Publications between 1999 and 2009 available on this web site (click here to return to AD’s home page) 

Stampede to Judgment: Persuasive Influence and Herding Behavior by Courts (with J. Reinganum). American Law and Economics Review, Vol. 1, Nos. 1&2, Fall 1999, pp. 158-89. (Published by Oxford University Press for the American Law and Economics Association).

Hush Money (with J. Reinganum). The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 30, No. 4, Winter 1999, pp. 661-78. Supplementary materials: Web Appendix.

Settlement in Bouckaert, B. and G DeGeest (ed.), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics Volume V, Edward Elgar Publishing Co., June 2000, pp. 95-158. Also on the web at the University of Ghent (click either link).

On the Economics of Trials: Adversarial Process, Evidence and Equilibrium Bias (with J. Reinganum). Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 16, No. 2, October 2000, pp. 365-94. (published by Oxford University Press).

Appealing Judgments (with J. Reinganum). The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 31, No. 3, Autumn 2000, pp.502-25.

Informational Externalities in Settlement Bargaining: Confidentiality and Correlated Culpability (with J. Reinganum). The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 33, No. 4, Winter 2002, pp. 587-604. Supplementary material: Web Appendix.

Found Money? Split-Award Statutes and Settlement of Punitive Damages Cases (with J. Reinganum). American Law and Economics Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, Spring 2003, pp. 134-164. (Published by Oxford University Press for the American Law and Economics Association).

Market Structure and the Demand for Free Trade (with O. Balboa and J. Reinganum). Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 13, No. 1, Spring 2004, pp.125-150. Supplementary material: Web Appendix.

Exploiting Future Settlements: A Signaling Model of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement Bargaining (with J. Reinganum). The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 35, No. 3, Autumn 2004, pp. 467-485. Supplementary material: Web Appendix.

Secrecy and Safety (with J. Reinganum). American Economic Review, Vol. 95, No. 4, September 2005, pp. 1074-91. Supplementary material: Web Appendix.

Economic Theories of Settlement Bargaining (with J. Reinganum). Annual Review of Law and Social Sciences, Vol. 1, December 2005, pp. 35-59.

Speaking Up: A Model of Judicial Dissent and Discretionary Review (with J. Reinganum). Supreme Court Economic Review, Vol. 14, 2006, pp. 1-41. Supplementary material: Web Appendix.

Markets, Torts and Social Inefficiency (with J. Reinganum). The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 37, No. 2, Summer 2006, pp. 300-23. Supplementary material: Web Appendix.

Competition and Confidentiality: Signaling Quality in a Duopoly Model (with J. Reinganum). Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 58, No. 1, January 2007, pp. 94-120. Supplementary material: Web Appendix.

Cournot Competition. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, 2008, Palgrave Macmillan, reproduced with permission of Palgrave Macmillan. Supplementary material: Excel file with Extended Cournot Model Bibliography 2001-2005.

Imperfect Competition and Quality Signaling (with J. Reinganum). The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 39, No. 1, Spring 2008, pp. 163-183.

Products Liability, Signaling & Disclosure (with J. Reinganum). Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 164, No. 1, March 2008, pp. 106-126. Supplementary material: Web Appendix.

Communicating Quality: A Unified Model of Disclosure & Signaling (with J. Reinganum). The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 39, No. 4, Winter 2008, pp. 973-989. Supplementary material: Referenced working paper. For a correction of the example in Section 4, see Levent Celik, 2013.

Hidden Talents: Complementary Entrepreneurship and Pareto-Improving Private Information (with J. Reinganum). Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 18, No. 3, Fall 2009, pp. 901-934. Supplementary material: Supplementary Appendix.