Race and Nation: How Racial Hierarchy Shapes National Attachments

Niambi M. Carter
Department of African American Studies
Temple University

and

Efrén O. Pérez
Department of Political Science
Vanderbilt University
efren.o.perez@vanderbilt.edu

*Forthcoming at Political Psychology

Key words: Racial and national identities; hierarchy; social identity theory.
Abstract

We contend that the boundaries and nature of national attachments are shaped by the position of one’s group within America’s racial order, with higher status yielding more racially exclusive forms of identity. We test our claims in the realm of xenophobia. Using an original survey of African Americans ($n = 1,000$) and Whites ($n = 1,000$), we assess national pride, nationalism, nativism, and racial identity, plus affect toward various immigrant groups. We establish that national attachments have racially varied meanings, thereby producing sharp differences in each racial group’s response to foreigners. Although national pride is unrelated to White antipathy toward outsiders, nationalism and nativism increase White hostility to immigrants—except when they are White. In contrast, national pride diminishes African American hostility to Black and non-Black immigrants, while nativism is generally unrelated to Black antipathy to outsiders. Finally, while nationalism heightens xenophobia among Blacks, this sentiment envelops all foreigners—including African immigrants. We discuss our results’ implications for theories of national attachment in inter-group settings.
Despite the many differences separating individual countrymen, national attachments galvanize Americans toward various political ends, including voting (Huddy and Khatib 2007), presidential approval (Kam and Ramos 2008), and policy support (Transue 2007) (cf. Theiss-Morse 2009; Wong 2010). Yet missing from this scholarship is a deeper sense about how race shapes the content of national attachments, i.e., the boundaries and nature giving them meaning (Brewer 1999; Finell et al. 2013; Meeus et al. 2010; Pehrson et al. 2009a; Pehrson et al. 2009b).

Studies show that Whites express stronger national attachment than non-Whites (e.g., patriotism, nationalism, national identity) (Kunovich 2009; Sidanius and Petrocik 2001; Sidanius et al. 1997; Theiss-Morse 2009; but see Citrin et al. 2001; Schildkraut 2007)—a pattern also displayed by non-U.S. racial majorities and minorities (Elkins and Sides 2007; Sidanius et al. 1997). Other work finds dissimilarity in the bond between national and racial identity (Dowley and Silver 2000; Sidanius and Petrocik 2001; Sidanius et al. 1997; Sinclair et al. 1998), with Whites displaying a positive correlation and non-Whites a null or negative one—a pattern also unearthed cross-nationally (Staerklé et al. 2010).

Nevertheless, these research traditions treat racial variation in national attachments as reflecting differences in degree, not kind. Members of distinct racial groups often express dissimilar levels of national attachment (Dowley and Silver 2000; Huddy and Khatib 2007; Sidanius and Petrocik 2001; Sidanius et al. 1997; Theiss-Morse 2009). Yet these studies presume that all Americans share a uniform sense of national pride, nationalism, and other attachments. Thus, while these forms of identity are diverse (Citrin et al. 2001; Parker 2010; Schildkraut 2007), their meaning is thought to be widely held (Huddy 2001). This suggests that when people from different racial groups share a national attachment—say, nativism—they should respond similarly to outgroups—that is, with antipathy (Higham 1981).
We reconsider this link between race and nation. Our point of departure is the contested incorporation of U.S. racial minorities into the nation, which has yielded a stable hierarchy where Whites enjoy higher status than non-Whites (Dawson 2000; Kim 2003; Masuoka and Junn 2013). Drawing mainly on social identity theory (SIT) (Tajfel and Turner 1979), we merge insights from Social Dominance Theory (SDT) (Sidanius and Pratto 1999) and System Justification Theory (SJT) (Jost et al. 2004) to derive a basic claim: status asymmetries shape people’s national attachments and how these notions structure reactions to outgroups.

We argue that Whites’ higher rank in the racial order prompts the formation of national attachments that bolster this station. Per SIT, we reason that when Whites imagine other Americans, they think of exemplars from their race (Devos and Banaji 2005), which yields identities that are racially restricted and hostile to outgroups that threaten this distinct nature (Brewer 1999). This aligns with the view that majority group members project their traits onto higher-order groups (e.g., nations) that contain their subgroup (e.g., Whites), thus positively distinguishing themselves from a minority (e.g., Blacks) under the same superordinate category (ingroup projection model; Mummendey and Wenzel 1999; Wenzel et al. 2007). Our claim also meshes with SDT’s insight that members of dominant groups exhibit a “keen sense of ownership of the nation and its symbols” (Peña and Sidanius 2002: 783; Sidanius and Petrocik 2001; Sidanius et al. 1997)—what SJT calls a “sense of entitlement (Jost et al. 2004: 906).”

In contrast, non-Whites’ lower post in the racial order contests their national belonging. We argue that this leads them to forgo projecting their traits onto national groups (Mummendey and Wenzel 1999) and instead modify the content of national attachments (cf. Finell et al. 2013; Meeus et al. 2010; Pehrson et al. 2009a; Pehrson et al. 2009b), what SIT calls social creativity (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Reality often limits minorities’ ingroup projection. History, power—
even common sense—can “make it seem preposterous for a [minority] group to claim to
be…prototypical (Wenzel et al. 2007: 343).” Moreover, SDT teaches that racial orders are stable
(Sidanius and Pratto 1999) because, says SJT, majorities and minorities internalize their statuses
(Jost et al. 2004). Thus, insofar as non-Whites’ lower rank impugns their national membership,
they will defuse this threat in a way that still facilitates distinctiveness via national group(s). We
think this occurs by forming identities with broader racial borders and less exclusive natures,
which distinguishes non-White attachments from Whites’ racially delimited forms.

We test our claims by revisiting the link between national identity and xenophobia among
U.S. Blacks and Whites.¹ Stronger national identity promotes xenophobic attitudes (Rensmann
and Miller 2010), but some forms of this attachment stimulate this sentiment more. For example,
while national pride is unrelated to xenophobia, such antipathy is responsive to nationalism, a
chauvinistic sense of national superiority (deFigueiredo and Elkins 2003). Others, meanwhile,
trace xenophobia to nativism, a fierce favoritism toward native-born countrymen (Higham 1981).
But these analyses often make no racial distinctions about the ties between these identities and
xenophobia. We thus commissioned a survey of Black (n =1,000) and White Americans (n =
1,000) with measures of national pride, nationalism, nativism, and racial identity, plus ratings of
African, Asian, Latino, and White immigrants. We will use these data to show that Blacks and
Whites construe the boundaries and nature of their national identities differently, with these
nuances yielding clear differences in how Blacks and Whites react to immigrants. But lest we
get too ahead of ourselves, let us expand on the theoretical framework guiding our inquiry.

**Imagining the Same Nation: Social Identity Theory**

The study of national attachments has been strongly shaped by social identity theory
(SIT) (Tajfel and Turner 1979) and its offshoot, self-categorization theory (Turner et al. 1987).

¹We define xenophobia (a.k.a, xenophobic attitudes, hostility to immigrants) as expressed antipathy to foreigners.
SIT says that when a group’s salience increases, people identify with it and use its identity to guide their behavior (Tajfel et al. 1971). The internalization of identity is cemented through one’s perceived similarity to a group’s prototype (McGarty et al. 1992). As Anderson (1983:6) observes, “members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”

Group identification leads people to differentiate their ingroup from outgroups to enhance the former’s positive distinctiveness (Tajfel and Turner 1979). This yields ingroup favoritism. Yet ingroup “love” and outgroup “hate” are not automatically connected (Brewer 1999). Their association hinges on factors like whether an identity prescribes antipathy toward outgroups (Brewer 1999). For example, national pride and nationalism promote commitment to the nation. But unlike national pride, nationalism is inherently comparative and chauvinistic. Thus, while nationalists are xenophobic, patriots are not (deFigueiredo and Elkins 2003).

Since people are theorized to imagine the same prototype when engaging an identity, it is often presumed an identity’s meaning is uniform. Take “minimal group” studies where identities are experimentally induced to observe their effects (Tajfel et al. 1971). Sniderman et al. (2004), for example, have shown that priming people to identify as Dutch citizens boosts immigration opposition (cf. Transue 2007). This approach affirms the link between categorization and identification, yet focuses on “simple group boundaries while ignoring their internal meaning (Huddy 2001: 130).” Perhaps, then, only a subset of those categorized share a uniform sense of national identity and drive collective behavior.

Other scholars, in turn, gauge national attachment via self-reports (Citrin et al. 2001; Parker 2010; Schildkraut 2011; Theiss-Morse 2009), revealing multiple forms of national identity. But these measures are rarely validated cross-racially, making it unclear whether they
tap similar forms of identity across diverse groups. Moreover, even if these measures capture the same national identities across race, it is uncertain whether they similarly influence outgroup attitudes among members of distinct racial ingroups.

Insights from the ingroup projection model (IPM) further hint at possible subgroup differences in the content of national attachments (Mummendey and Wenzel 1999; Wenzel et al. 2007). IPM stipulates that higher-order categories (e.g., nation) serve as a comparison point for subgroups (e.g., race) under these superordinate identities (cf. Transue 2007). Specifically, members of a nested subgroup project their traits onto a higher-order group, allowing them to perceive their subgroup as more prototypical of the super-ordinate category, which yields positive distinctiveness for the projecting group. A subgroup’s appropriation of a higher-order category shows how the boundaries and nature of super-ordinate identities can be shaped. But as IPM theorists acknowledge, their “research has…focused on the perspective of majorities, but it is minorities…who are likely to find social reality to be a stumbling block for claims of prototypicality (Wenzel et al. 2007: 364).”

**Racial Hierarchy and Shades of National Attachment**

Since America’s inception, race has structured the formal and informal ties of individuals to the nation, thus helping to erect a lasting racial order where Whites hold higher status than non-Whites (Dawson 2000; Kim 2003; Masuoka and Junn 2013; Sidanius et al. 1997). For example, although the 1964 Civil Rights Act outlawed racially discriminatory practices (e.g., housing segregation, voter fraud), durable racial disparities persist, as evidenced by, *inter alia*, higher incarceration and poverty rates among Blacks relative to Whites (Conley 1999; Weaver
and Lerman 2010). America’s racial hierarchy is thus often characterized as having stable group relations and largely impermeable group boundaries (Ho et al. 2011).

When hierarchies display these features, SIT predicts responses that reflect an ingroup’s rank (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Members of higher status groups express attitudes that reinforce this station, thus preserving the positive distinctiveness derived from their membership. The reaction is different among members of low status groups, whose rank works against achieving positive distinctiveness. One could arguably attain distinctiveness by entering the higher status group. But this works only if group boundaries are permeable (Jackson et al. 1996). When they are not, members of low status groups engage in social creativity (Tajfel and Turner 1979), where they recast their comparison to the higher status group in more favorable terms. This does not entail actual changes in group status. It only requires facilitating distinctiveness.

In America’s racial hierarchy, these insights suggest that Whites will form national attachments that buttress their higher position. Thus, Whites will imagine other Whites as exemplars of the nation (Devos and Banaji 2005; McGarty et al. 1992), thereby yielding attachments that are delimited to members of their race and hostile to outgroups that jeopardize this unique character (Brewer 1999). In the logic of the ingroup projection model (Mummendey and Wenzel 1999), Whites will generalize their ingroup’s traits to nation-level groups (e.g., patriots), thus asserting their greater prototypicality as Americans.

In turn, non-Whites’ lower tier in the hierarchy impugns their membership in the nation, which limits positive distinctiveness via national identity. Indeed, if White national attachments are racially restricted, as we argue, then non-Whites will find it hard to claim these. Thus, to attain distinctiveness via a national group, non-Whites will engage in social creativity by modifying the content (i.e., boundaries and nature) of national identities (Finell et al. 2013; Hochschild and Weaver 2007).
Meeus et al. 2010; Pehrson et al. 2009a). Such revisions allow non-Whites to counter the threat of exclusion implied by White forms of national identity, while still gaining distinctiveness on that category’s basis. We believe this occurs by differentiating the revised versions of attachment from Whites’ racially exclusive varieties. That is, non-Whites will form national identities with broader borders and less racially restricted natures than those engaged by Whites.

Our reasoning is enhanced by Social Dominance Theory (SDT) (Peña and Sidanius 2002; Sidanius and Petrocik 2001; Sidanius et al. 1997; Sinclair et al. 1998; Staerklé et al. 2010) and System Justification Theory (SJT) (Jost and Kay 2005; Jost et al. 2004; Jost et al. 2003; Jost and Burgess 2000; van der Toorn et al. 2014). SDT teaches that in racial orders, the dominant group “regards itself as having…ownership of the nation, its resources, and its symbols (Sidanius et al. 1997: 105),” thus producing attitudinal asymmetries between racial groups with varied status (Sidanius et al. 1997; Sinclair et al. 1998; Staerklé et al. 2010). For instance, dominant racial groups express stronger national attachment than subordinate ones (Sidanius et al. 1997). Moreover, within dominant racial groups, stronger national attachment correlates with ethnocentrism (Sidanius and Petrocik 2001) and support for ideologies that legitimate group inequalities (Peña and Sidanius 2002). This affirms our claim that durable status hierarchies motivate dominant groups to manifest attitudes that bolster their rank.

In parallel, SJT suggests that people often engage in system justification: “the process by which existing social arrangements are legitimized, even at the expense of personal and group interest (Jost and Banaji 1994: 2).” SJT shows that in social arrangements like racial orders, dominant and subordinate groups engage in behaviors that uphold the status quo (Jost and Banaji 1994; Jost and Burgess 2000; Jost et al. 2003; see also Lane et al. 2005). Among dominants, this can manifest itself in a heightened sense of entitlement and greater support for ideologies
justifying group inequities (Jost et al. 2004). Among subordinates, this can reveal itself in the internalization of negative ingroup attitudes and beliefs (Jost and Banaji 1994). This suggests that insofar as social creativity enables racial minorities to attain distinctiveness via national attachment(s), it ultimately maintains rather than upends the racial order.

**Race, Nation, and Xenophobia: Hypotheses**

We test our claims by examining xenophobic attitudes among African Americans and Whites: two groups whose “relative ordering has remained constant” across U.S. history (Masuoka and Junn 2013: 5). Across different immigration waves, Blacks and Whites have wrestled with thorny questions about who qualifies as members of the nation and on what grounds (King 2000; Shankman 1982). In the current era, increases in non-European immigrants are leading many Americans to ask themselves again: who are we (Huntington 2004)?

We believe the answer depends on the social status of one’s racial group. National identity is generally tied to xenophobia (Rensmann and Miller 2010), but how race affects this link is unclear. Xenophobia studies favor explanations centered on economic self-interest (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). And, when scholars study its cultural basis (e.g., national attachments) (Sides and Citrin 2007), they often overlook whether such factors operate similarly across racial groups. These patterns are partly reflected in the few studies examining xenophobia among racial minorities. For example, many African Americans share neighborhoods and labor markets with foreigners, yet explanations of Black hostility to immigrants stress economic interests, not national attachments (Diamond 1998; Gay 2006; McClain et al. 2007).

Our focus on xenophobia—i.e., anti-immigrant feelings—aligns with studies on national identity’s implications for hostility to foreigners (cf. Finell et al. 2013; Meeus et al. 2010). We

---

3 U.S. Whites and non-Blacks do perceive Whites as the racial group with the highest social status and African Americans as the one with the lowest (Fang et al. 1998; Kahn et al. 2009).
unpack xenophobia into specific groups to provide nuance about which immigrants provoke stronger reactions. By studying feelings toward immigrants, we also isolate xenophobia’s affective base, which is indistinguishable from its cognitive elements in some studies (e.g., Pershon et al. 2009a).

We contend that group status in a racial order shapes the content of national attachments and their influence on xenophobia. Thus, relative to Blacks, Whites will form more racially exclusive national identities (H1). But national identity has varied manifestations, so we derive further hypotheses by defining for each racial group those attachments that prior work furnishes as explanations of xenophobia: national pride, nationalism, and nativism. We also examine racial identity, which is deemed by some as a source of xenophobia (Gerstle 2001; Saxton 1971).

*National pride* is a deep love for one’s country (Conover and Feldman 1987; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989). It is related to symbolic patriotism (Parker 2010), which also entails positive affect toward the nation. Huddy and Khatib (2007: 64) describe national pride as “closely aligned with symbolic patriotism since both measures reference a sense of pride.” National pride stresses satisfaction with national achievements and institutions, as seen in this construct’s measures (deFiguieredo and Elkins 2003; Dowley and Silver 2000). Patriotism displays other forms (e.g., blind and constructive patriotism) (Schatz and Staub 1997), but these are critiqued for being ideologically biased and conceptually blurry (Huddy and Khatib 2007). National pride is less affected by these concerns.

We predict that national pride is unrelated to xenophobia among Whites (H2a), but inversely related to it among Blacks (H2b). While some scholars find that national pride is decoupled from xenophobia among Blacks and Whites (deFigueiredo and Elkins 2003), others argue that Blacks’ sense of national pride is distinct from Whites’ because it is tied to aspirations
for greater civil rights, drawing on a strong belief in civic ideals denied to Blacks (e.g., equality) (Parker 2009; Shaw 2004). By promoting a racially inclusive view of the nation, Black national pride should reduce xenophobia.

*Nationalism* is “a commitment to the denigration of the alternatives to the nation’s institutions and principles (deFigueiredo and Elkins 2003: 175),” which is reciprocally tied to chauvinism toward outsiders (Conover and Feldman 1987; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Machiavelli 1984 [1532]). We posit that nationalism heightens xenophobia among Whites (H3a) and Blacks (H3b), but the pattern will differ between them. Among Whites, nationalism displays an element of racial superiority, where the imagined circle of countrymen is limited to other Whites (Gerstle 2001). Thus, nationalism should boost White antipathy to non-White foreigners, but not White immigrants. In turn, nationalism among Blacks is also inherently chauvinistic, but without a sense of racial superiority (Parker 2009). Hence, nationalism among Blacks should boost hostility to all foreigners, including African immigrants.4

*Nativism* favors a nation’s native-born, yielding what Higham (1981: 4) calls an “intense opposition to an internal minority on the ground of its foreign…connections.” We hypothesize that nativism boosts xenophobia among Whites (H4a), but is unrelated to it among Blacks (H4b). White nativists have historically derogated immigrants for allegedly failing to display “American” traits (e.g., speaking English), with the political efforts of White nativists often limiting the privileges of native-born Americans to those who are racially White (King 2000). Nativism also exists among Blacks. But for them, it does not entail hostility to foreigners, since such antipathy is viewed as bolstering White racial hegemony (Shankman 1982). Thus, Black nativists will favor native-born individuals without denigrating foreigners (Brewer 1999).

---

4 Black nationalism refers to endorsement of a *national identity*, not a *belief system*. Black nationalism, the belief system, supports Black political, economic, and cultural autonomy (Davis and Brown 2002). We omit it because we focus on identities and it lacks a clear analog among Whites.
Racial identity is attachment to one’s race. We claim it increases xenophobia among Whites (H5a), but is unrelated to it among Blacks (H5b). White racial identity is a stable construct that often fosters negative attitudes toward non-Whites (Arriola and Cole 2001; Hutchings et al. 2011). In contrast, Black racial identity is often dissociated from hostility to non-Blacks (Herring et al. 1999), while liberalizing Black public opinion (Dawson 1994).

Data and Measures

We test our claims with an online survey of adult African Americans (n =1,000) and Whites (n =1,000) run by YouGov/Polimetrix (YGP) from June 17-29, 2010. Using a proprietary matching algorithm, YGP produces non-probability samples of opt-in respondents that resemble the benchmark random samples of the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS). YGP surveys (e.g., the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study) produce quality data that enable effective prediction of public opinion (Vavreck and Rivers 2008). Our sample was matched on gender, age, education, partisanship, ideology, and political interest, and weighted to known marginals for the U.S. Black and White population from the 2006 ACS.

Our dependent variables are feeling thermometer ratings of African, Asian, Latino, and White immigrants, each on a 0 (unfavorable) to 100 (favorable) scale. We recode these so that higher values reflect greater unfavorability. Our main independent variables are national pride, nationalism, nativism, and racial identity. We assess national pride with items gauging pride in

---

5 While it makes sense to also study Native Americans, we did not have the resources to sample this hard-to-reach population. Similar constraints prevented us from sampling Latinos and Asians, who contain English and non-English speakers. YGP only samples English speakers within these groups. And, when firms (e.g., GfK) recruit non-English speakers, such samples are more expensive and raise questions about language effects on opinion reports (Lee and Pérez 2014). We later discuss our framework’s applicability to non-Blacks.

6 Our national attachment items are from the 1996 General Social Survey, except for the “more influence” item, which is from Kosterman and Feshbach (1989). Validating evidence for these items is reported by Citrin et al. (2001), Huddy and Khatib (2007), and Kosterman and Feshbach (1989). Our linked fate items are from the 1993 National Black Politics Study, with Davis and Brown (2002) reporting validating evidence.
1) the way democracy works in the U.S.; 2) America’s economic achievements; and 3) America’s history, all running from not proud at all (1) to very proud (4).

We tap nationalism with the statements: 1) The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like Americans; 2) Generally speaking, America is no better than most other countries (reverse-scored); and 3) Generally, the more influence America has on other nations, the better off they are, all ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (4).

We measure nativism with items gauging agreement with whether certain traits make one an American: 1) born in America; 2) being a Christian; 3) lived in U.S. most of one’s life; and 4) able to speak English. These traits reflect those historically advanced by nativist movements (cf. King 2000). Each item runs from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (4).

We tap racial identity with items probing a sense of “linked fate” (Dawson 1994). One item asks: Do you think what happens generally to [Black/White] people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life? A second item asks: Do you think what happens generally to [Black men/White men] in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life? And, our last item queries: Do you think what happens generally to [Black men/White men] in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life? All three of these items run from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (4).

Some of our analyses use education, ideology, job concerns, and cultural concerns as covariates. Education runs from no high school to post-graduate education. Ideology is a 5-point item ranging from very liberal to very conservative. Job concerns are gauged through

---

7 These items are less affective than those for symbolic patriotism (e.g., My love for the U.S. is extremely strong; Parker 2010), yet consistent with prior work (cf. deFiguieredo and Elkins 2003).
8 Racial identity is multi-dimensional. These items reflect the “attachment and sense of interdependence” dimension in Ashmore et al.’s (2004) taxonomy. We use these items because 1) they are heavily used by political scientists studying Black identity (Davis and Brown 2002; Dawson 1994); and 2) scholars are examining whether such items tap identity among non-Black groups (Gay and Hochschild 2010).
agreement with the statement: The job prospects of Americans are getting worse. Cultural
concerns are measured via people’s agreement with the statement: American culture is
increasingly endangered. These items run from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (4).\(^9\)

**Racially Varied Meanings of National Attachments**

We first examine whether our national attachment measures capture their target concepts
and whether these identities are similarly construed by Blacks and Whites. Table 1 reports a
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) of national pride, nationalism, nativism, and racial identity,
disaggregated by race. Given the categorical nature of our measures, we run this CFA with
robust weighted least squares (WSMV) (Brown 2006).

- [table 1 here]-

Diagnostics indicate a well-fitting model, with CFI and TLI above .90 and RMSEA
below .10 (Brown 2006). Moreover, all item thresholds and loadings are reliably estimated, with
the magnitude of the latter generally being robust (the first column in each entry provides the
estimates for Blacks). Consider *Pride-economy*. A unit shift in latent national pride produces a
shift of .922 among Blacks and 1.030 among Whites in the response variable underlying this
indicator, with comparable results emerging for other items. Close inspection of these
parameters, however, reveals some noticeable differences between Blacks and Whites, a tipoff
that members of each group might construe these attachments differently (Brown 2006).

We formally assess whether these racial differences in item loadings and thresholds are
statistically meaningful by constraining these parameters to equality across both groups. If this
restricted model produces a poorer fit, relative to our unrestricted model in table 1, then we will
infer that these items capture attachments with racially similar meaning (Brown 2006). But if

\(^9\) Per Sniderman et al. (2004), our economic and cultural threat items decouple the valued object (e.g., jobs) from
outgroups presumed to threaten it, so as to better estimate concern about the former.
these constraints yield a restricted model with worse fit, then we will conclude that the items reflect attachments with racially varied meanings. The telltale signs here are shifts in CFI and TLI values greater than .01; RMSEA values closer to .10, and a significant change in the chi-square statistic (Cheung and Rensvold 2002; Pérez and Hetherington 2014).

The relevant comparisons are in the last rows of table 1, under the labels “unrestricted” and “restricted.” There we see that the CFI and TLI drop by more than .01 points to .900 and .894, respectively. Moreover, the RMSEA rises to .086 and the change in chi-square is statistically significant. This suggests that restricting the item loadings and thresholds to equality yields a simpler model with worse fit than one where the same parameters are unrestricted. Thus, these items seem to capture attachments with racially varied meanings.10

Supporting this inference, table 2 reports the correlations between the varied forms of national and racial attachments, with entries for African Americans denoted by “a”. Insofar as these attachments mean the same thing to Blacks and Whites, we should observe positive and reliable correlations of similar magnitude between racial and national identity. However, in line with prior work, we find that national and racial identity are positively related among Whites, yet negatively related among Blacks (Dowley and Silver 2000; Phinney et al. 1997; Sidanius and Petrocik 2001; Sidanius et al. 1997; Sinclair et al. 1998; Staerklé et al. 2010).11 These results support our claim that racial hierarchy shapes national attachments.12

---[table 2 here]---

10 Direct racial comparisons on these identities thus involve “apples” and “oranges” (Pérez and Hetherington 2014). Given this caveat, we note mean (M) differences in national pride (Black M = .62; White M = .70, p < .001); nationalism (Black M = .46; White M = .57, p < .001); and nativism (Black M = .62; White M = .60, p < .06).
11 This subgroup asymmetry hypothesis (SAH) predicts an inter-group gap in the association between racial and national identity. The SAH anticipates this correlation to be negative or null for minority groups. We also note that the correlation between Black identity and national pride is still negative and reliable (r = -.11, p < .01) if the latter is measured with the one item not referencing pride in U.S. history or democracy.
12 Class is also durable and consequential (Bartels 2008). But if race underlies the hierarchy between Blacks and Whites, then it should moderate the correlation between these attachments and other constructs suggested by prior research, even after adjusting them for income differences by race (table A, Supporting Information [SI]).
Racially Nuanced Influences of National Attachments

Do national attachments also yield reactions to foreigners that reflect each racial group’s rank in America’s racial order? We answer this by separately modeling Black and White hostility toward each immigrant group as a function of national pride, nationalism, nativism, and racial identity, plus education, ideology, job concerns, and cultural concerns. We use OLS, where each attachment is a summed scale and all variables run on a 0-1 interval.

We hypothesized that to preserve their dominant rank, White national attachments will heighten hostility to non-White immigrants, but not White foreigners. Table 3 supports this claim. While national pride is generally unrelated to xenophobia (cf. Elkins and deFiguiere 2003), nationalism and nativism generally increase hostility to non-White immigrants. Greater nationalism among Whites heightens antipathy to most non-White foreigners, yet reliably diminishes hostility to White immigrants (-.07, p < .04). Similarly, a shift from the lowest to highest nativism level boosts hostility to non-White immigrants by an average of 10 points, but the same shift yields an increase nearly half the size and outside conventional significance levels for White immigrants (.05, p > .09). Figure 1 displays the marginal effects of nationalism (panel A) and nativism (panel B) on hostility toward each immigrant group. Each attachment leads Whites to express more hostility toward non-White immigrants, but not White foreigners.

This apparent double standard in White hostility to outsiders is corroborated by White racial identity, which also heightens hostility to non-White foreigners, but not White immigrants.

---

13 Table 1 implies a data-generating process with racially heterogeneous effects for national attachments, making pooled regressions inadvisable (Brown 2006).
14 Foreign-born status is not a covariate since by design our respondents are native-born. Also, the yield of foreign-born in our sample would be small and limit any statistical inferences about them. Grieco (2010) reports that 1.0% and 2.5% of the U.S. population is foreign-born non-Hispanic Black and non-Hispanic White, respectively.
Stronger levels of White racial identity reliably increase antipathy to African (.093, \( p < .01 \)), Asian (.074, \( p < .05 \)), and Latino immigrants (.170, \( p < .001 \)), but not White immigrants (.033, \( ns \)). Beyond national attachments, we find that education reduces hostility to all four immigrant groups. Moreover, while job concerns are unrelated to Whites’ xenophobia, cultural concerns are positively associated with it—but again, not in the case of White immigrants.\(^{15} \)-

\[\text{[table 4 here]}\]

The results for African Americans are different. Table 4 reveals that, as predicted, greater national pride among Blacks lessens hostility toward each immigrant group, without any exceptions. Furthermore, greater nativism among Blacks is also, as hypothesized, unrelated to the derogation of Black and non-Black immigrants. In the case of nationalism among African Americans, we predicted heightened hostility to all foreigners—\textit{including} African immigrants. This is what we uncover, further confirming the absence of a double standard in how African Americans respond to Black and non-Black immigrants on the basis of national attachments. Figure 2 underscores this point. Panel A shows that inasmuch as national pride decreases Black hostility to African foreigners, it also reduces it for the remaining non-Black immigrant groups. In turn, panel B illustrates that nationalism generally increases Black hostility toward immigrant groups, irrespective of whether they are Black or not.

\[\text{[figure 2 here]}\]

This general pattern is affirmed by the results for Black racial identity which, unlike its White analog, is unrelated to xenophobia. Black racial identity corresponds with small and unreliable shifts in hostility to African (.016, \( ns \)), Asian (.001, \( ns \)), Latino (.016, \( ns \)), and White immigrants (.008, \( ns \)). Besides group attachments, education sometimes lessens Blacks’

\(^{15}\) These results are robust to controls for age, income, and gender (tables B and C, SI).
xenophobia, while job concerns often increase it, with the latter result affirming prior work on economic concerns triggering Black antipathy to foreigners (cf. Diamond 1998).16

**Summary and Implications**

Status asymmetries between racial groups, we claimed, lead people to form national attachments that mirror their group’s hierarchical position. Drawing on Social Identity Theory, while culling insights from Social Dominance Theory and System Justification Theory, we predicted that Whites forge national attachments that are restricted to Whites and hostile to outgroups that imperil this quality, thereby conserving the positive distinctiveness derived from belonging to a higher status group. In contrast, non-Whites’ lower status hinders positive distinctiveness via national attachments. Hence, we expected them to engage in *social creativity*, altering the content of national attachments to attain distinctiveness on a national identity basis.

Our results support our reasoning. Our measurement analysis suggested that while our national attachment items reflect their intended identities, Blacks and Whites construe these attachments differently. We also found that racial and national identity are negatively correlated among Blacks, but positively correlated among Whites (cf. Dowley and Silver 2000; Sidanius and Petrocik 2001; Sidanius et al. 1997). Earlier efforts unearthed this pattern in convenience samples or survey samples with relatively few non-Whites. We detected it in a national poll with a large Black oversample, further boosting confidence in this pattern.

We also established that racial nuances in the content of these attachments correlate with how African Americans and Whites respond to immigrants. White national attachments yielded distinct reactions toward White and non-White immigrants, where the former generally escape hostility. Black national attachments generated reactions to immigrants that encompass all

---

16 Our results are not driven by an affluence/education bias in our sample (tables D and E, SI). Also, the relations between group attachments and hostility to specific immigrants are generally reliably different (table F, SI).
foreigners regardless of whether they are Black or not. These findings imply that beyond self-interests (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014), group-interests can profoundly impact people’s reactions to immigrants (cf. Sides and Citrin 2007).

Our evidence amends established views about the implications of national identity content (cf. Theiss-Morse 2009). For example, deFiguieredo and Elkins’ (2003) showed that while nationalism is tied to xenophobia, patriotism is not—a pattern traced to the former’s chauvinistic character. These correlations were similar among Whites and non-Whites. But the number of non-Whites in their sample is small (Black $n < 150$), which works against finding reliable racial differences in these relationships. In turn, we drew on a survey with large numbers of Blacks and Whites, furnishing us with more statistical power to uncover reliable racial differences. We find that the content of national attachments does hinge on the rank of one’s racial group. For instance, as a chauvinistic commitment to the nation, nationalism is known yield hostility to outsiders (deFiguieredo and Elkins 2003; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989). Yet by addressing racial hierarchy, we have learned that nationalism leads Whites to be harsher toward non-White immigrants, thus bolstering a privileged station in the racial order.

Of course, our study is not without its limitations. First is our operationalization of xenophobia as affect toward specific groups. We did this to unpack the generic category “immigrant(s),” which is often used in measures of attitudes toward foreigners (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014); and, to better illuminate the affective substrate of xenophobia. Our choice differs from prior work, which often measures xenophobia in a way that combines the cognitive and affective bases of these evaluations (e.g., deFigueiredo and Elkins 2003; Finell et al. 2013; Perhson et al. 2009b). So, can our framework also explain the types of xenophobia studied

---

17 Our confidence in this interpretation is boosted by the fact that we used similar (though fewer) items than deFiguieredo and Ellkins (2003) to measure national pride.
previously? We think so because those measures of xenophobia do not disentangle its cognitive and affective substrates. Thus, some variance in those measures will be related to national identity measures like ours. Still, we think future work can better serve scholars by theoretically integrating these affective and cognitive components under a single model.

A second limitation is our operationalization of outgroups as immigrants, which raises questions about whether similar results would emerge if the outgroups were other U.S. minority groups, such as Latinos and Asians. We suspect they will, given that many of the immigrant groups we analyzed (e.g., Latino immigrants) are nested under larger pan-ethnic groups (i.e., Latinos). Yet it is unclear whether such correlations would be stronger or weaker with such groups, making it an empirical question worth pursuing in future work.

A third blind spot is whether our framework extends to other minorities like Latinos and Asian Americans. We think it can, with minor theoretical adjustments. What is crucial for our framework is the durable social status difference between a majority and minority. Thus, a comparison of national attachments between Whites and Asians (Latinos) should also yield dissimilarities in identity content. Caveats enter as one grapples with the immigration-induced heterogeneity introduced by studying Asians and Latinos. Sears and Savalei (2006) note that while Blacks, Asians, and Latinos display a high degree of interest in their racial/ethnic group, this interest is stronger among foreign-born Asians and Latinos. This suggests that dissimilarities in national attachments between Whites and Asians (Latinos) might be strongest among immigrant members of these latter two groups, with such variations dissipating the longer a person is in the U.S. Hence, whereas we provide one answer to “why” there is variety in national identity content, future work on Asians and Latinos can allow scholars to more fully answer the question of “who?” most likely displays these nuances.
Bibliography


Table 1. Confirmatory Factor Analysis of National and Racial Attachments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>National pride</th>
<th>Nationalism</th>
<th>Nativism</th>
<th>Racial Identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pride-history</strong></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pride-democracy</strong></td>
<td>.876 (.059)</td>
<td>.881 (.046)</td>
<td>-1.538 -1.372</td>
<td>-674 -.553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pride-economy</strong></td>
<td>.922 (.058)</td>
<td>1.030 (.049)</td>
<td>-1.563 -1.372</td>
<td>-604 -.550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Like Americans</strong></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. no better (R)</td>
<td>.551 (.050)</td>
<td>.858 (.035)</td>
<td>-1.007 -1.254</td>
<td>-.154 -.396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More influence</td>
<td>1.003 (.058)</td>
<td>.971 (.038)</td>
<td>-1.007 -1.227</td>
<td>.298 -.233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Speak English</strong></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live in U.S.</td>
<td>.607 (.070)</td>
<td>.468 (.062)</td>
<td>-1.195 -1.211</td>
<td>-.583 -.559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be Christian</td>
<td>1.188 (.110)</td>
<td>1.081 (.082)</td>
<td>-.385 -.199</td>
<td>.176 .375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in U.S.</td>
<td>.349 (.074)</td>
<td>.291 (.065)</td>
<td>-1.405 -1.259</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Continued...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unrestricted</th>
<th>Restricted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linked fate</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked – female</td>
<td>.882</td>
<td>.690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.031)</td>
<td>(.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-1.141</td>
<td>-1.287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.553</td>
<td>-.653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.530</td>
<td>.935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked – male</td>
<td>.858</td>
<td>.805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.028)</td>
<td>(.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.994</td>
<td>-1.341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.496</td>
<td>-.665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.550</td>
<td>.935</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unrestricted</th>
<th>Restricted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CFI</td>
<td>.948</td>
<td>.900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLI</td>
<td>.930</td>
<td>.894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMSEA [90% CI]</td>
<td>.070 [.065, .075]</td>
<td>.086 [.082, .091]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ in Chi-square</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Reliable:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$p &lt; .001$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Robust weighted least squares estimates. N = 2,000. One item loading per factor is fixed to 1.00 to identify model. Factors run from 1 to 4 in 1-point units. Entries are unstandardized loadings with standard errors in parentheses. Italicized entries are item thresholds. The first column of entries in each cell is for African Americans. All loadings and thresholds are significant at the 5% level or better.

Table 2. Correlations Between Racial and National Attachments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>National Pride</th>
<th>Nationalism</th>
<th>Nativism</th>
<th>Racial Identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National pride</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>.62 (^a) / .62</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nativism</td>
<td>.30 (^a) / .36</td>
<td>.50 (^a) / .68</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Identity</td>
<td>-.25 (^a) / .17</td>
<td>-.13 (^a) / .32</td>
<td>-.18 (^a) / .29</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: “\(^a\)” denotes entry for Blacks. Entries are standardized factor correlations from table 1’s model. All entries are significant at the 5% level or better. The mean/standard deviation for each scale by race is: national pride [Blacks: .62/.22, Whites: .70/.22]; nationalism [Blacks: .46/.23, Whites: .57/.26]; nativism [Blacks: .62/.23, Whites: .60/.23]; and racial identity [Blacks: .62/.27, Whites: .62/.22].
### Table 3. White Hostility to White and Non-White Immigrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>African immigrants</th>
<th>Asian immigrants</th>
<th>Latino immigrants</th>
<th>White immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>National pride</strong></td>
<td>-.040</td>
<td>-.091*</td>
<td>-.030</td>
<td>-.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.035)</td>
<td>(.035)</td>
<td>(.039)</td>
<td>(.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nationalism</strong></td>
<td>.123*</td>
<td>.060^</td>
<td>.076*</td>
<td>-.068*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.035)</td>
<td>(.035)</td>
<td>(.038)</td>
<td>(.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nativism</strong></td>
<td>.097*</td>
<td>.084*</td>
<td>.105*</td>
<td>.053^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.035)</td>
<td>(.034)</td>
<td>(.038)</td>
<td>(.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Racial Identity</strong></td>
<td>.093*</td>
<td>.074*</td>
<td>.170*</td>
<td>.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.032)</td>
<td>(.032)</td>
<td>(.035)</td>
<td>(.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>-.094*</td>
<td>-.166*</td>
<td>-.120*</td>
<td>-.046*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.024)</td>
<td>(.024)</td>
<td>(.027)</td>
<td>(.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideology</strong></td>
<td>-.028</td>
<td>-.019</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.030)</td>
<td>(.030)</td>
<td>(.032)</td>
<td>(.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Job Concerns</strong></td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>-.008</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.029)</td>
<td>(.029)</td>
<td>(.032)</td>
<td>(.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural Concerns</strong></td>
<td>.065*</td>
<td>.052*</td>
<td>.147*</td>
<td>.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.026)</td>
<td>(.026)</td>
<td>(.029)</td>
<td>(.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>.277*</td>
<td>.406*</td>
<td>.233*</td>
<td>.366*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.036)</td>
<td>(.036)</td>
<td>(.039)</td>
<td>(.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adj. R²</strong></td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>.087</td>
<td>.160</td>
<td>.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean VIF</strong></td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>996</td>
<td>996</td>
<td>996</td>
<td>996</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *p <.05, two-tailed; ^p <.10, two-tailed. All variables run from 0 to 1. Cell entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4. Black Hostility to Black and Non-Black Immigrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>African immigrants</th>
<th>Asian immigrants</th>
<th>Latino immigrants</th>
<th>White immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>National pride</strong></td>
<td>-.095* (0.037)</td>
<td>-.129* (0.036)</td>
<td>-.107* (0.037)</td>
<td>-.242* (0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nationalism</strong></td>
<td>.072* (0.035)</td>
<td>.056^ (0.034)</td>
<td>.105* (0.035)</td>
<td>.068* (0.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nativism</strong></td>
<td>-.017 (0.034)</td>
<td>.044 (0.033)</td>
<td>.035 (0.034)</td>
<td>.031 (0.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Racial Identity</strong></td>
<td>.016 (0.027)</td>
<td>.001 (0.026)</td>
<td>.016 (0.027)</td>
<td>-.008 (0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>-.014 (0.027)</td>
<td>-.075* (0.026)</td>
<td>-.062* (0.027)</td>
<td>-.028 (0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideology</strong></td>
<td>.040 (0.033)</td>
<td>.055^ (0.032)</td>
<td>.075* (0.033)</td>
<td>.005 (0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Job Concerns</strong></td>
<td>.042^ (0.025)</td>
<td>.040^ (0.024)</td>
<td>.070* (0.025)</td>
<td>.037 (0.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural Concerns</strong></td>
<td>.035 (0.023)</td>
<td>.008 (0.022)</td>
<td>.030 (0.023)</td>
<td>.009 (0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>.341* (0.041)</td>
<td>.429* (0.040)</td>
<td>.357* (0.042)</td>
<td>.537* (0.040)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adj. R^2</strong></td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>.030</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean VIF</strong></td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**N** 994

Notes: *p < .05, two-tailed; ^p < .10, two-tailed. All variables run from 0 to 1. Cell entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
Figure 1. Marginal Effects of White National Attachments on Hostility to Specific Immigrants (95% confidence intervals)

A. Nationalism

B. Nativism
Figure 2. Marginal Effects of Black National Attachments on Hostility to Specific Immigrants (95% confidence intervals)

A. National Pride

B. Nationalism