We contend that the boundaries and nature of national attachments are shaped by the position of one’s group within America’s racial order, with higher status yielding more racially exclusive forms of identity. We test our claims in the realm of xenophobia. Using an original survey of African Americans (n = 1,000) and Whites (n = 1,000), we assess national pride, nationalism, nativism, and racial identity, plus affect toward various immigrant groups. We establish that national attachments have racially varied meanings, thereby producing sharp differences in each racial group’s response to foreigners. Although national pride is unrelated to White antipathy toward outsiders, nationalism and nativism increase White hostility to immigrants—except when they are White. In contrast, national pride diminishes African American hostility to Black and non-Black immigrants, while nativism is generally unrelated to Black antipathy to outsiders. Finally, while nationalism heightens xenophobia among Blacks, this sentiment envelops all foreigners—including African immigrants. We discuss our results’ implications for theories of national attachment in intergroup settings.

KEY WORDS: racial and national identities, hierarchy, social identity theory

Despite the many differences separating individual countrymen, national attachments galvanize Americans toward various political ends, including voting (Huddy & Khatib, 2007), presidential approval (Kam & Ramos, 2008), and policy support (Transue, 2007) (cf. Theiss-Morse, 2009; Wong, 2010). Yet missing from this scholarship is a deeper sense about how race shapes the content of national attachments, i.e., the boundaries and nature giving them meaning (Brewer, 1999; Finell, Ola-kivi, Liebkind, & Lipsanen, 2013; Meeus, Duriez, Vanbeselaere, & Boen, 2010; Pehrson, Brown, & Zagelka, 2009; Pehrson, Vignoles, & Brown, 2009).

Studies show that Whites express stronger national attachment than non-Whites (e.g., patriotism, nationalism, national identity) (Kunovich, 2009; Sidanius & Petrocik, 2001; Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, & Pratto, 1997; Theiss-Morse, 2009; but see Citrin, Wong, & Duff, 2001; Schildkraut, 2007)—a pattern also displayed by non-U.S. racial majorities and minorities (Elkins & Sides, 2007; Sidanius et al., 1997). Other work finds dissimilarity in the bond between national and racial identity (Dowley & Silver, 2000; Sidanius & Petrocik, 2001; Sidanius et al.1997; Sinclair, Sidanius, & Levin, 1998), with Whites displaying a positive correlation and non-Whites a null or negative one—a pattern also unearthed cross-nationally (Staerklé, Sidanius, Green, & Molina, 2010).
Nevertheless, these research traditions treat racial variation in national attachments as reflecting differences in degree, not kind. Members of distinct racial groups often express dissimilar levels of national attachment (Dowley & Silver, 2000; Huddy & Khatib, 2007; Sidanius & Petrocik, 2001; Sidanius et al. 1997; Theiss-Morse, 2009). Yet these studies presume that all Americans share a uniform sense of national pride, nationalism, and other attachments. Thus, while these forms of identity are diverse (Citrin et al., 2001; Parker, 2010; Schildkraut, 2007), their meaning is thought to be widely held (Huddy, 2001). This suggests that when people from different racial groups share a national attachment—say, nativism—they should respond similarly to outgroups—that is, with antipathy (Higham, 1981).

We reconsider this link between race and nation. Our point of departure is the contested incorporation of U.S. racial minorities into the nation, which has yielded a stable hierarchy where Whites enjoy higher status than non-Whites (Dawson, 2000; Kim, 2003; Masuoka & Junn, 2013). Drawing mainly on social identity theory (SIT) (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), we merge insights from Social Domination Theory (SDT) (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and System Justification Theory (SJT) (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004) to derive a basic claim: status asymmetries shape people’s national attachments and how these notions structure reactions to outgroups.

We argue that Whites’ higher rank in the racial order prompts the formation of national attachments that bolster this station. Per SIT, we reason that when Whites imagine other Americans, they think of exemplars from their race (Devis & Banaji, 2005), which yields identities that are racially restricted and hostile to outgroups that threaten this distinct nature (Brewer, 1999). This aligns with the view that majority group members project their traits onto higher-order groups (e.g., nations) that contain their subgroup (e.g., Whites), thus positively distinguishing themselves from a minority (e.g., Blacks) under the same superordinate category (ingroup projection model; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Wenzel, Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2007). Our claim also meshes with SDT’s insight that members of dominant groups exhibit a “keen sense of ownership of the nation and its symbols” (Peña & Sidanius, 2002, p. 783; Sidanius & Petrocik, 2001; Sidanius et al., 1997)—what SJT calls a “sense of entitlement” (Jost et al., 2004, p. 906).

In contrast, non-Whites’ lower post in the racial order contests their national belonging. We argue that this leads them to forgo projecting their traits onto national groups (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) and instead modify the content of national attachments (cf. Finell et al., 2013; Meeus et al., 2010; Pehrson, Brown, & Zagefka, 2009; Pehrson, Vignoles, & Brown, 2009), what SIT calls social creativity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Reality often limits minorities’ ingroup projection. History, power—even common sense—can “make it seem preposterous for a [minority] group to claim to be...prototypical (Wenzel et al., 2007, p. 343).” Moreover, SDT teaches that racial orders are stable (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) because, says SJT, majorities and minorities internalize their statuses (Jost et al., 2004). Thus, insofar as non-Whites’ lower rank impugns their national membership, they will defuse this threat in a way that still facilitates distinctiveness via national group(s). We think this occurs by forming identities with broader racial borders and less exclusive natures, which distinguishes non-White attachments from Whites’ racially delimited forms.

We test our claims by revisiting the link between national identity and xenophobia among U.S. Blacks and Whites.¹ Stronger national identity promotes xenophobic attitudes (Rensmann & Miller, 2010), but some forms of this attachment stimulate this sentiment more. For example, while national pride is unrelated to xenophobia, such antipathy is responsive to nationalism, a chauvinistic sense of national superiority (deFigueiredo & Elkins, 2003). Others, meanwhile, trace xenophobia to nativism, a fierce favoritism toward native-born countrymen (Higham, 1981). But these analyses often make no racial distinctions about the ties between these identities and xenophobia. We thus commissioned a survey of Black (n =1,000) and White Americans (n = 1,000) with measures of national pride,

¹ We define xenophobia (a.k.a., xenophobic attitudes, hostility to immigrants) as expressed antipathy to foreigners.
nationalism, nativism, and racial identity, plus ratings of African, Asian, Latino, and White immigrants. We will use these data to show that Blacks and Whites construe the boundaries and nature of their national identities differently, with these nuances yielding clear differences in how Blacks and Whites react to immigrants. But lest we get too ahead of ourselves, let us expand on the theoretical framework guiding our inquiry.

**Imagining the Same Nation: Social Identity Theory**

The study of national attachments has been strongly shaped by social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and its offshoot, self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). SIT says that when a group’s salience increases, people identify with it and use its identity to guide their behavior (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flamente, 1971). The internalization of identity is cemented through one’s perceived similarity to a group’s prototype (McGarty, Turner, Hogg, David, & Wetherell, 1992). As Anderson (1983) observes, “members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (p. 6).

Group identification leads people to differentiate their ingroup from outgroups to enhance the former’s positive distinctiveness (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This yields ingroup favoritism. Yet ingroup “love” and outgroup “hate” are not automatically connected (Brewer, 1999). Their association hinges on factors like whether an identity prescribes antipathy toward outgroups (Brewer, 1999). For example, national pride and nationalism promote commitment to the nation. But unlike national pride, nationalism is inherently comparative and chauvinistic. Thus, while nationalists are xenophobic, patriots are not (deFigueiredo & Elkins, 2003).

Since people are theorized to imagine the same prototype when engaging an identity, it is often presumed an identity’s meaning is uniform. Take “minimal group” studies where identities are experimentally induced to observe their effects (Tajfel et al., 1971). Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior (2004), for example, have shown that priming people to identify as Dutch citizens boosts immigration opposition (cf. Transue, 2007). This approach affirms the link between categorization and identification, yet focuses on “simple group boundaries while ignoring their internal meaning” (Huddy, 2001, p. 130). Perhaps, then, only a subset of those categorized share a uniform sense of national identity and drive collective behavior.

Other scholars, in turn, gauge national attachment via self-reports (Citrin et al., 2001; Parker, 2010; Schildkraut, 2011; Theiss-Morse, 2009), revealing multiple forms of national identity. But these measures are rarely validated cross-racially, making it unclear whether they tap similar forms of identity across diverse groups. Moreover, even if these measures capture the same national identities across race, it is uncertain whether they similarly influence outgroup attitudes among members of distinct racial ingroups.

Insights from the ingroup projection model (IPM) further hint at possible subgroup differences in the content of national attachments (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Wenzel et al., 2007). IPM stipulates that higher-order categories (e.g., nation) serve as a comparison point for subgroups (e.g., race) under these superordinate identities (cf. Transue, 2007). Specifically, members of a nested subgroup project their traits onto a higher-order group, allowing them to perceive their subgroup as more prototypical of the superordinate category, which yields positive distinctiveness for the projecting group. A subgroup’s appropriation of a higher-order category shows how the boundaries and nature of superordinate identities can be shaped. But as IPM theorists acknowledge, their “research has...focused on the perspective of majorities, but it is minorities...who are likely to find social reality to be a stumbling block for claims of prototypicality” (Wenzel et al., 2007, p. 364).
Racial Hierarchy and Shades of National Attachment

Since America’s inception, race has structured the formal and informal ties of individuals to the nation, thus helping to erect a lasting racial order where Whites hold higher status than non-Whites (Dawson, 2000; Kim, 2003; Masuoka & Junn, 2013; Sidanius et al., 1997). For example, although the 1964 Civil Rights Act outlawed racially discriminatory practices (e.g., housing segregation, voter fraud), durable racial disparities persist, as evidenced by, inter alia, higher incarceration and poverty rates among Blacks relative to Whites (Conley, 1999; Weaver & Lerman, 2010). America’s racial hierarchy is thus often characterized as having stable group relations and largely impermeable group boundaries (Ho, Sidanius, Levin, & Banaji, 2011).²

When hierarchies display these features, SIT predicts responses that reflect an ingroup’s rank (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Members of higher status groups express attitudes that reinforce this station, thus preserving the positive distinctiveness derived from their membership. The reaction is different among members of low-status groups, whose rank works against achieving positive distinctiveness. One could arguably attain distinctiveness by entering the higher-status group. But this works only if group boundaries are permeable (Jackson, Sullivan, Harnish, & Hodge, 1996). When they are not, members of low-status groups engage in social creativity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), where they recast their comparison to the higher status group in more favorable terms. This does not entail actual changes in group status. It only requires facilitating distinctiveness.

In America’s racial hierarchy, these insights suggest that Whites will form national attachments that buttress their higher position. Thus, Whites will imagine other Whites as exemplars of the nation (Devos & Banaji, 2005; McGarty et al., 1992), thereby yielding attachments that are delimited to members of their race and hostile to outgroups that jeopardize this unique character (Brewer, 1999). In the logic of the ingroup projection model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999), Whites will generalize their ingroup’s traits to nation-level groups (e.g., patriots), thus asserting their greater prototypicality as Americans.

In turn, non-Whites’ lower tier in the hierarchy impugns their membership in the nation, which limits positive distinctiveness via national identity. Indeed, if White national attachments are racially restricted, as we argue, then non-Whites will find it hard to claim these. Thus, to attain distinctiveness via a national group, non-Whites will engage in social creativity by modifying the content (i.e., boundaries and nature) of national identities (Finell et al., 2013; Meeus et al., 2010; Pehrson, Brown, & Zagefka, 2009). Such revisions allow non-Whites to counter the threat of exclusion implied by White forms of national identity, while still gaining distinctiveness on that category’s basis. We believe this occurs by differentiating the revised versions of attachment from Whites’ racially exclusive varieties. That is, non-Whites will form national identities with broader borders and less racially restricted natures than those engaged by Whites.

Our reasoning is enhanced by Social Dominance Theory (Peña & Sidanius, 2002; Sidanius & Petrocik, 2001; Sidanius et al., 1997; Sinclair et al., 1998; Staerklé et al., 2010) and System Justification Theory (Jost & Kay, 2005; Jost et al., 2004; Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003; Jost & Burgess, 2000; van der Toorn, Nail, Liviatan, & Jost, 2014). SDT teaches that in racial orders, the dominant group “regards itself as having...ownership of the nation, its resources, and its symbols” (Sidanius et al., 1997, p. 105), thus producing attitudinal asymmetries between racial groups with varied status (Sidanius et al., 1997; Sinclair et al., 1998; Staerklé et al., 2010). For instance, dominant racial groups express stronger national attachment than subordinate ones (Sidanius et al., 1997). Moreover, within dominant racial groups, stronger national attachment correlates with ethnocentrism (Sidanius & Petrocik, 2001) and support for ideologies that legitimate group inequalities (Peña & Sidanius,

² This, despite intragroup heterogeneity (Hochschild & Weaver, 2007).
In parallel, SJT suggests that people often engage in system justification: “the process by which existing social arrangements are legitimized, even at the expense of personal and group interest” (Jost & Banaji, 1994, p. 2). SJT shows that in social arrangements like racial orders, dominant and subordinate groups engage in behaviors that uphold the status quo (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Burgess, 2000; Jost et al., 2003; see also Lane, Mitchell, & Banaji, 2005). Among dominants, this can manifest itself in a heightened sense of entitlement and greater support for ideologies justifying group inequalities (Jost et al., 2004). Among subordinates, this can reveal itself in the internalization of negative ingroup attitudes and beliefs (Jost & Banaji, 1994). This suggests that insofar as social creativity enables racial minorities to attain distinctiveness via national attachment(s), it ultimately maintains rather than upends the racial order.

Race, Nation, and Xenophobia: Hypotheses

We test our claims by examining xenophobic attitudes among African Americans and Whites: two groups whose “relative ordering has remained constant” across U.S. history (Masuoka & Junn, 2013, p. 5). Across different immigration waves, Blacks and Whites have wrestled with thorny questions about who qualifies as members of the nation and on what grounds (King, 2000; Shankman, 1982). In the current era, increases in non-European immigrants are leading many Americans to ask themselves again: who are we (Huntington, 2004)?

We believe the answer depends on the social status of one’s racial group. National identity is generally tied to xenophobia (Rensmann & Miller, 2010), but how race affects this link is unclear. Xenophobia studies favor explanations centered on economic self-interest (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). And, when scholars study its cultural basis (e.g., national attachments) (Sides & Citrin, 2007), they often overlook whether such factors operate similarly across racial groups. These patterns are partly reflected in the few studies examining xenophobia among racial minorities. For example, many African Americans share neighborhoods and labor markets with foreigners, yet explanations of Black hostility to immigrants stress economic interests, not national attachments (Diamond, 1998; Gay, 2006; McClain et al., 2007).

Our focus on xenophobia—i.e., anti-immigrant feelings—aligns with studies on national identity’s implications for hostility to foreigners (cf. Finell et al., 2013; Meeus et al., 2010). We unpack xenophobia into specific groups to provide nuance about which immigrants provoke stronger reactions. By studying feelings toward immigrants, we also isolate xenophobia’s affective base, which is indistinguishable from its cognitive elements in some studies (e.g., Pehrson, Brown, & Zagefka, 2009).

We contend that group status in a racial order shapes the content of national attachments and their influence on xenophobia. Thus, relative to Blacks, Whites will form more racially exclusive national identities (H1). But national identity has varied manifestations, so we derive further hypotheses by defining for each racial group those attachments that prior work furnishes as explanations of xenophobia: national pride, nationalism, and nativism. We also examine racial identity, which is deemed by some as a source of xenophobia (Gerstle, 2001; Saxton, 1971).

National pride is a deep love for one’s country (Conover and Feldman, 1987; Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989). It is related to symbolic patriotism (Parker, 2010), which also entails positive affect toward the nation. Huddy and Khatib (2007) describe national pride as “closely aligned with symbolic interest”(

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3 U.S. Whites and non-Whites do perceive Whites as the racial group with the highest social status and African Americans as the one with the lowest (Fang, Sidanius, & Pratto, 1998; Kahn, Ho, Sidanius, & Pratto, 2009).
patriotism since both measures reference a sense of pride” (p. 64). National pride stresses satisfaction with national achievements and institutions, as seen in this construct’s measures (deFiguieredo & Elkins, 2003; Dowley & Silver, 2000). Patriotism displays other forms (e.g., blind and constructive patriotism) (Schatz & Staub, 1997), but these are critiqued for being ideologically biased and conceptually blurry (Huddy & Khatib, 2007). National pride is less affected by these concerns.

We predict that national pride is unrelated to xenophobia among Whites (H2a), but inversely related to it among Blacks (H2b). While some scholars find that national pride is decoupled from xenophobia among Blacks and Whites (deFiguieredo & Elkins, 2003), others argue that Blacks’ sense of national pride is distinct from Whites’ because it is tied to aspirations for greater civil rights, drawing on a strong belief in civic ideals denied to Blacks (e.g., equality) (Parker, 2009; Shaw, 2004). By promoting a racially inclusive view of the nation, Black national pride should reduce xenophobia.

**Nationalism** is “a commitment to the denigration of the alternatives to the nation’s institutions and principles” (deFiguieredo & Elkins, 2003, p. 175), which is reciprocally tied to chauvinism toward outsiders (Conover & Feldman, 1987; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Machiavelli, 1532/1984). We posit that nationalism heightens xenophobia among Whites (H3a) and Blacks (H3b), but the pattern will differ between them. Among Whites, nationalism displays an element of racial superiority, where the imagined circle of countrymen is limited to other Whites (Gerstle, 2001). Thus, nationalism should boost White antipathy to non-White foreigners, but not White immigrants. In turn, nationalism among Blacks is also inherently chauvinistic, but without a sense of racial superiority (Parker, 2009). Hence, nationalism among Blacks should boost hostility to all foreigners, including African immigrants.4

**Nativism** favors a nation’s native-born, yielding what Higham (1981) calls an “intense opposition to an internal minority on the ground of its foreign...connections” (p. 4). We hypothesize that nativism boosts xenophobia among Whites (H4a), but it is unrelated to it among Blacks (H4b). White nativists have historically derogated immigrants for allegedly failing to display “American” traits (e.g., speaking English) with the political efforts of White nativists often limiting the privileges of native-born Americans to those who are racially White (King, 2000). Nativism also exists among Blacks. For them, it does not entail hostility to foreigners, since such antipathy is viewed as bolstering White racial hegemony (Shankman, 1982). Thus, Black nativists will favor native-born individuals without denigrating foreigners (Brewer, 1999).

**Racial identity** is attachment to one’s race. We claim it increases xenophobia among Whites (H5a) but is unrelated to it among Blacks (H5b). White racial identity is a stable construct that often fosters negative attitudes toward non-Whites (Arriola, Jacob, & Cole, 2001; Hutchings, Walton, Mickey, & Jardina, 2011). In contrast, Black racial identity is often dissociated from hostility to non-Blacks (Herring et al., 1999), while liberalizing Black public opinion (Dawson, 1994).

**Data and Measures**

We test our claims with an online survey of adult African Americans (\(n = 1,000\)) and Whites (\(n = 1,000\)) run by YouGov/Polimetrix (YGP) from June 17 to 29, 2010.5 Using a proprietary matching algorithm, YGP produces nonprobability samples of opt-in respondents that resemble the benchmark random samples of the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS). YGP surveys

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4 Black nationalism refers to endorsement of a national identity, not a belief system. Black nationalism, the belief system, supports Black political, economic, and cultural autonomy (Davis & Brown, 2002). We omit it because we focus on identities, and it lacks a clear analog among Whites.

5 While it makes sense to also study Native Americans, we did not have the resources to sample this hard-to-reach population. Similar constraints prevented us from sampling Latinos and Asians, who contain English and non-English speakers. YGP only samples English speakers within these groups. And, when firms (e.g., GfK) recruit non-English speakers, such samples are more expensive and raise questions about language effects on opinion reports (Lee & Pérez, 2014). We later discuss our framework’s applicability to non-Blacks.
(e.g., the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study) produce quality data that enable effective prediction of public opinion (Vavreck & Rivers, 2008). Our sample was matched on gender, age, education, partisanship, ideology, and political interest and weighted to known marginals for the U.S. Black and White population from the 2006 ACS.

Our dependent variables are feeling thermometer ratings of African, Asian, Latino, and White immigrants, each on a 0 (unfavorable) to 100 (favorable) scale. We recode these so that higher values reflect greater unfavorability. Our main independent variables are national pride, nationalism, nativism, and racial identity.6 We assess national pride with items gauging pride in (1) the way democracy works in the United States; (2) America’s economic achievements; and (3) America’s history, all running from “not proud at all” (1) to “very proud” (4).7

We tap nationalism with the statements: (1) “The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like Americans”; (2) “Generally speaking, America is no better than most other countries” (reverse-scored); and (3) “Generally, the more influence America has on other nations, the better off they are,” all ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (4).8

We measure nativism with items gauging agreement with whether certain traits make one an American: (1) born in America; (2) being a Christian; (3) lived in the United States most of one’s life; and (4) able to speak English. These traits reflect those historically advanced by nativist movements (cf. King, 2000). Each item runs from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (4).

We tap racial identity with items probing a sense of “linked fate” (Dawson, 1994). One item asks: “Do you think what happens generally to [Black/White] people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?” A second item asks: “Do you think what happens generally to [Black men/White men] in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?” And, our last item queries: “Do you think what happens generally to [Black women/White women] in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?” All three of these items run from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (4).8

Some of our analyses use education, ideology, job concerns, and cultural concerns as covariates. Education runs from no high school to postgraduate education. Ideology is a 5-point item ranging from very liberal to very conservative. Job concerns are gauged through agreement with the statement: “The job prospects of Americans are getting worse.” Cultural concerns are measured via people’s agreement with the statement: “American culture is increasingly endangered.” These items run from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (4).9

Racially Varied Meanings of National Attachments

We first examine whether our national attachment measures capture their target concepts and whether these identities are similarly construed by Blacks and Whites. Table 1 reports a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) of national pride, nationalism, nativism, and racial identity, disaggregated by race. Given the categorical nature of our measures, we run this CFA with robust weighted least squares (WSMV) (Brown, 2006).

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6 Our national attachment items are from the 1996 General Social Survey, except for the “more influence” item, which is from Kosterman and Feshbach (1989). Validating evidence for these items is reported by Citrin et al. (2001), Huddy and Khatib (2007), and Kosterman and Feshbach (1989). Our linked fate items are from the 1993 National Black Politics Study, with Davis and Brown (2002) reporting validating evidence.

7 These items are less effective than those for symbolic patriotism (e.g., “My love for the U.S. is extremely strong”; Parker, 2010), yet consistent with prior work (cf. deFiguieredo and Elkins, 2003).

8 Racial identity is multidimensional. These items reflect the “attachment and sense of interdependence” dimension in Ashmore, Deaux, and T. McLaughlin-Trope’s (2004) taxonomy. We use these items because (1) they are heavily used by political scientists studying Black identity (Davis & Brown, 2002; Dawson, 1994); and (2) scholars are examining whether such items tap identity among non-Black groups (Gay & Hochschild, 2010).

9 Per Sniderman et al. (2004), our economic and cultural threat items decouple the valued object (e.g., jobs) from outgroups presumed to threaten it, so as to better estimate concern about the former.
### Table 1. Confirmatory Factor Analysis of National and Racial Attachments

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<th>National Pride</th>
<th>Nationalism</th>
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<td><strong>National Pride</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pride-history</td>
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<td>Pride-democracy</td>
<td>.876 (.059)</td>
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<td>−1.538 −1.372</td>
<td>−.674 −.553</td>
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<td>.640</td>
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<td>Pride-economy</td>
<td>.922 (.058)</td>
<td>1.030 (.049)</td>
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<td>−1.563 −1.372</td>
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<td>Like Americans</td>
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<td>United States no better (R)</td>
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<td>−1.007 −1.254</td>
<td>−.582 −.559</td>
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<td>.668</td>
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<td>More influence</td>
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<td>1.299</td>
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<td>Speak English</td>
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<td>Live in United States</td>
<td>.607 (.070)</td>
<td>.468 (.062)</td>
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<td>−1.195 −1.211</td>
<td>−.582 −.59</td>
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<td>.459</td>
<td>.504</td>
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<td>Be Christian</td>
<td>1.188 (.110)</td>
<td>1.081 (.082)</td>
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<td>−.285 −.199</td>
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<td>.692</td>
<td>.986</td>
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<td>Born in United States</td>
<td>.340 (.074)</td>
<td>.291 (.065)</td>
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<td>−1.405 −1.259</td>
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<td>Linked fate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Linked – female</td>
<td>.882 (.031)</td>
<td>.690 (.030)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>−1.141 −1.287</td>
<td>−.553 −.653</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.530</td>
<td>.935</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked – male</td>
<td>.858 (.028)</td>
<td>.805 (.032)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>−.964 −1.341</td>
<td>−.496 −.665</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.550</td>
<td>.935</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CFI</strong></td>
<td>.948</td>
<td>.900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TLI</strong></td>
<td>.930</td>
<td>.894</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RMSEA [90% CI]</strong></td>
<td>.070 [.065,.075]</td>
<td>.086 [.082,.091]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Δ in Chi-square</strong></td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Reliable, p &lt; .001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes:* Robust weighted least squares estimates. N = 2,000. One item loading per factor is fixed to 1.00 to identify model. Factors run from 1 to 4 in 1-point units. Entries are unstandardized loadings with standard errors in parentheses. Italicized entries are item thresholds. The first column of entries in each cell is for African Americans. All loadings and thresholds are significant at the 5% level or better.
Diagnostics indicate a well-fitting model, with CFI and TLI above .90 and RMSEA below .10 (Brown, 2006). Moreover, all item thresholds and loadings are reliably estimated, with the magnitude of the latter generally being robust (the first column in each entry provides the estimates for Blacks).

Consider Pride-economy. A unit shift in latent national pride produces a shift of .922 among Blacks and 1.030 among Whites in the response variable underlying this indicator, with comparable results emerging for other items. Close inspection of these parameters, however, reveals some noticeable differences between Blacks and Whites, a tip-off that members of each group might construe these attachments differently (Brown, 2006).

We formally assess whether these racial differences in item loadings and thresholds are statistically meaningful by constraining these parameters to equality across both groups. If this restricted model does not produce a deteriorated fit relative to our unrestricted model in Table 1, then we will infer that these items capture attachments with racially similar meaning (Brown, 2006). But if these constraints yield a restricted model with worse fit, then we will conclude that the items reflect attachments with racially varied meanings. The telltale signs here are shifts in CFI and TLI values greater than .01; RMSEA values closer to .10, and a significant change in the chi-square statistic (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002; Pérez & Hetherington, 2014).

The relevant comparisons are in the last rows of Table 1, under the labels “unrestricted” and “restricted.” There we see that the CFI and TLI drop by more than .01 points to .900 and .894, respectively. Moreover, the RMSEA rises to .086 and the change in chi-square is statistically significant. This suggests that restricting the item loadings and thresholds to equality yields a simpler model with worse fit than one where the same parameters are unrestricted. Thus, these items seem to capture attachments with racially varied meanings.10

Supporting this inference, Table 2 reports the correlations between the varied forms of national and racial attachments, with entries for African Americans denoted by “a.” Insofar as these attachments mean the same thing to Blacks and Whites, we should observe positive and reliable correlations of similar magnitude between racial and national identity. However, in line with prior work, we find that national and racial identity are positively related among Whites, yet negatively related among Blacks (Dowley & Silver, 2000; Phinney, Fergusson, & Tate, 1997; Sidanius & Petrocik, 2001; Sidanius et al., 1997; Sinclair et al., 1998; Staerkelé et al., 2010).11 These results support our claim that racial hierarchy shapes national attachments.12

10 Direct racial comparisons on these identities thus involve “apples” and “oranges” (Pérez & Hetherington, 2014). Given this caveat, we note mean (M) differences in national pride (Black M = .62; White M = .70, p < .001); nationalism (Black M = .46; White M = .57, p < .001); and nativism (Black M = .62; White M = .60, p < .06).

11 This subgroup asymmetry hypothesis (SAH) predicts an intergroup gap in the association between racial and national identity. The SAH anticipates this correlation to be negative or null for minority groups. We also note that the correlation between Black identity and national pride is still negative and reliable (r = −.11, p < .01) if the latter is measured with the one item not referencing pride in U.S. history or democracy.

12 Class is also durable and consequential (Bartels, 2008). But if race underlies the hierarchy between Blacks and Whites, then it should moderate the correlation between these attachments and other constructs suggested by prior research, even after adjusting them for income differences by race (Table A of the online supporting information).
Do national attachments also yield reactions to foreigners that reflect each racial group’s rank in America’s racial order? We answer this by separately modeling Black and White hostility toward each immigrant group as a function of national pride, nationalism, nativism, and racial identity, plus education, ideology, job concerns, and cultural concerns. We use ordinary least squares (OLS), where each attachment is a summated scale, and all variables run on a 0–1 interval. We hypothesized that to preserve their dominant rank, White national attachments will heighten hostility to non-White immigrants, but not White foreigners. Table 3 supports this claim. While national pride is generally unrelated to xenophobia (cf. deFiguieredo & Elkins, 2003), nationalism and nativism generally increase hostility to non-White immigrants. Greater nationalism among Whites heightens antipathy to most non-White foreigners, yet reliably diminishes hostility to White immigrants ($2.07, p < .04$). Similarly, a shift from the lowest to highest nativism level boosts hostility to non-White immigrants by an average of .10 points, but the same shift yields an increase nearly half the size and outside conventional significance levels for White immigrants (.05, $p > .09$). Figure 1 displays the marginal effects of nationalism (panel A) and nativism (panel B) on hostility toward each immigrant group. Each attachment leads Whites to express more hostility toward non-White immigrants, but not White foreigners.

This apparent double standard in White hostility to outsiders is corroborated by White racial identity, which also heightens hostility to non-White foreigners, but not White immigrants. Stronger levels of White racial identity reliably increase antipathy to African (.093, $p < .01$), Asian (.074, $p < .05$), and Latino immigrants (.170, $p < .001$), but not White immigrants (.033, $ns$). Beyond national attachments, we find that education reduces hostility to all four immigrant groups. Moreover, while job concerns are unrelated to Whites’ xenophobia, cultural concerns are positively associated with it—but again, not in the case of White immigrants.

### Table 3. White Hostility to White and Non-White Immigrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>African Immigrants</th>
<th>Asian Immigrants</th>
<th>Latino Immigrants</th>
<th>White Immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National pride</td>
<td>−.040 (.035)</td>
<td>−.091* (.035)</td>
<td>−.030 (.039)</td>
<td>−.025 (.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>.123* (.035)</td>
<td>.060* (.035)</td>
<td>.076* (.038)</td>
<td>−.068* (.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nativism</td>
<td>.097* (.035)</td>
<td>.084* (.034)</td>
<td>.105* (.038)</td>
<td>.053* (.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Identity</td>
<td>.093* (.032)</td>
<td>.074* (.032)</td>
<td>.170* (.035)</td>
<td>.033 (.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>−.094* (.024)</td>
<td>−.166* (.024)</td>
<td>−.120* (.027)</td>
<td>−.046* (.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>−.028 (.030)</td>
<td>−.019 (.030)</td>
<td>.002 (.032)</td>
<td>.022 (.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Concerns</td>
<td>.039 (.029)</td>
<td>−.008 (.029)</td>
<td>.038 (.032)</td>
<td>.003 (.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Concerns</td>
<td>.065* (.026)</td>
<td>.052* (.026)</td>
<td>.147* (.029)</td>
<td>.028 (.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.277* (.036)</td>
<td>.406* (.036)</td>
<td>.233* (.039)</td>
<td>.366* (.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. $R^2$</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>.087</td>
<td>.160</td>
<td>.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean VIF</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>996</td>
<td>996</td>
<td>996</td>
<td>996</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. All variables run from 0 to 1. Cell entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *$p < .05$, two-tailed; */$p < .10$, two-tailed.

Racially Nuanced Influences of National Attachments

Do national attachments also yield reactions to foreigners that reflect each racial group’s rank in America’s racial order? We answer this by separately modeling Black and White hostility toward each immigrant group as a function of national pride, nationalism, nativism, and racial identity, plus education, ideology, job concerns, and cultural concerns. We use ordinary least squares (OLS), where each attachment is a summated scale, and all variables run on a 0–1 interval.

We hypothesized that to preserve their dominant rank, White national attachments will heighten hostility to non-White immigrants, but not White foreigners. Table 3 supports this claim. While national pride is generally unrelated to xenophobia (cf. deFiguieredo & Elkins, 2003), nationalism and nativism generally increase hostility to non-White immigrants. Greater nationalism among Whites heightens antipathy to most non-White foreigners, yet reliably diminishes hostility to White immigrants ($2.07, p < .04$). Similarly, a shift from the lowest to highest nativism level boosts hostility to non-White immigrants by an average of .10 points, but the same shift yields an increase nearly half the size and outside conventional significance levels for White immigrants (.05, $p > .09$). Figure 1 displays the marginal effects of nationalism (panel A) and nativism (panel B) on hostility toward each immigrant group. Each attachment leads Whites to express more hostility toward non-White immigrants, but not White foreigners.

This apparent double standard in White hostility to outsiders is corroborated by White racial identity, which also heightens hostility to non-White foreigners, but not White immigrants. Stronger levels of White racial identity reliably increase antipathy to African (.093, $p < .01$), Asian (.074, $p < .05$), and Latino immigrants (.170, $p < .001$), but not White immigrants (.033, $ns$). Beyond national attachments, we find that education reduces hostility to all four immigrant groups. Moreover, while job concerns are unrelated to Whites’ xenophobia, cultural concerns are positively associated with it—but again, not in the case of White immigrants.

---

13 Table 1 implies a data-generating process with racially heterogeneous effects for national attachments, making pooled regressions inadvisable (Brown, 2006).

14 Foreign-born status is not a covariate since by design our respondents are native-born. Also, the yield of foreign-born in our sample would be small and limit any statistical inferences about them. Grieco (2010) reports that 1.0% and 2.5% of the U.S. population is foreign-born non-Hispanic Black and non-Hispanic White, respectively.

15 These results are robust to controls for age, income, and gender (Tables B and C in the online supporting information).
The results for African Americans are different. Table 4 reveals that, as predicted, greater national pride among Blacks lessens hostility toward each immigrant group, without any exceptions. Furthermore, greater nativism among Blacks is also, as hypothesized, unrelated to the derogation of Black and non-Black immigrants. In the case of nationalism among African Americans, we predicted heightened hostility to all foreigners—*including* African immigrants. This is what we uncover, further confirming the absence of a double standard in how African Americans respond to Black and non-Black immigrants on the basis of national attachments. Figure 2 underscores this point. Panel A shows that inasmuch as national pride decreases Black hostility to African foreigners, it also reduces it for the remaining non-Black immigrant groups. In turn, panel B illustrates that nationalism generally increases Black hostility toward immigrant groups, irrespective of whether they are Black or not.

This general pattern is affirmed by the results for Black racial identity which, unlike its White analog, is unrelated to xenophobia. Black racial identity corresponds with small and unreliable shifts in hostility to African (.016, *ns*), Asian (.001, *ns*), Latino (.016, *ns*), and White immigrants (−.008, *ns*). Besides group attachments, education sometimes lessens Blacks’ xenophobia, while job concerns often increase it, with the latter result affirming prior work on economic concerns triggering Black antipathy to foreigners (cf. Diamond, 1998).\(^{16}\)

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\(^{16}\) Our results are not driven by an affluence/education bias in our sample (Tables D and E of the supporting information). Also, the relations between group attachments and hostility to specific immigrants are generally reliably different (Table F of the supporting information).
Summary and Implications

Status asymmetries between racial groups, we claimed, lead people to form national attachments that mirror their group’s hierarchical position. Drawing on Social Identity Theory, while culling insights from Social Dominance Theory and System Justification Theory, we predicted that Whites forge national attachments that are restricted to Whites and hostile to outgroups that imperil this quality, thereby conserving the positive distinctiveness derived from belonging to a higher status group. In

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>African Immigrants</th>
<th>Asian Immigrants</th>
<th>Latino Immigrants</th>
<th>White Immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National pride</td>
<td>-.095* (.037)</td>
<td>-.129* (.036)</td>
<td>-.107* (.037)</td>
<td>-.242* (.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>.072* (.035)</td>
<td>.056* (.034)</td>
<td>.105* (.035)</td>
<td>.068* (.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nativism</td>
<td>-.017 (.034)</td>
<td>.044 (.033)</td>
<td>.035 (.034)</td>
<td>.031 (.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Identity</td>
<td>.016 (.027)</td>
<td>.001 (.026)</td>
<td>.016 (.027)</td>
<td>-.008 (.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.014 (.027)</td>
<td>-.075* (.026)</td>
<td>-.062* (.027)</td>
<td>-.028 (.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>.040 (.033)</td>
<td>.055* (.032)</td>
<td>.075* (.033)</td>
<td>.005 (.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Concerns</td>
<td>.042* (.025)</td>
<td>.040* (.024)</td>
<td>.070* (.025)</td>
<td>.037 (.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Concerns</td>
<td>.035 (.023)</td>
<td>.008 (.022)</td>
<td>.030 (.023)</td>
<td>.009 (.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.341* (.041)</td>
<td>.429* (.040)</td>
<td>.357* (.042)</td>
<td>.537* (.040)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>.030</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean VIF</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>994</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. All variables run from 0 to 1. Cell entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *p < .05, two-tailed; †p < .10, two-tailed.

Figure 2. Marginal effects of Black national attachments on hostility to specific immigrants (95% confidence intervals).
contrast, non-Whites’ lower status hinders positive distinctiveness via national attachments. Hence, we expected them to engage in social creativity, altering the content of national attachments to attain distinctiveness on a national identity basis.

Our results support our reasoning. Our measurement analysis suggested that while our national attachment items reflect their intended identities, Blacks and Whites construe these attachments differently. We also found that racial and national identity are negatively correlated among Blacks, but positively correlated among Whites (cf. Dowley & Silver, 2000; Sidanius & Petrocik, 2001; Sidanius et al., 1997). Earlier efforts unearthed this pattern in convenience samples or survey samples with relatively few non-Whites. We detected it in a national poll with a large Black oversample, further boosting confidence in this pattern.

We also established that racial nuances in the content of these attachments correlate with how African Americans and Whites respond to immigrants. White national attachments yielded distinct reactions toward White and non-White immigrants, where the former generally escape hostility. Black national attachments generated reactions to immigrants that encompass all foreigners regardless of whether they are Black or not. These findings imply that beyond self-interests (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014), group interests can profoundly impact people’s reactions to immigrants (cf. Sides & Citrin, 2007).

Our evidence amends established views about the implications of national identity content (cf. Theiss-Morse, 2009). For example, deFiguieredo and Elkins’ (2003) showed that while nationalism is tied to xenophobia, patriotism is not—a pattern traced to the former’s chauvinistic character. These correlations were similar among Whites and non-Whites. But the number of non-Whites in their sample is small (Black n < 150), which works against finding reliable racial differences in these relationships.17 In turn, we drew on a survey with large numbers of Blacks and Whites, furnishing us with more statistical power to uncover reliable racial differences. We find that the content of national attachments does hinge on the rank of one’s racial group. For instance, as a chauvinistic commitment to the nation, nationalism is known to yield hostility to outsiders (deFiguieredo & Elkins, 2003; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). Yet by addressing racial hierarchy, we have learned that nationalism leads Whites to be harsher toward non-White immigrants, thus bolstering a privileged station in the racial order.

Of course, our study is not without its limitations. First is our operationalization of xenophobia as affect toward specific groups. We did this to unpack the generic category of “immigrant(s),” which is often used in measures of attitudes toward foreigners (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014), and to better illuminate the affective substrate of xenophobia. Our choice differs from prior work, which often measures xenophobia in a way that combines the cognitive and affective bases of these evaluations (e.g., deFigueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Finell et al., 2013; Pehrson, Vignoles, & Brown, 2009). So, can our framework also explain the types of xenophobia studied previously? We think so because those measures of xenophobia do not disentangle its cognitive and affective substrates. Thus, some variance in those measures will be related to national identity measures like ours. Still, we think future work can better serve scholars by theoretically integrating these affective and cognitive components under a single model.

A second limitation is our operationalization of outgroups as immigrants, which raises questions about whether similar results would emerge if the outgroups were other U.S. minority groups, such as Latinos and Asians. We suspect they will, given that many of the immigrant groups we analyzed (e.g., Latino immigrants) are nested under larger pan-ethnic groups (i.e., Latinos). Yet it is unclear whether such correlations would be stronger or weaker with such groups, making it an empirical question worth pursuing in future work.

17 Our confidence in this interpretation is boosted by the fact that we used similar (though fewer) items than deFigueiredo and Elkins (2003) to measure national pride.
A third blind spot is whether our framework extends to other minorities like Latinos and Asian Americans. We think it can, with minor theoretical adjustments. What is crucial for our framework is the durable social status difference between a majority and minority. Thus, a comparison of national attachments between Whites and Asians (Latinos) should also yield dissimilarities in identity content. Caveats enter as one grapples with the immigration-induced heterogeneity introduced by studying Asians and Latinos. Sears and Savalei (2006) note that while Blacks, Asians, and Latinos display a high degree of interest in their racial/ethnic group, this interest is stronger among foreign-born Asians and Latinos. This suggests that dissimilarities in national attachments between Whites and Asians (Latinos) might be strongest among immigrant members of these latter two groups, with such variations dissipating the longer a person is in the United States. Hence, whereas we provide one answer to “why” there is variety in national identity content, future work on Asians and Latinos can allow scholars to more fully answer the question of “who” most likely displays these nuances.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Efren O. Pérez, Department of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, PMB 505, 230 Appleton Place, Nashville, TN 37203-5721. E-mail: efren.o.perez@vanderbilt.edu

REFERENCES


Race and Nation


Supporting Information

Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher’s website:

Table A. Associations Between Group Attachments and Political and Psychological Explanation of Results in Table A.

Table B. Original Results are Robust to the Inclusion of Additional Socio-Economic Covariates.

Table C. Original Results are Robust to the Inclusion of Additional Socio-Economic Covariates.

Table D. Robustness of Original Regression Estimates Using a Sample With Truncated Education or Income Levels White Respondents.

Table E. Robustness of Original Regression Estimates Using a Sample With Truncated Education or Income Levels Black Respondents.

Table F. Associations Between Hostility to Immigrants and National Attachments Are Significantly Different (By Race) Works Cited in Supporting Information.