{"id":660,"date":"2018-07-18T15:04:55","date_gmt":"2018-07-18T20:04:55","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/my.vanderbilt.edu\/davidlewis\/?page_id=660"},"modified":"2026-06-11T14:54:02","modified_gmt":"2026-06-11T19:54:02","slug":"data-articles","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/my.vanderbilt.edu\/davidlewis\/data-articles\/","title":{"rendered":"Articles"},"content":{"rendered":"

\u201cObtaining Comparable Measures of Organizational Performance: An Application to U.S. Federal Agencies, 2002-2024,\u201d<\/a> (with George A. Krause),\u00a0Journal of Policy Analysis and Management<\/i> 45(1):1-20 (2026) [Data]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cPresident Trump and the Federal Personnel System: Theory and Practice,\u201d<\/a>\u00a0PS: Political Science & Politics<\/i>, forthcoming (2026) [Data]<\/a><\/p>\n

“Measuring the Impact of Appointee Vacancies on U.S. Federal Agency Performance,”<\/a> (with Mark D. Richardson and Chris Piper), Journal of Politics, forthcoming. [Data]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cPresidential Investment in the Administrative State,\u201d<\/a> (with Nick Bednar) American Political Science Review<\/em>, 118(1):442-57(2024) [Data]<\/a> [Webpage]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cThe Independent Agency Myth,\u201d<\/a> (with Neal Devins), Cornell Law Review<\/em>, forthcoming. [Data]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cDo Vacancies Hurt Federal Agency Performance?\u201d<\/a> (with Christopher M. Piper), Journal of Public <\/em>Administration Research & Theory <\/em>33(2):313-28 (2023). [Data<\/a>] [Codebook<\/a>] [STATA batch file for all analysis<\/a>] [R code for figures<\/a>] [Readme for replication<\/a>]<\/p>\n

“The Very Best People: President Trump and the Management of Executive Personnel.”<\/a> (with Mark D. Richardson) Presidential Studies Quarterly <\/em>51 (1): 51-70 (2021). [Data]<\/a> [Codebook]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cExecutive Control and Turnover in the Senior Executive Service,\u201d<\/a> (with Kathleen Doherty and Scott Limbocker) Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory<\/em> [Data request\u2014IRB restrictions<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cPresident Trump as Manager: Reflections on the First Year.\u201d<\/a> (with Patrick Bernhard and Emily H. You) Presidential Studies Quarterly <\/em>48(3):480-501. [Data for Figure 2 and Appendix A]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cElite Perceptions of Agency Ideology and Workforce Skill.\u201d<\/a> (with Mark D. Richardson and Joshua D. Clinton) Journal of Politics<\/em> 80(1):303-7 (2018). [Ideology estimates] [Ideology estimates codebook<\/a>] [Skills estimates<\/a>] [Skills estimates codebook<\/a>] [Dataverse page link<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cAgency Performance Challenges and Agency Politicization.\u201d<\/a> (with Abby K. Wood) Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory<\/em> 27(4):581-95 (2017). [Data]<\/a> [Codebook<\/a>] [STATA batch file for replication]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cPolitical Control and the Forms of Agency Independence.\u201d<\/a> (with Jennifer L. Selin) George Washington Law Review<\/em> 83(4\/5):1487-1516 (2015). [Selin data]<\/a> [Selin data codebook<\/a>] [Selin website<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cPresidents and Patronage.\u201d<\/a> (with Gary E. Hollibaugh, Jr. and Gabe Horton), American Journal of Political Science <\/em>58(4):1024-1042 (2014). [Data]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cInfluencing the Bureaucracy: The Irony of Congressional Oversight.\u201d<\/a> (with Joshua D. Clinton and Jennifer L. Selin), American Journal of Political Science <\/em>58(2):387-401 (2014). [Replication files]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cGovernment Reform, Political Ideology, and Administrative Burden: The Case of Performance Management in the Bush Administration.\u201d<\/a> (with St\u00e9phane Lavertu and Donald P. Moynihan) Public Administration Review<\/em> 73(6):845-57 (2013).<\/p>\n

\u201cPolicy Influence, Agency-Specific Expertise, and Exit in the Federal Service.\u201d<\/a> (with Anthony M. Bertelli) Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory<\/em> 23(2):223-245 (2013). [Data request\u2014IRB restrictions<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cPolitics Can Limit Policy Opportunism in Fiscal Institutions: Evidence from Official General Fund Revenue Forecasts in the American States.\u201d<\/a> (with George A. Krause and James Douglas) Journal of Policy Analysis and Management<\/em> 32(2):271-95 (2013). [Data]<\/a> [Codebook<\/a>] [Output<\/a>] [STATA batch files<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cThe Invisible Presidential Appointments: An Examination of Appointments to the Department of Labor, 2001-2011.\u201d<\/a> (with Richard W. Waterman) Presidential Studies Quarterly<\/em> 43 (1): 35-57 (2013). [Data]<\/a> [STATA batch file]<\/a> [Output<\/a>] [Resumes<\/a>] [Coding instructions<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cThe Personnel Process in the Modern Presidency.\u201d<\/a> Presidential Studies Quarterly<\/em> 42(3):577-96 (2012). [Data<\/a>] [Figures<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cSeparated Powers in the United States.\u201d<\/a> (with Joshua D. Clinton, Anthony M. Bertelli, Christian Grose, and David C. Nixon) American Journal of Political Science<\/em> 56(2):341-54 (2012). [Estimates<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cThe Consequences of Presidential Patronage for Agency Performance.\u201d<\/a> (with Nick Gallo) Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory<\/em>. 22(2): 219-243 (2012). [Data<\/a>] [STATA batch file<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cPresidential Appointments and Personnel.\u201d<\/a> Annual Review of Political Science <\/em>14 (June):47-66 (2011).<\/p>\n

“Measurement and Public Service Motivation: New Insights, Old Questions.”<\/a> International Public Management Journal<\/em> 13(1):1-10 (2010).<\/p>\n

\u201cModern Presidents and the Transformation of the Federal Personnel System.\u201d <\/a>The<\/em>Forum<\/em>, 7(4): Article 6 (2010). [Data for Figure 1<\/a>] [Data for Figure 2]<\/p>\n

\u201cRevisiting the Administrative Presidency: Policy, Patronage, and Administrative Competence.\u201d<\/a> Presidential Studies Quarterly<\/em> 39 (1):60-73 (2009).<\/p>\n

\u201cManagement and Leadership Performance in the Defense Department: Evidence from Surveys of Federal Employees.\u201d<\/a> (with Major Paul S. Oh, U.S. Army) Armed Forces and Society<\/em> 34(4): 639-661 (2008). [Data<\/a>] [STATA batch file<\/a>] [STATA output<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cNot-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design.\u201d<\/a> (with Neal Devins) Boston University Law Review<\/em> 88(2):459-98 (2008). [Data<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cExpert Opinion, Agency Characteristics, and Agency Preferences.\u201d<\/a> (with Joshua D. Clinton) Political Analysis<\/em> 16(1):3-16 (2008). [Agency ideology estimates<\/a>] [Raw data<\/a>] [Codebook<\/a>] [Expert survey<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cToward a Broader Understanding of Presidential Power: A Re-Evaluation of the Two Presidencies Thesis.\u201d<\/a>\u00a0 (with Brandice Canes-Wrone and William G. Howell) Journal of Politics<\/em> 70(1):1-16 (2008). [Data<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cTesting Pendleton\u2019s Premise: Do Political Appointees Make Worse Bureaucrats?\u201d<\/a> Journal of Politics<\/em> 69(4):1073-88 (2007).\u00a0 [PART Data-STATA]<\/a>[PART Data-Excel<\/a>] [codebook]<\/a>[Time-varying covariates]\u00a0 <\/a>[STATA batch file]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cDoes Performance Budgeting Work? An Examination of OMB\u2019s PART Scores.\u201d<\/a> (with John B. Gilmour) Public Administration Review<\/em> 66(5):742-52 (2006). [Data<\/a>][Managers data]<\/a> [STATA batch file]<\/a>[Budget and performance data]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cPolitical Appointments, Civil Service Systems, and Bureaucratic Competence: Organizational Balancing and Gubernatorial Revenue Forecasts in the American States.\u201d<\/a> (with George Krause and James Douglas) American Journal of Political Science<\/em> 50(3):770-87 (2006).\u00a0[Data]<\/a> [Codebook<\/a>] [STATA batch file]\u00a0[Stata output]<\/a>[Additional data – excluding certain cases]<\/a>[Auxiliary output]<\/a>[Auxiliary analyses]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cAssessing Performance Budgeting at OMB: The Influence of Politics, Performance, and Program Size.\u201d<\/a> (with John B. Gilmour) Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory<\/em> 16(2):169-86 (2006). [Note<\/a>] [Data\u2014cohort 1<\/a>] [Data \u2013cohort 2<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cPolitical Appointees and the Competence of Federal Program Management.\u201d<\/a> (with John B. Gilmour) American Politics Research<\/em> 34(1):22-50 (2006). [PART data<\/a>] [Time-varying covariates]<\/a>[STATA batch file<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cStaffing Alone: Unilateral Action and the Politicization of the Executive Office of the President, 1988-2004.\u201d<\/a> Presidential Studies Quarterly<\/em> 35(3):496-514 (2005). [Data<\/a>] [Data-time-varying covariates<\/a>] [STATA batch file]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cPolitical Learning from Rare Events: Poisson Inference, Fiscal Constraints and the Lifetime of Bureaus.\u201d<\/a> (with Daniel C. Carpenter) Political Analysis<\/em> 12(3):201-32 (2004). [Data\u2014Excel<\/a>] [Data\u2014STATA<\/a>] [STATA batch file<\/a>] [Note<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cThe Adverse Consequences of the Politics of Agency Design for Presidential Management in the United States: The Relative Durability of Insulated Agencies.\u201d<\/a> British Journal of Political Science<\/em> 34:377-404 (2004). [Data\u2014Excel<\/a>] [Data\u2014STATA<\/a>] [STATA batch file<\/a>] [Note<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cThe Irrational Escalation of Commitment and the Ironic Labor Politics of the Rust Belt.\u201d<\/a> (with Glenn Beamer) Enterprise and Society<\/em> 4(4):676-306 (2003). [Data\u2014Mills<\/a>] [Data\u2014Companies]<\/a>[STATA batch file<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cAgencies by Presidential Design.\u201d<\/a> (with William G. Howell) Journal of Politics <\/em>64(4):1095-1114 (2002). [Data<\/a>] [Figures<\/a>] [STATA batch file<\/a>]<\/p>\n

\u201cThe Politics of Agency Termination:\u00a0 Confronting the Myth of Agency Immortality.\u201d<\/a> Journal of Politics<\/em> 64(1):89-107 (2002). [Data<\/a>] [Figures<\/a>] [STATA batch file<\/a>]<\/p>\n

“What Time Is It? The Use of Power in Four Different Types of Presidential Time.”<\/a> (with James Michael Strine) Journal of Politics<\/em> 58(3):682-706 (1996). [Data<\/a>]<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

\u201cObtaining Comparable Measures of Organizational Performance: An Application to U.S. Federal Agencies, 2002-2024,\u201d (with George A. Krause),\u00a0Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 45(1):1-20 (2026) [Data] \u201cPresident Trump and the Federal Personnel System: Theory and Practice,\u201d\u00a0PS: Political Science & Politics, forthcoming (2026) [Data] “Measuring the Impact of Appointee Vacancies on U.S. Federal Agency Performance,” (with Mark…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1282,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"tags":[10],"class_list":["post-660","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry","tag-httpss3-amazonaws-comvu-mywp-contentuploadssites41120180716141446woodlewisfoia2018-zip"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/my.vanderbilt.edu\/davidlewis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/660","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/my.vanderbilt.edu\/davidlewis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/my.vanderbilt.edu\/davidlewis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/my.vanderbilt.edu\/davidlewis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1282"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/my.vanderbilt.edu\/davidlewis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=660"}],"version-history":[{"count":183,"href":"https:\/\/my.vanderbilt.edu\/davidlewis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/660\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1358,"href":"https:\/\/my.vanderbilt.edu\/davidlewis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/660\/revisions\/1358"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/my.vanderbilt.edu\/davidlewis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=660"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/my.vanderbilt.edu\/davidlewis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=660"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}