .2937474 1.099102 -1.532663 -.2634579

1 | 11 .1269454 .2428366 .8053977 -.4141281 .668019

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

Combined | 25 -.4470579 .218567 1.092835 -.898158 .0040421

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

diff | -1.025006 .395762 -1.843702 -.2063101

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

diff = mean(0) - mean(1) t = -2.5900

H0: diff = 0 Degrees of freedom = 23

Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0

Pr(T < t) = 0.0082 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0164 Pr(T > t) = 0.9918

Small commissions that drop out of survey have lower skills than agencies that stay in [2014 data]

. ttest skills\_mean if year==2014, by(drop)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Group | Obs Mean Std. err. Std. dev. [95% conf. interval]

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

0 | 134 -.0169522 .0660879 .7650228 -.1476715 .1137671

1 | 27 -.4312964 .181068 .9408569 -.803487 -.0591059

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

Combined | 161 -.0864385 .063757 .8089851 -.2123522 .0394752

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

diff | .4143442 .1680076 .0825298 .7461586

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

diff = mean(0) - mean(1) t = 2.4662

H0: diff = 0 Degrees of freedom = 159

Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0

Pr(T < t) = 0.9926 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0147 Pr(T > t) = 0.0074

. ttest skills\_mean if year==2014&indcom==1, by(drop)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Group | Obs Mean Std. err. Std. dev. [95% conf. interval]

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

0 | 11 -.0584541 .3138564 1.040944 -.7577698 .6408616

1 | 14 -.7523895 .2857508 1.069182 -1.369717 -.1350624

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

Combined | 25 -.4470579 .218567 1.092835 -.898158 .0040421

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

diff | .6939354 .4258763 -.1870568 1.574928

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

diff = mean(0) - mean(1) t = 1.6294

H0: diff = 0 Degrees of freedom = 23

Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0

Pr(T < t) = 0.9416 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1168 Pr(T > t) = 0.0584

. ttest skills\_mean if year==2014&drop==1, by(indcom)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Group | Obs Mean Std. err. Std. dev. [95% conf. interval]

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

0 | 13 -.0855039 .1818126 .6555345 -.4816394 .3106317

1 | 14 -.7523895 .2857508 1.069182 -1.369717 -.1350624

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

Combined | 27 -.4312964 .181068 .9408569 -.803487 -.0591059

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

diff | .6668856 .3446535 -.0429416 1.376713

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

diff = mean(0) - mean(1) t = 1.9349

H0: diff = 0 Degrees of freedom = 25

Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0

Pr(T < t) = 0.9678 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0644 Pr(T > t) = 0.0322

*2020 Data*: Show No Statistically Distinguishable Difference in Skills in Agencies that Remain in Data.

. ttest skills\_mean if year==2020, by(indcom)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Group | Obs Mean Std. err. Std. dev. [95% conf. interval]

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

0 | 135 .0761858 .0760587 .8837221 -.074245 .2266167

1 | 12 .3026262 .294426 1.019922 -.3454011 .9506535

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

Combined | 147 .0946708 .0737259 .8938794 -.0510372 .2403787

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

diff | -.2264404 .2695368 -.759169 .3062883

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

diff = mean(0) - mean(1) t = -0.8401

H0: diff = 0 Degrees of freedom = 145

Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0

Pr(T < t) = 0.2011 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.4022 Pr(T > t) = 0.7989

Pg 65 (FN 258): Small independents get less support from the political branches than executive agencies (and major independents). Analysis of Survey Data (Please also see nominations data). [reg\_comm=all independents; IRC=major independents]

*White House*

. ttest sup\_misn\_wh, by(reg\_comm)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Group | Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

0 | 156 1.60388 .0669976 .8367996 1.471534 1.736226

1 | 25 .8310668 .1354043 .6770213 .5516062 1.110527

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

combined | 181 1.497138 .0637496 .8576632 1.371345 1.622931

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

diff | .7728134 .1760481 .4254168 1.12021

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

diff = mean(0) - mean(1) t = 4.3898

Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 179

Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0

Pr(T < t) = 1.0000 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000

. ttest sup\_misn\_wh if reg\_comm==1, by(irc)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Group | Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

0 | 14 .6225191 .1755628 .6568958 .2432387 1.001799

1 | 11 1.096491 .1908614 .6330158 .6712254 1.521757

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

combined | 25 .8310668 .1354043 .6770213 .5516062 1.110527

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

diff | -.4739721 .2605313 -1.012922 .0649778

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

diff = mean(0) - mean(1) t = -1.8193

Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 23

Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0

Pr(T < t) = 0.0410 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0819 Pr(T > t) = 0.9590

*Congress (Committees)*

. ttest sup\_misn\_comm, by(reg\_comm)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Group | Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

0 | 158 2.50587 .0589783 .7413458 2.389376 2.622363

1 | 26 2.175765 .1666165 .8495806 1.832612 2.518918

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

combined | 184 2.459225 .0563089 .7638117 2.348126 2.570323

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

diff | .3301043 .1602376 .0139421 .6462665

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

diff = mean(0) - mean(1) t = 2.0601

Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 182

Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0

Pr(T < t) = 0.9796 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0408 Pr(T > t) = 0.0204

. ttest sup\_misn\_comm if reg\_comm==1, by(irc)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Group | Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

0 | 15 2.05507 .2519488 .9757937 1.514694 2.595447

1 | 11 2.34035 .1953499 .6479024 1.905083 2.775616

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

combined | 26 2.175765 .1666165 .8495806 1.832612 2.518918

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

diff | -.2852795 .3392405 -.9854376 .4148785

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

diff = mean(0) - mean(1) t = -0.8409

Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 24

Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0

Pr(T < t) = 0.2043 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.4087 Pr(T > t) = 0.7957

**Appendix B: Other Data Claims in Footnotes**

* In Footnote 128 we claim, “‘Major’ independents routinely rank ahead of other independents, suggesting (once again) that elected officials often orphan minor independents. *See* Data Analysis Memo posted at <https://my.vanderbilt.edu/davidlewis/> (noting that there is a statistically significant gap between “major” and other independents with respect to agency influence).” Here is the output that supports that claim:

\*\*T-test by whether or not a commission is a major commission (major)

. ttest infl\_rating if indcom==1, by(major)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Group | Obs Mean Std. err. Std. dev. [95% conf. interval]

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

0 | 19 -1.153396 .1521085 .6630257 -1.472964 -.833828

1 | 12 -.2486077 .2442954 .846264 -.7862983 .2890828

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

Combined | 31 -.8031555 .1531449 .8526747 -1.115919 -.4903919

---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------

diff | -.9047884 .2720911 -1.461277 -.3482996

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

diff = mean(0) - mean(1) t = -3.3253

H0: diff = 0 Degrees of freedom = 29

Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0

Pr(T < t) = 0.0012 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0024 Pr(T > t) = 0.9988

* On p. 54 (Footnote 218) we claim, “Since 2000, at least 10 different commissions have lost a quorum for a period of at least 30 days, leaving them unable to perform key adjudicatory and regulatory functions.” Here we rely on data in a Microsoft Excel file agency\_structure\_quorum\_110118.xls and accompanying memo, “Statutory Characteristics and Current Configurations of Independent Commissions” included with submission materials.
* On p. 57 and footnotes 229-231 we make a series of claims about commissions and appointments.
  + On p. 57 (Footnote 229) we claim, “In total, these 47 independent agencies require presidents to nominate and the Senate confirm 292 positions, comprising 22% of all Senate confirmed positions.”
  + On p. 57 (Footnote 230) we claim, “At the start of the Biden Administration, 187 of the 292 independent agency positions was vacant. This included 16 positions on the major independents and 170 on smaller independents.”
  + On p. 57 (Footnote 231) we claim, “There were 17 vacancies on the board of the Corporation for National and Community Service, 10 vacancies on the board of the Inter-American Foundation, and 13 on the board of the National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers.”

To calculate these numbers we use a dataset of presidential nominations called GPO-PLUMBOOK-2020-020422.xlsx, described in Presidentially Appointed Positions Dataset 2020\_020422.docx. Here are the calculations:

. tab indcom

indcom | Freq. Percent Cum.

------------+-----------------------------------

0 | 1,030 77.91 77.91

1 | 292 22.09 100.00

------------+-----------------------------------

Total | 1,322 100.00

. tab indcom vacant

| vacant

indcom | 0 1 | Total

-----------+----------------------+----------

0 | 28 1,002 | 1,030

1 | 105 187 | 292

-----------+----------------------+----------

Total | 133 1,189 | 1,322

. tab agcyname if vacant==1

agcyname | Freq. Percent Cum.

----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------

ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNIT.. | 1 0.08 0.08

ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVA.. | 1 0.08 0.17

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION | 7 0.59 0.76

AMTRAK | 8 0.67 1.43

APPALACHIAN REGIONAL COMMISSION | 1 0.08 1.51

African Development Bank | 2 0.17 1.68

Asian Development Bank | 2 0.17 1.85

BARRY GOLDWATER SCHOLARSHIP AND EXCEL.. | 8 0.67 2.52

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY | 3 0.25 2.78

CHEMICAL SAFETY AND HAZARD INVESTIGAT.. | 4 0.34 3.11

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION | 1 0.08 3.20

CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU | 1 0.08 3.28

CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION | 2 0.17 3.45

CORPORATION FOR NATIONAL AND COMMUNIT.. | 17 1.43 4.88

COURT SERVICES AND OFFENDER SUPERVISI.. | 1 0.08 4.96

Civil Rights Cold Case Records Review.. | 5 0.42 5.38

Corporation for Public Broadcasting | 4 0.34 5.72

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD | 3 0.25 5.97

DELTA REGIONAL AUTHORITY | 1 0.08 6.06

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE | 15 1.26 7.32

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE | 22 1.85 9.17

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - DEPARTMENT OF.. | 8 0.67 9.84

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - DEPARTMENT OF.. | 8 0.67 10.51

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - DEPARTMENT OF.. | 7 0.59 11.10

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - OFFICE OF THE.. | 35 2.94 14.05

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE--OFFICE OF THE .. | 1 0.08 14.13

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION | 15 1.26 15.39

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OFFICE OF THE.. | 1 0.08 15.48

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY | 22 1.85 17.33

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICE OF THE IN.. | 1 0.08 17.41

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES | 18 1.51 18.92

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVIC.. | 1 0.08 19.01

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY | 16 1.35 20.35

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY OFFIC.. | 1 0.08 20.44

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVEL.. | 12 1.01 21.45

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVEL.. | 1 0.08 21.53

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE | 216 18.17 39.70

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR | 14 1.18 40.87

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR OFFICE OF INSPECT.. | 1 0.08 40.96

DEPARTMENT OF STATE | 266 22.37 63.33

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF THE INS.. | 1 0.08 63.41

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR | 16 1.35 64.76

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR OFFICE OF .. | 1 0.08 64.84

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY | 30 2.52 67.37

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY OFFICE OF .. | 1 0.08 67.45

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY SPECIAL IN.. | 1 0.08 67.54

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY TAX ADMINI.. | 1 0.08 67.62

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION | 18 1.51 69.13

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE O.. | 1 0.08 69.22

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS | 11 0.93 70.14

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE.. | 1 0.08 70.23

Denali Commission | 1 0.08 70.31

Department of Defense | 1 0.08 70.40

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY | 12 1.01 71.40

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY OFFIC.. | 1 0.08 71.49

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION | 1 0.08 71.57

EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND .. | 1 0.08 71.66

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT | 24 2.02 73.68

EXPORT-IMPORT BANK | 3 0.25 73.93

EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OFFICE OF THE INSP.. | 1 0.08 74.01

European Bank for Reconstruction and .. | 1 0.08 74.10

FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION | 1 0.08 74.18

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION | 2 0.17 74.35

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION | 3 0.25 74.60

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION | 3 0.25 74.85

FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY | 2 0.17 75.02

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY | 1 0.08 75.11

FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION | 2 0.17 75.27

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SE.. | 1 0.08 75.36

FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW.. | 2 0.17 75.53

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM | 2 0.17 75.69

FEDERAL RETIREMENT THRIFT INVESTMENT .. | 5 0.42 76.11

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | 1 0.08 76.20

Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corpora.. | 5 0.42 76.62

Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund | 2 0.17 76.79

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION | 1 0.08 76.87

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION OFFIC.. | 1 0.08 76.96

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABIILTY OFFICE | 1 0.08 77.04

Harry S Truman Scholarship Foundation | 8 0.67 77.71

INSTITUTE OF MUSEUM AND LIBRARY SERVI.. | 1 0.08 77.80

INTER-AMERICAN FOUNDATION | 10 0.84 78.64

INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION | 3 0.25 78.89

Inter-American Development Bank | 2 0.17 79.06

International Monetary Fund | 2 0.17 79.23

James Madison Memorial Fellowship Fou.. | 6 0.50 79.73

Legal Services Corporation | 9 0.76 80.49

MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION | 3 0.25 80.74

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD | 3 0.25 80.99

MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION | 1 0.08 81.08

MORRIS K UDALL SCHOLARSHIP AND EXCELL.. | 9 0.76 81.83

Metropolitan Washington Airport Autho.. | 3 0.25 82.09

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINI.. | 3 0.25 82.34

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINI.. | 1 0.08 82.42

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINIS.. | 1 0.08 82.51

NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS | 20 1.68 84.19

NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES | 18 1.51 85.70

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD | 2 0.17 85.87

NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD | 3 0.25 86.12

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION | 2 0.17 86.29

NORTHERN BORDER REGIONAL COMMISSION | 1 0.08 86.38

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | 1 0.08 86.46

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE .. | 1 0.08 86.54

National Association of Registered Ag.. | 13 1.09 87.64

National Consumer Cooperative Bank | 3 0.25 87.89

National Institute of Building Sciences | 6 0.50 88.39

Northern Great Plains Regional Author.. | 1 0.08 88.48

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW.. | 1 0.08 88.56

OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS | 1 0.08 88.65

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT | 2 0.17 88.81

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT OFFICE.. | 1 0.08 88.90

OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL | 1 0.08 88.98

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR FOR NATIONAL I.. | 6 0.50 89.49

OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL COORDINATOR ALA.. | 1 0.08 89.57

PEACE CORPS | 17 1.43 91.00

PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION | 1 0.08 91.08

POSTAL REGULATORY COMMISSION | 1 0.08 91.17

PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT.. | 1 0.08 91.25

PUERTO RICO FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND M.. | 6 0.50 91.76

RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD OFFICE OF T.. | 1 0.08 91.84

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION | 1 0.08 91.93

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION | 3 0.25 92.18

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION OFFICE .. | 1 0.08 92.26

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION | 5 0.42 92.68

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION OFFICE.. | 1 0.08 92.77

Securities Investor Protection Corpor.. | 5 0.42 93.19

Southeast Crescent Regional Commission | 1 0.08 93.27

Southwest Border Regional Commission | 1 0.08 93.36

Special Panel on Appeals | 1 0.08 93.44

St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corpo.. | 5 0.42 93.86

State Justice Institute | 11 0.93 94.79

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY | 3 0.25 95.04

TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT AGENCY | 1 0.08 95.12

U.S. AGENCY FOR GLOBAL MEDIA | 10 0.84 95.96

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONA.. | 14 1.18 97.14

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONA.. | 1 0.08 97.22

UNITED STATES ELECTION ASSISTANCE COM.. | 3 0.25 97.48

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE | 12 1.01 98.49

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPME.. | 4 0.34 98.82

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COM.. | 3 0.25 99.07

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE | 5 0.42 99.50

United States Sentencing Commission | 6 0.50 100.00

----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------

Total | 1,189 100.00

1. See David E. Lewis & Mark D. Richardson, *The Very Best People: President Trump and the Management of Executive Branch Personnel*, 51 Presidential Stud. Q. 51 (2021) for another use of this data (hereinafter, Lewis and Richardson, *The Very Best People*). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. This includes bureaus and offices within the fifteen executive departments, agencies within the Executive Office of the President, and 66 federal agencies outside the executive departments. We used David E. Lewis and Jennifer L. Selin, *Sourcebook of United States Executive Agencies* (2012) to create our list of workplaces. Agencies in the Executive Office of the President were identified using Table 1. We excluded the Executive Residence, Office of Administration, and White House Office. Prominent bureaus and agencies within executive departments were identified using Table 2. The research team made limited adjustments to this list based on which agencies and bureaus the team wanted to be able to analyze separately from the executive department as a whole. Agencies outside the executive departments were identified using Table 5. Scholarship agencies, regional agencies, and non-profits and cooperatives were excluded. Other limited adjustments were made by the research team. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. This includes all Senate-confirmed appointees (PAS), other presidential appointees not requiring Senate confirmation (PA), non-career SES (NA), and Schedule C (SC) appointees. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. See: https://www.leadershipconnect.io/. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. This section borrows heavily from the document “ABOUT THE SURVEY ON THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT SERVICE” available with the description of the 2014 Survey on the Future of Government Service at (<https://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/research/MethodsDocument.pdf>). Mark D. Richardson wrote this document describing the 2014 survey methodology. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. This section borrows heavily from the document “SFGS 2020 Methods: Sample Construction, Weighting, and Agency List,” on file with the author. Mark D. Richardson wrote this document describing the 2020 survey methodology. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. For further details on the surveys, see Mark Richardson, *Politicization and Expertise, Effort, and Investment*, 81 J. Pol. 878 (2019), and Lewis & Richardson, *The Very Best People*. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. For details of the 2014 survey timeline and procedure see <https://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/research/MethodsDocument.pdf> and for 2020 see the document, “SFGS 2020 Methods” included with this memo. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. We refer to the participation rate since many respondents started but did not complete the whole survey. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Stephanie Marken, *Still Listening: The State of Telephone Surveys*, Gallup Methodology Blog, (January 11, 2018) https://news.gallup.com/opinion/methodology/225143/listening-state-telephone-surveys.aspx. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. For other work using these or similar numerical estimates based upon ratings in the Survey on the Future of Government Service see Mark D. Richardson, Joshua D. Clinton, & David E. Lewis, *Elite Perceptions of Agency Ideology and Workforce Skill*, 80 J. Pol. 303 (2018) (hereinafter Richardson et al, *Elite Perceptions*) and David E. Lewis, Mark D. Richardson, & Eric Rosenthal, *OMB In Its Management Role: Evidence from Surveys of Federal Executives*, *in* Executive Policymaking: The Role of the OMB in the Presidency (Meena Bose & Andrew Rudalevige, eds*.*,Brookings Inst. Press 2020). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. For the purposes of department-wide averages (i.e., where the question asks about an entire department), we use only the responses of employees working in the Office of the Secretary. These respondents were asked about the whole department while other respondents were asked specifically about sub-units of the larger departments. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. See September 2020 data from the Office of Personnel Management (<https://www.fedscope.opm.gov/>, accessed February 6, 2022). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. For full details on the methods employed see the appendix to Richardson et al, *Elite Perceptions* (<https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/suppl/10.1086/694846/suppl_file/170307Appendix.pdf>). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. For full details of the skills ratings see Richardson, et al, *Elite Perceptions* (<https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/suppl/10.1086/694846/suppl_file/170307Appendix.pdf>). The appendix includes all the relevant details. For details of the influence ratings see David E. Lewis, Mark D. Richardson, and Eric Rosenthal, “OMB in its Management Role: Evidence from Surveys of Federal Executives,” In Meena Bose and Andrew Rudalevige, eds. *Executive Policymaking: The Role of the OMB in the Presidency.*Washington, DC:Brookings Institution Press (2020).  [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. We can provide any statistical output of these difference of means tests as required and, if necessary, we can work with editorial team members to satisfy any remaining concerns about replication or analysis. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Data for the status of the boards and commissions at the start of the Obama Administration come from Congressional Research Service, "Presidential Appointments to Full-Time Positions on Regulatory and Other Collegial Boards and Commissions, 110th Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, R41463, October 25, 2010 (<https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20101025_R41463_fac4ff94cc535cbc6fd229b4bbc793764d9c0a9d.pdf>). Data for the status of the boards and commissions at the start of the Trump Administration come from Michael Greene and Jared C. Nagel, "Presidential Appointments to Full-Time Positions on Regulatory and Other Collegial Boards and Commissions, 114th Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, R45029 (https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R45029.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-17)