

ONLINE APPENDIX FOR:

**Influencing the Bureaucracy:
The Irony of Congressional Oversight**

Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics and Additional Specifications

Appendix A contains descriptive statistics for the analyzed variables and additional specifications to probe the robustness of the results reported in the text.

Appendix B presents additional details on the survey from Clinton et al. (2012).

A1. Questions and Descriptive Statistics

To collect the opinions of executives on the level of influence that the various political actors exert over agency policymaking described in section 2 and analyzed in sections 3 and 4, we analyze the questions captured in the survey screen shot of Figure A1.

	A great deal	A good bit	Some	Little	None	Don't know
Democrats in Congress	<input type="radio"/>					
Republicans in Congress	<input type="radio"/>					
Congressional committees	<input type="radio"/>					
White House	<input type="radio"/>					
Office of Management and Budget	<input type="radio"/>					
Senior civil servants	<input type="radio"/>					
Political appointees	<input type="radio"/>					
Interest group representatives	<input type="radio"/>					
Public opinion	<input type="radio"/>					

Figure A1. Screen Shot of Influence Questions from the *Survey on the Future of Government Service*.

To collect the number of committees that are perceived to actively oversee the agency – the critical independent variable for our investigation -- as well as the names of the most involved committee in the House and Senate we use in the analysis of Section 5, we ask the series of questions captured in the screen shot in Figure A2.

How many congressional committees would you estimate exercise active oversight of your agency?

0
 1-2
 3-4
 5-6
 7-8
 9+

Of all the House committees, what committee's jurisdiction overlaps most with the work of your agency or program?

Of all the Senate committees, what committee's jurisdiction overlaps most with the work of your agency or program?

Figure A2. Screen Shot of Oversight Questions from the *Survey on the Future of Government Service*.

Table A1 presents the agency level variables that result from aggregating executive opinions or collecting agency level data and Table A2 provides a description of the executive level variables used in the analysis.

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev	Min	Max
<i>Difference in Influence: White House - Committees</i>	128	-.01	.58	-2	1.25
<i>Difference in Influence: White House – Dem. Party</i>	127	.55	.69	1	5
<i># Oversight Committees</i>	128	3.00	.70	1	5
<i># Policy Areas for Agency</i>	108	4.47	4.00	1	13
<i>Bush Agenda?</i>	137	.26	.44	0	1
<i>Agency Ideal Point</i>	109	.25	1.13	-1.72	2.4
<i>Independent Commission?</i>	128	.17	.38	0	1
<i>Cabinet Department?</i>	125	.51	.50	0	1
<i>% Appointees</i>	128	.13	.19	0	1
<i>% Employed in Field Office</i>	128	.14	.23	0	1
<i># Respondents</i>	128	14.48	17.48	1	87
<i>Agency Response Rate</i>	128	.30	.15	.04	1

Table A1: Agency Level Summary Statistics: The average responses for executives and program managers in the agencies and bureaus we examine.


Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>Difference in Influence: White House - Committees</i>	1816	.12	1.01	-4	4
<i>Difference in Influence: White House – Dem. Party</i>	1743	.64	1.17	-4	4
<i># Oversight Committees</i>	1798	3.21	1.10	1	6
<i># Policy Areas for Agency</i>	1674	6.20	4.36	1	13
<i>Bush Agenda</i>	1816	.39	.49	0	1
<i>Agency Ideal Point</i>	1729	.18	1.07	-1.72	2.4
<i>Independent Commission?</i>	1816	.09	.28	0	1
<i>Cabinet Department?</i>	1791	.68	.47	0	1
<i>Bureaucrats’ Ideal Point</i>	1765	-.04	.82	-1.51	1.79
<i>Appointee Indicator</i>	1810	.11	.32	0	1
<i>Employed in Field Office?</i>	1809	.19	.39	0	1
<i>Years Employed in Agency</i>	1801	18.68	11.71	0	50
<i>Executive Pay Grade</i>	1744	5.23	2.45	1	11

Table A2: Executive Level Summary Statistics: The distribution of individual responses. These are aggregated to produce the means reported in Table A1.

A2. Measuring Relative Influence

For descriptive purposes, Figure A3 presents the distribution of the individual level differences in perceived influence – i.e., White House influence – committee influence (top) and White House influence – Democratic party influence (bottom). The modal response of 0 suggests equal influence, but the positive skew of the distribution suggests that more executives report greater White House influence than either congressional committees (top) or the majority party in Congress (bottom). The results suggest that, to the extent that parties matter for influencing agency policy, they largely do so through the committee system.

Distribution of White House Influence – Committee Influence



Distribution of White House Influence – Democrat Influence




Figure A3: White House Influence Relative to Congress: Higher values indicate greater White House Influence.

A3. *Measuring Committee Oversight*

There is a modest (.39) correlation between the agency average and the number of unique committees holding a published hearing related to agency policy in the prior year according to the *Policy Agendas* dataset (Figure A4). (Using the number of hearings reveals a similar pattern.) Moreover, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has the highest average response as well as the highest number of unique committees holding hearings, and agencies such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the National Archives and Record Administration (NARA) have the least amount of oversight according to either measure.




Figure A4: Relationship Between the Average Number of Committees Reported to be Conducting Active Oversight (Self-Reported) and the Number of Committees Holding Hearings: Committee hearing data based on the Policy Agendas Project (www.policyagendas.org).

As yet another check on the validity of our measure, we use the daily issues of the Congressional Record for the 110th Congress to identify each hearing at which an executive branch official testified. There were a total of 5,819 unique hearing appearances in the 110th Congress by executive branch officials from the agencies

represented in our survey. Counting the number of committees and subcommittees that heard testimony for each agency reveals a correlation of .47 between this measure of committee oversight and our agency survey average. DHS again stands out as having one of the highest numbers of unique committees (26 committees and 60 subcommittees heard testimony from DHS officials).

A4. Robustness Results: Table 1 in the Text

Table A3 replicates the results of Table 1 in the text using the number of committees that held hearings involving the agency during the 110th Congress instead of the respondents' perceptions of the average number of committees with oversight jurisdiction. The results are in the same direction, but the effect is extremely imprecise. For the reasons we provide in the text, we believe that our measure is superior as it is not entirely clear what the number of committees holding hearings means in terms of the level of active oversight.

	White House Influence Relative to Congressional Committees	White House Influence Relative to Congressional Committees	White House Influence Relative to Democratic Party	White House Influence Relative to Democratic Party
	All Executives	Careerists Only	All Executives	Careerists Only
	(Model 1)	(Model 2)	(Model 3)	(Model 4)
<i>Constant (Std. Err)</i>	.37* (.15)	.37* (.16)	.90* (.14)	.92* (.15)
<i># of Committees Holding Hearings</i>	.009 (.009)	.009 (.009)	.006 (.01)	.004 (.01)
<i># Policy Areas for Agency</i>	.02 (.01)	.009 (.01)	.03 (.02)	.02 (.02)
<i>Bush Agenda?</i>	-.03 .11	.02 (.13)	-.06 (.14)	-.03 (.15)
<i>Agency Ideal Point</i>	-.12* (.05)	-.11* (.06)	-.10 (.06)	-.09 (.06)
<i>Independent Commission?</i>	-.90* (.19)	-1.24* (.26)	-.88* (.22)	-1.19* (.25)

<i>Cabinet Department?</i>	-.31* (.13)	-.35* (.14)	-.24 (.15)	-.28* (.15)
<i>% Political Appointees</i>	-.31 (.74)		-.43 (.54)	
<i>% Employed in Field Office</i>	-.13 (.17)	.03 (.20)	-.29 (.24)	-.13 (.25)
<i>R²</i>	.49	.52	.45	.49
<i>N</i>	58	58	58	58

Table A3: Agency Level Regression Results for the Effect of Multiple Committee Oversight (i.e., Holding Hearings) on Influence. * denotes two-tailed significance at .10 or better.

A5. *Individual Level Analysis – Additional Models*

Because executives and program managers work for a larger agency or bureau, running a regression on the pooled responses is inadvisable because of unaccounted for agency-level effects (that are therefore clearly not independent across respondents). For motivation, consider the simple univariate regression of executive *i*'s opinions about the perceived relative influence of the president in agency *j* (Y_{ij}) and the number of committees perceived to be exercising oversight in agency *j* (X_{ij}) given by:

$Y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{ij} + u_j + u_{ij}$. In addition to the typical idiosyncratic errors u_{ij} , there are also likely omitted effects correlated within an agency (denoted by u_j) because multiple executives and program managers belong to the same agency.

There are several ways to account for common unobserved factors. Agency level fixed effects permit the unknown agency level effects u_j to be correlated with the included covariates X_{ij} and estimates separate agency-level intercepts. A random effects model assumes that the agency level errors u_j are uncorrelated with the included covariates, but allows the error variance to differ across agencies. A “mixed” effects model (sometimes called a multilevel model or a hierarchical model) specifies covariates for the variation in u_j (i.e., there is a regression for the respondent level characteristics

and a regression for the agency level characteristics).¹ The results are not sensitive to how we model the omitted agency effects. Table A4 reports the results of various model specifications for this relationship.

White House Influence Relative to Congressional Committees	OLS	Fixed Effects by Agency	Random Effects by Agency	Mixed Effect Model by Agency
<i>Constant</i> (Std. Err)	-.0002 (.13)	-.14 (.11)	-.20 (.13)	-.05 (.11)
<i># Oversight Committees</i>	.08* (.03)	.07* (.03)	.07* (.02)	.07* (.02)
<i># Policy Areas for Agency</i>	.02 (.01)			
<i>Bush Agenda?</i>	.04 (.07)			
<i>Agency Ideal Point</i>	-.12* (.03)			
<i>Independent Commission?</i>	-.91* (.16)			
<i>Cabinet Department?</i>	-.22* (.11)			
<i>Bureaucrats' Ideal Point</i>	-.08* (.04)	-.07* (.04)	-.07* (.03)	-.07* (.03)
<i>Appointee Indicator</i>	-.05 (.10)	-.01 (.09)	-.02 (.09)	-.04 (.09)
<i>Employed in Field Office?</i>	-.02 (.06)	.07 (.08)	.07 (.07)	-.02 (.07)
<i>Years Employed in Agency</i>	-.002 (.002)	-.001 (.002)	-.001 (.002)	-.002 (.002)
<i>Executive Pay Grade</i>	-.002 (.01)	.008 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.0001 (.01)
R ²	.09	.13		
N	1509	1670	1670	1521

Table A4: Executive Level Regression Results for the Effect of Multiple Committee Oversight on White House Influence. * denotes two-tailed significance at .10 or better. Standard errors are clustered by agency in Models 5 and 6.

¹ A Hausman test comparing the difference in coefficient estimates for fixed and random effects models using a Hausman test yields a test statistic of 6.09 with 6 degrees of freedom. Nonetheless, we report estimates from both models.

Regardless of the model used, Table A4 reveals that the coefficient on the number of oversight committees is distinguishable from zero and of nearly identical substantive magnitude.

A6. *Robustness Results: Influence of Interest Groups*

It is well known that that measures of congressional involvement may be inadequate because Congress can rely on others to monitor and influence bureaucratic activity (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). To address this possibility, we examine how much influence interest groups are reported to have over agency policy according to the executives. Interest groups are reported to have far less influence than congressional committees. Even if Congress relies on interest groups to monitor agency activity, in the eyes of the individuals responsible for directing agency policy, interest groups are not substitutes for congressional involvement. Possible involvement by interest groups in agency policy making does not undermine the conclusions that follow.²

Table A5 looks at the relative influence of the White House relative to interest groups to examine whether the relationship in the text is a misleading indication of the level of congressional influence because of the ability of committees to rely on interest groups to affect agency policy. The results in Table A5 are qualitatively identical to the results in Table 1 – more committee involvement leads to more presidential influence relative to interest group influence. The fact that the relationship is unchanged suggests that interest groups are not substitutes for congressional committees.

² Additionally, because we focus on variation among agencies, so long as interest group activity is either correlated with the number of involved committees (or, in fact, any other variable that we control for in the regressions that follow), the possibility of additional groups monitoring agency activity does not affect our substantive conclusions.

	White House Influence Relative to Int. Groups	White House Influence Relative to Int. Groups
	All Executives	Careerists Only
<i>Constant</i> (Std. Err)	-.66 (.48)	-1.01 (.68)
<i>Average # of Oversight Committees</i>	.57* (.16)	.57* (.19)
<i># Policy Areas for Agency</i>	-.004 (.02)	.005 (.02)
<i>Bush Agenda?</i>	.03 (.13)	-.10 (.23)
<i>Agency Ideal Point</i>	-.01 (.06)	-.38* (.09)
<i>Independent Commission?</i>	-.98* (.21)	-.47 (.44)
<i>Cabinet Department?</i>	-.27* (.15)	.02 (.26)
<i>% Political Appointees</i>	.41 (.44)	
<i>% Employed in Field Office</i>	-.48* (.20)	.05 (.41)
R ²	.52	.24
N	95	95

Table A5: Agency Level Regression Results for the Effect of Multiple Committee Oversight on Presidential influence relative to Interest Groups: * denotes two-tailed significance at .10 or better.

A7. Robustness Results: Influence of Democratic Party

Table A5 replicates the results of Table 3 in the text for the influence of the president relative to the Democratic Party. As was the case in Table 3, the results are not affected by accounting for omitted agency-level variation. The estimated effect of increasing the number of committees on the difference in presidential and congressional influence ranges from .10 to .12.

White House Influence Relative to Democratic Party	OLS	Fixed Effects by Agency	Random Effects by Agency	Mixed Effect Model by Agency
<i>Constant</i> (Std. Err)	.18 (.15)	.26 (.14)	.25* (.14)	.30* (.13)

# Oversight Committees	.12* (.02)	.10* (.03)	.10* (.03)	.11* (.03)
# Policy Areas for Agency	.03* (.01)			
Agency Ideal Point	-.08* (.04)			
Independent Commission?	-.78* (.16)			
Bureaucrats' Ideal Point	-.15* (.04)	-.14* (.04)	-.14* (.04)	-.15* (.04)
Appointee Indicator	-.14 (.10)	-.10 (.10)	-.11 (.10)	-.13 (.11)
Employed in Field Office?	-.17* (.09)	-.07 (.09)	-.06 (.08)	-.14* (.08)
Years Employed in Agency	.001 (.003)	.002 (.002)	.001 (.003)	.001 (.003)
Executive Pay Grade	.004 (.02)	.01 (.02)	.01 (.01)	.006 (.01)
R ²	.09	.12		
N	1460	1584	1584	1446

Table A6: Regression Results for the Effect of Multiple Committee Oversight on Democratic Party Influence. * denotes two-tailed significance at .10 or better. Standard errors are clustered by agency in Models 1 and 2.

To be clear, while this may understand the actual influence of parties if parties act through the committee system, the motivation for conducting this analysis was to ensure that we were not underestimating the influence of Congress by ignoring the influence of political parties outside of the committee system. Because the influence of the parties does not mitigate the relationship between the number of committees and relative presidential influence, the critical conclusion for us is that while parties may ameliorate the deleterious effects of multiple principles, the effect still persists.

A.8 Bayesian Hierarchical Model Results

Given the results of Table 3, there should be no reason to suspect that a different answer results from using a Bayesian hierarchical model. Nonetheless, we estimate hierarchical models allowing the intercepts to vary according to agency characteristics as

well as a model that allowed the intercept and the slope coefficient on *Number of Committees* to vary. None of the substantive results are sensitive to this specification choice – presidential influence relative to Congress increases as the number of involved committees increases.

For executive i , serving in agency j , we estimate their opinion on the influence of the president relative to Congress controlling for aspects at the individual and agency level that may either affect the actual amount of relative influence or affect the individual’s perception of the relative influence.

$$y_i = \alpha_{[j]} + \beta_{[j]} \times Num.Comm_i + X[i,]\theta + \varepsilon_i$$

where $X[i,]$ is a row vector of individual level characteristics that may affect the actual or perceived amount of relative influence over that aspect of agency j in which individual i works and θ is the column vector of individual level coefficients.

To allow for the average amount of relative influence to vary across agencies, we estimate a separate intercept for each agency ($\alpha_{[j]}$). We can also allow for the relationship between the number of committees involved in the oversight of any agency and the relative amount of presidential influence to vary across agencies by estimating separate intercepts for each agency ($\beta_{[j]}$).

Because we can hypothesize about the agency level characteristics that may explain variation in the relative influence of the president, we model the agency level intercepts using agency level data. More precisely, $\alpha = Z\kappa + \zeta$ where Z is a matrix of agency level covariates, κ is the column vector of agency level coefficients. The individual and agency level covariates are as described in the text. We assume

diffuse, mean-zero, priors for the coefficient vectors θ and κ and we assume that the varying intercepts are drawn from a common distribution: $\alpha_{ij} \sim N(\mu, \tau)$.

The JAGS code for estimating a model with varying intercepts with individual and agency covariates, as well as the choice of priors is as follows:

```
model{
  for(i in 1:N){
    y[i] ~ dnorm(y.hat[i], tau.y)
    y.hat[i] <- a[agency[i]] + b*numcom[i] +
inprod(b.0[], x.0[i,])
  }

  tau.y <- pow(sigma.y, -2)
  sigma.y ~ dunif(0,100)
  b ~ dnorm(0, .0001)

  for(j in 1:J){
    a[j] ~ dnorm(a.hat[j], Tau.A)
    a.hat[j] <- inprod(g.a[], U[j,])
  }

  for(k in 1:K.0){
    b.0[k] ~ dnorm(0, .0001)
  }

  for(k in 1:(G.0)){
    g.a[k] ~ dnorm(0, .0001)
  }

  Tau.A <- pow(sigma.a, -2)
  sigma.a ~ dunif(0,100)
}
```

A.9: Distribution of Congressional Ideal Points

Figure A5 plots the distribution of ideal points of all members of Congress using the ideal point estimates that are used in Section 5. The fact that the Senate median in the Democratically-controlled Senate is positive is entirely an artifact of the mean 0, variance 1 normalization assumption after including the “votes” of the career executives (who are

more likely to be liberal than conservative and who are more numerous than members of Congress).




Figure A5: Distribution of Agency Comparable Ideal Points in the 110th House and Senate: Using the estimates of Clinton et al (2012), we plot the density of ideal points in the House (shaded) and Senate (unshaded) as well as the locations of President Bush and the chamber medians.

Appendix B: Details of the Survey on the Future of Government Service

The principal investigators of the survey obtained the contact information for all federal agency administrators and program managers from Leadership Directories, Inc., the firm that publishes the *Federal Yellow Book*. Of the 7,448 names provided, 297 turned out to be incorrect; they either were no longer in their position, they do not work in a strictly federal entity (e.g., Delaware River Basin Commission) or their contact information was incorrect. The survey was web-based and conducted by the Princeton Survey Research Center (PSRC). Each potential respondent was sent a letter on Princeton University letterhead inviting them to participate and giving them options about how to do so. Those for whom PSRC had email addresses (77%) were told that they would be getting an email of the survey one week after the initial letter. They were also told they could go to a website and login immediately with information included in the invitation letter. All respondents for whom PSRC had an email received an initial letter, an email invitation, up to three follow up email reminders, and a telephone call. The response rate from this group was 35%.

Those for whom PSRC did not have email addresses were asked to provide an email or go to the website directly and use the login and password provided. PSRC then scheduled a series of follow up emails, letters, and ultimately, telephone calls. Those respondents whose email PSRC did not have received an initial letter, a follow up letter, a telephone call, and a final reminder letter. The response rate for this group was 20%.

The overall response rate (once the 297 incorrect names were excluded) is 33% (2,368/7,151). Of the 2,368 respondents, 2,043 completed the full survey. Agency-by-agency, the lowest responders were the Executive Office of the President (11%), the

United States Post Office (15%), and the Department of the Treasury (20%). The highest responders were the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (56%), the Federal Trade Commission (63%), and the National Archives and Records Administration (71%). Agencies closer to the president have lower response rates on average than other agencies.

While our survey has many more respondents than prior surveys, the fact that we are trying to interview every executive results in a lower response rate than some prior interviews and executive surveys. In conducting personal interviews, Golden 2000 achieves a 90.8% response rate and Aberbach and Rockman 2000 achieve a responses rate of 88.4%. In terms of survey response rates, Maranto (1993a; 1993b) has a response rate of 49%, and the work of Maranto (2005) and Maranto and Hult (2004) used 1993 survey data (49%) and newer data (42%). In their survey conducted in the early 1970s, Meier and Nigro (1976) had a 56% response rates. While our 35% response rate is slightly lower than some of the prior surveys, there is a robust debate in the survey literature about the relationship between response rates and data quality and many scholars conclude that there is very little relationship between the two in practice (e.g., Merkle and Edelman 2002).³

The response rate was noticeably higher among career professionals than appointees. The survey produced responses from 259 political appointees, compared to 2,021 career professionals. Of the appointees, 102 are Senate-confirmed appointees. Of the approximately 550 policy-relevant Senate-confirmed appointees, this amounts to a 19% response rate. There are 131 appointed members of the Senior Executive Service

³ Merkle, Daniel and Murray Edelman. 2002. "Nonresponse in Exit Polls: A Comprehensive Analysis," In *Survey Nonresponse*, ed. Robert Groves, Don Dillman, John Eltinge, and Rod Little, pp. 243-58. NY: Wiley.

(SES) who responded out of approximately 700 total (19%), but not all of the 700 appointees in the SES are administrators or program managers. This suggests that the response rate from appointees in the SES is higher.

In the sample, PhDs and men were also more likely to respond to the survey. The original list also included 461 potential respondents from the National Science Foundation (NSF) because the firm incorrectly labeled NSF program officers as managers or executives. If NSF employees are removed the response rate is 33% (2,225/6,690).

Nonresponse weights based on available covariates such as gender, agency, and whether the appointee was a career civil servant or a political appointee were constructed and applied to the data when constructing the agency means, but no appreciable differences emerged from so doing.

B1. The effect of item non-response:

Among the 2,300+ respondents who respond to the survey, not everyone provides valid answers. Table A2 summarized the number of responses to the various questions, but to examine whether the unit non-response is driven by partisan or ideological beliefs that would be problematic for interpreting the meaning of our results, we predict the probability of answering the influence questions as a function of self reported partisanship, ideology and the ideal point of respondents as measured from a series of specific policy questions. Specifically, we use responses to a 7-point ideology question where 1 indicates “very conservative” and 7 indicates “very liberal,” and a five point scale ranging from Strong Democrat (1) to Strong Republican (5) along with their

estimated ideal point along with years of employment, executive pay grade and whether the respondent is in a field office reveals.

Table A6 reveals that the only characteristic that affects the probability of non-response is whether the respondent resides in a field office.⁴ Respondents whose main source of employment is in a field office are less likely to provide a response to the influence question, but not only are they a relatively small percentage of the respondents (14%), and it is unclear whether the tasks of executives in field offices differ from the tasks of executives in DC. The increased non-response may be do to the fact that field office work has very little political interaction and the non-response reflects an inability to answer the question rather than a desire to duck the question. Regardless of the reason, we control for field office status in the results reported in the text.

White House Influence Relative to Congressional Committees	Coefficient (Std. Err.)
<i>Appointee Indicator</i>	.25 (.20)
<i>Employed in Field Office?</i>	-.54* (.11)
<i>Years Employed in Agency</i>	.01 (.004)
<i>Executive Pay Grade</i>	.03 (.02)
<i>Partisanship</i>	-.02 (.04)
<i>Ideology</i>	-.02 (.05)
R ²	.07
N	1636

Table B1: Predicting Item Non-Response (on Influence Questions).

B2. Agency Response Rates

⁴ We also include agency fixed effects to control for differences across agencies that may result because of differential response across agencies and the fact that some agencies are also more partisan than others.

Table B2 provides a list of all agencies covered by the survey as well as their individual response rates. For agencies that are bureaus within a larger department, the department is indicated in parentheses.

Agency	Response Rate
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (DOD)	0.215
Administration for Children and Families (HHS)	0.800
Agricultural Marketing Service (USDA)	0.323
Agricultural Research Service (USDA)	0.417
Air Force (DOD)	0.263
Air Traffic Organization (DOT)	0.208
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA)	0.250
Appalachian Regional Commission	0.200
Army (DOD)	0.311
Army Corps of Engineers (DOD)	0.300
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System	0.211
Broadcasting Board of Governors	0.158
Bureau of Labor Statistics (DOL)	0.476
Bureau of Land Management (INT)	0.318
Bureau of the Census (COM)	0.434
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (HHS)	0.182
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (HHS)	0.231
Commodity Futures Trading Commission	0.222
Comptroller (DOD)	0.200
Consumer Product Safety Commission	0.357
Customs and Border Protection (DHS)	0.243
Defense Logistics Agency (DOD)	0.200
Department of Agriculture	0.308
Department of Commerce	0.234
Department of Defense	0.213
Department of Education	0.219
Department of Energy	0.226
Department of Health and Human Services	0.269
Department of Homeland Security	0.136
Department of Housing and Urban Development	0.317
Department of Interior	0.303
Department of Justice	0.190
Department of Labor	0.284
Department of State	0.307

Department of the Treasury	0.166
Department of Transportation	0.246
Department of Veterans Affairs	0.344
Employment and Training Administration (ETA)	0.350
Environmental Protection Agency	0.254
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission	0.231
Executive Office of the President	0.205
Export-Import Bank of the United States	0.192
Federal Aviation Administration (DOT)	0.224
Federal Bureau of Prisons (DOJ)	0.256
Federal Communications Commission	0.175
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation	0.111
Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS)	0.364
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission	0.379
Federal Highway Administration (DOT)	0.255
Federal Housing Finance Board	0.600
Federal Maritime Commission	0.188
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (DOT)	0.296
Federal Trade Commission	0.475
Federal Transit Administration (DOT)	0.292
Food and Drug Administration (HHS)	0.235
Food and Nutrition Service (USDA)	0.200
Forest Service (USDA)	0.240
General Services Administration	0.398
Health Resources and Services Administration (HHS)	0.333
Indian Health Services (HHS)	0.269
Institute of Museum and Library Services	0.250
Internal Revenue Service (TRS)	0.141
Joint Chiefs of Staff (DOD)	0.179
National Aeronautics and Space Administration	0.317
National Archives and Records Administration	0.607
National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities	0.200
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (DOT)	0.407
National Institute of Standards and Technology (COM)	0.343
National Institutes of Health (HHS)	0.245
National Labor Relations Board	0.446
National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE)	0.160
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (COM)	0.413
National Resources Conservation Service (USDA)	0.480
Navy (DOD)	0.220
Networks and Information Integration (DOD)	0.143

Nuclear Regulatory Commission	0.500
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (DOL)	0.185
Office of Legal Advisor (STAT)	0.286
Office of Management and Budget (EOP)	0.040
Office of Personnel Management	0.250
Office of Postmast General and Chief Executive Officer (USPS)	0.107
Peace Corps	0.294
Personnel and Readiness (DOD)	0.125
Railroad Retirement Board	0.333
Rural Development (USDA)	0.236
Securities and Exchange Commission	0.167
Small Business Administration	0.322
Smithsonian Institution	0.255
Social Security Administration	0.377
Underscretary of the Navy (DOD)	0.379
Undersecretary for Management (STAT)	0.229
Undersecretary for Political Affairs (STAT)	0.094
Undersecretary of the Army (DOD)	0.500
United States Agency for International Development	0.238
United States International Trade Commission	0.400
United States Marine Corps (DOD)	0.333
United States Patent and Trademark Office (COM)	0.130
United States Postal Service	0.154
Veterans Benefits Administration (DVA)	0.355
Veterans Health Administration (DVA)	0.293
Vice Chief of Naval Operations (DOD)	0.203
Vice Chief of Staff, Airforce (DOD)	0.226
Vice Chief of Staff, Army (DOD)	0.167

Table B2: Agency Response Rates.

Table B3 presents agency response rates as a function of agency structural and personnel features. Our structural variables include whether the agency is in the cabinet, is an independent commission, or a bureau within a larger department; the number of policy areas an agency’s programs cover; the number of programs implemented by the agency; agency ideology; and whether the agency is on President Bush’s agenda. Our agency personnel variables include the number of employees who work in the agency and the number of potential respondents in the agency sample.

Response Rate of Agencies	Coefficient (Std. Err.)
<i>Cabinet</i>	-0.020 (0.028)
<i>Independent Commission</i>	0.010 (0.038)
<i>Bureau</i>	-0.001 (0.001)
<i>Number of Policy Areas</i>	0.003 (0.005)
<i>Number of Programs</i>	-0.003 (0.001)
<i>Agency Ideology</i>	-0.004 (0.012)
<i>Bush Agenda</i>	0.003 (0.023)
<i>Employment</i>	-0.006 (0.007)
<i>Potential Respondents</i>	0.000 (0.000)
R ²	0.128
N	95

Table B3. Regression Results for Agency Response Rates.

Table B3 reveals that neither the structural features of an agency nor agency personnel characteristics significantly affect the response rate of the agency. There are certainly different response rates across agencies, but these differences are not related to aspects that are plausibly related to the ideological nature of the agency in ways that would create concern for the analyses that we conduct.