

Political Attitudes in the Post-Network Era

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The audience for network television news has declined dramatically in the past 20 years, and the 1996 and 2000 election cycles have seen significant declines in the amount of coverage the networks devote to electoral politics. Meanwhile, candidates, parties, and interest groups have spent rapidly escalating sums of money on political advertising. Our analysis suggests that these dramatic shifts in the flow of political communication have had only modest and largely offsetting effects on political attitudes. Americans' interest in political campaigns and faith in the electoral process have *declined* as a result of decreasing exposure to network television news but *increased* as a result of increasing exposure to political advertising. Conversely, trust in government and positive evaluations of the presidential candidates have *increased* as a result of declining exposure to network news but *declined* as a result of increasing exposure to political ads. The estimated impact of ad exposure is sensitive to the positive or negative tone of ads, with more positive ads producing more favorable attitudes toward politicians and government but less interest and faith in the electoral process. Unfortunately, *no* combination of news coverage and advertising (whether positive or negative) seems likely to increase political engagement without decreasing political allegiance, or to increase political allegiance without decreasing political engagement.

Political Attitudes in the Post-Network Era¹

The past several years have seen fundamental changes in the flow of political communication to the American public. Network television, which has been most Americans' primary source of political news for almost four decades, has gradually lost a significant fraction of its audience to a plethora of more specialized cable television channels. In response to this development, among others, the network news divisions have drastically contracted their political coverage, leaving viewers who lack the resources or motivation to seek out politics on cable, in print, or on the Internet with much-reduced access to the electoral process. At the same time, paid political advertising has become increasingly ubiquitous, with candidates, parties, and interest groups all raising and spending vastly more money to promote themselves and their political views, primarily through 30-second television ads. Together, these trends have produced a substantial shift away from non-partisan political news (produced and controlled primarily by journalists) toward partisan political communication (produced and controlled primarily by politicians).²

Our aim in this chapter is to explore the political ramifications of this shift. We do so by examining the impact of exposure to network television news coverage and political advertising on public attitudes toward the candidates, the electoral process, and the broader political system.

The data for our analysis come from American National Election Study (NES) surveys

¹ An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the 2000 meeting of the American Political Science Association in Washington, DC. We are grateful to Tom Rudolph for invaluable research assistance, to John Zaller for helpful discussion, and to John Geer, Carlos Gutierrez, Daron Shaw, and John Zaller for providing published and unpublished data.

² On the struggle between journalists and politicians for control of political communication see Zaller (1999). Whereas Zaller emphasizes competition for control of news content, the trends we highlight here have made news content a less important battleground in the broader struggle than it was in the heyday of the non-partisan mass media. The network anchors' Maginot Line is crumbling; their corporate bosses have already implemented a strategic retreat; and the candidates and parties are busily parachuting

conducted before and after the presidential elections of 1988, 1992, and 1996. By tracing the effects of varying quantities of campaign news and campaign ads across and within these three campaign seasons, we hope to illuminate the political consequences of declining network news coverage, on one hand, and of increasing political advertising, on the other.

Our analysis suggests that the effects of decreasing exposure to network news coverage and increasing exposure to political ads have been modest and largely offsetting. Campaign interest and faith in the electoral process have *declined* as a result of decreasing exposure to network news but *increased* as a result of increasing exposure to political ads. Conversely, evaluations of the presidential candidates and trust in government have *increased* as a result of decreasing exposure to network news but *declined* as a result of increasing exposure to political ads. Thus, rather surprisingly (and perhaps ironically), campaign advertising appears to be a fairly effective substitute for campaign news, and vice versa -- at least in the current political environment, and for the constellation of political attitudes considered here.

Our analysis also suggests that the impact of political advertising depends significantly upon whether that advertising is predominantly positive or negative in tone. Exposure to predominantly positive ads tends to produce more favorable attitudes toward politicians and government, but also less interest in the campaign and faith in the electoral process; conversely, exposure to predominantly negative ads tends to produce more interest in the campaign and faith in the electoral process, but also less favorable attitudes toward the candidates and less trust in government. Unfortunately, *no* combination of news coverage and advertising (whether positive or negative) seems likely to increase political engagement without decreasing political allegiance, or to increase political allegiance without decreasing political engagement.

hundreds of millions of dollars in “soft money” behind enemy lines.

The Transformation of Political Communication

One of the most important changes in the landscape of American politics in the past twenty years has been the decline of network television as the quintessential mass medium of political communication. By the mid-1960s the penetration of television into American households was virtually complete; network television journalists like Walter Cronkite and Chet Huntley had established themselves as authoritative reporters and commentators on conventions, assassinations, and other important political events; and television had already surpassed newspapers as the American public's most important source of news (Donovan and Scherer 1992). Through the 1970s and early 1980s the three major networks shared about 90 percent of the total television audience, they were enormously profitable, and their news divisions were heavily subsidized bastions of prestige journalism (Auletta 1991).

However, by the early 1980s the proliferation of VCRs and the increasing variety and penetration of cable television channels were beginning to make a perceptible dent in the networks' share of the total television audience. The 1990s brought additional competition from satellite television and the Internet. A no-longer "captive" audience could, and increasingly did, abandon the networks' sitcoms and police dramas for alternative fare. It also could, and increasingly did, tune out network coverage of presidential addresses, campaign debates, and other political events in favor of non-political alternatives, bringing an end to what Baum and Kernell (1999) have referred to as "the golden age of presidential television."

The steady and substantial decline of the network television audience over the past 20 years has by no means spared the networks' flagship evening news programs. That fact is reflected in Figure 1, which tracks the combined Nielsen ratings of the three major networks'

half-hour evening news broadcasts from 1970 to the present. Through the 1970s the combined rating for all three evening news programs averaged about 36 (that is, 36 percent of all homes with televisions tuned in to one or another of the three networks' news broadcasts on a typical evening). The corresponding combined rating for the 1999-2000 television season was 23 — a decline in the network news audience of more than one-third since the 1970s, and of more than 40 percent from the high point of 1979-80.

***** Figure 1 *****

Few analysts and observers seem to expect the steady hemorrhaging of the network news audience evident in Figure 1 to end any time soon. Indeed, one former network news executive, Jon Katz (quoted by Mayer 2000, 30) has colorfully asserted that “network news is basically a corpse that hasn’t been pronounced yet.” Our own view is that Katz’s death certificate is more than a bit premature: even at its current rate of decline, the network news audience will be large enough to be politically significant for many years to come. Nevertheless, the long-term prognosis for network news implied by the trend in Figure 1 seems to us to be sufficiently bleak to warrant some consideration of the possible political shape of a “post-network” era.

The political implications of the long, steady erosion of the network news audience evident in Figure 1 may be exacerbated by more recent changes in patterns of network news coverage. Since the mid-1980s network news divisions have been under increasing economic pressure from new (and newly profit-minded) corporate owners unwilling to treat their news operations as loss leaders. To significant degrees, all three networks have streamlined news production, shifted resources from unprofitable “hard news” to more profitable “soft news” (including primetime news magazines and morning news programs), and pressed producers and

reporters to tailor their coverage more carefully to the tastes of their viewers. In recent years, one of the primary casualties of increasing sensitivity to (perceived) viewer tastes has been the networks' traditional focus on national politics and elections.

Figure 2 displays one measure of the amount of network news coverage devoted to each of the past eight presidential campaigns. The data represent the average number of total minutes of coverage of each year's fall campaign on each of the three major networks' evening news programs, as measured by John Zaller.³ The figures range from a high of 481 minutes in 1992 to a low of 248 minutes in 1996. Although there is no clear trend over the entire period, the sharp drop in coverage between 1992 and 1996 seems consistent with the hypothesis that networks in the current economic environment have become increasingly reluctant to lavish coverage on campaigns and elections.

***** Figure 2 *****

Some journalists and news executives have argued that the sharp decline in political coverage in 1996 simply reflected the fact that it was a boring election year. President Clinton was renominated without opposition; by early March the Republicans had settled on a familiar figure, Bob Dole, to run against him; neither candidate said or did anything very extraordinary during the campaign; and Clinton maintained a solid lead in trial heats right up to Election Day.

If the paucity of election coverage in 1996 was attributable to the specific circumstances of that campaign, we should presumably expect to see a significant rebound in coverage in 2000

³ These data are derived from a broader content analysis of campaign coverage from 1948 through 1996 in *Time* and *Newsweek* magazines and *The New York Times* and on the broadcast television networks. See Zaller (1999) for further description and analysis. Content analysis done by the Center for Media Affairs for Stephen Hess (2000a) at the Brookings Institution finds similar average totals for 1992 (475 minutes) and 1996 (263 minutes).

– especially with both parties’ nominations seriously contested, George W. Bush and John McCain emerging as attractive new figures on the political scene, and trial heats suggesting a close general election contest. Instead, the networks have devoted even less attention to the electoral process in 2000 than they did in 1996. Gutierrez’s (2000) content analysis comparing coverage of the 1996 and 2000 campaigns on ABC’s evening news program, *World News Tonight*, indicates that the average share of total news coverage devoted to the presidential election declined from 13 percent in the first six months of 1996 to 10 percent in the first six months of 2000 – a decline of almost one-fourth from the already-low level of 1996. A parallel analysis by the Center for Media and Public Affairs recorded even bigger declines – 38 percent for ABC and 33 percent for all three major broadcast networks combined (Center for Media and Public Affairs 2000). At the time of this writing, the decline in coverage appears to have continued into the traditional fall campaign season. According to the Center’s analysis of campaign coverage since Labor Day, total network coverage of the campaign in the first four weeks of the fall campaign is down 6% over 1996 levels (Hess 2000b). The decisions by all of the broadcast television networks to curtail their coverage of the 2000 conventions “is merely one more example of the radical shift in election coverage on television,” according to a recent *New York Times* report (Marks 2000a). “CNN and its cable competitors – C-Span, MSNBC and Fox News Channel – have usurped the role of the old broadcast networks as the dominant source for the nation’s political news.” The same point was made early in the 2000 primary season by a mainstay of the old broadcast networks, ABC News correspondent Sam Donaldson (quoted by Bark 2000), who observed that “we are doing a very minimal amount of coverage [of the presidential campaign] at ABC. ... Outside of ‘Nightline’ and our Sunday show, ABC News in my view has simply forfeited the field.”

The further decline of election news coverage during the 2000 campaign seems to reinforce the suspicion that the decline in campaign coverage in 1996 reflected economic pressures as much or more than it did judgments about intrinsic news value. We can use the data in Figures 1 and 2 to test this suspicion somewhat more systematically by examining the statistical relationship between campaign news coverage and network ratings over the past seven presidential election cycles. A log-log regression of total network news *COVERAGE* of each year's campaign (Zaller's measure of total minutes of coverage averaged across the three major networks) on network news *RATINGS* (lagged one season), election *YEAR*, and public *INTEREST* (as measured by the average level of interest in the NES survey at the beginning of each fall campaign)⁴ produces the following results:

$$\ln(\text{COVERAGE}) = - 796.9 + 2.769 \ln(\text{RATINGS}) + 103.62 \ln(\text{YEAR}) + 1.591 \ln(\text{INTEREST})$$

| | | | |
|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| (367.9) | (1.290) | (47.60) | (1.059) |
|---------|---------|---------|---------|

$$R^2 = .62; \text{ adj. } R^2 = .25; \text{ std. error of reg.} = .207; \text{ DW} = 2.53; \text{ N} = 7 \text{ (1972-96)}$$

Obviously, it would be rash to take too seriously the results of a regression analysis with four coefficients estimated on the basis of seven observations. Nevertheless, these results do tend to substantiate the suspicion that the networks' taste for campaign coverage has been sensitive to their ratings: as the networks' audience has shrunk, so has the amount of time they spend covering presidential campaigns. This effect of declining ratings has been mitigated by a

⁴ The NES data are described more fully below. For each election year, our measure of pre-existing public interest in the campaign is the intercept from a regression of campaign interest on birth cohort, education, race, gender, strength of partisanship, and date of pre-election interview. The variables are recoded so that this intercept reflects the expected level of campaign interest as of Labor Day for a white female born in 1936 with a high school diploma and "not strong" partisanship. The values (on a zero-to-

separate tendency to increase campaign coverage net of ratings, as measured by the positive coefficient for the *YEAR* variable. However, the relative magnitudes of the two effects suggest that the positive time trend is likely to be swamped by the negative impact on campaign coverage of any significant declines in the size of the news audience. For example, the decline in combined news ratings from 27.5 in 1991-92 to 24.2 in 1995-96 produced an estimated *net* decline of 14 percent in campaign coverage between 1992 and 1996, even after allowing for the effect of the positive time trend.

The final parameter estimate in the regression analysis indicates that campaign coverage is also sensitive to the level of public interest in the campaign at the beginning of each fall campaign season. This result tends to validate the claim of network executives that trends in coverage are dictated, in part, by trends in the tastes of their viewing audience. However, the magnitude of the estimated effect suggests that public interest is a secondary rather than a primary determinant of how much attention the networks pay to the presidential race. For example, the difference in expected campaign coverage attributable to the difference between the highest and lowest levels of public interest in the seven election cycles covered by our analysis (1976 and 1984, respectively) is roughly equivalent to one-third of the difference attributable to the decline in network news ratings from their peak in 1980 to their current level.

The decline of network news coverage of electoral politics since the mid-1990s has not gone unnoticed by observers and would-be reformers of the political process. A press release presenting the results of a study by the Center for Media and Public Affairs of network news coverage of the 2000 campaign quoted CMPA President Robert Lichter declaring that "The big three networks have handed off much of the campaign coverage to the 24-hour cable news

100 scale) range from a high of 62.1 in 1976 to a low of 45.8 in 1984.

networks and Internet sites. America is on the verge of having a subscription democracy. If you're not wired, you're disconnected from the political process" (Center for Media and Public Affairs 2000). Paul Taylor, a former political reporter now directing the Alliance for Better Campaigns, has sounded a similar alarm about the migration of campaign coverage from broadcast television to cable: "If you want to witness a presidential candidate," Taylor complained (quoted by Elder 2000), "you've got to buy a ticket."

If traditional network television news is in serious decline as a medium of political communication, what (if anything) will take its place? Specialized cable television news outlets such as CNN and MSNBC seem eager to fill the void, but reach only small and highly motivated audiences. Internet news sites are proliferating rapidly, but are still a very long way from matching the reach of the broadcast television networks in their prime. For ordinary citizens, paid political advertising may increasingly become the most pervasive and influential medium of campaign communication. In Taylor's phrase (quoted by Marks 2000b), "The picture of politics has become all ads, all the time."

While we know of no consistent historical data on the volume of campaign advertising, the general trend seems clear from Federal Election Commission reports on fundraising activities by candidates and parties. The FEC reported that Democratic and Republican party committees raised a total of \$881 million in the 1995-96 election cycle – a 73 percent increase over 1991-92. The corresponding figure for the 1997-98 midterm election cycle was \$628 million -- a 41 percent increase over 1993-94. In 1999 and the first half of 2000, presidential primary candidates raised \$335 million -- a 41 percent increase over the 1996 primary season. Contributions of "soft money" (exempt from federal restrictions and ostensibly used for state and local party-building activities, but increasingly indistinguishable in practice from federally

regulated funds) have escalated even faster -- by 216 percent in the 1996 election cycle and 97 percent in the 1998 midterm cycle.

By no means all of this money was spent on television ads; nevertheless, ads invariably appear as the largest single expenditure in contemporary national (and many sub-national) political campaigns. Unregulated “issue advocacy” ads by parties and independent groups have also become increasingly pervasive; although precise accounting is impossible, one study estimated that at least \$135 to \$150 million was spent on issue advocacy ads in 1996 (Beck et al. 1997). Thus, the perception that paid advertising has become an increasingly prominent feature of modern political campaigns seems well grounded.

We do not expect the proliferation of political advertising to end any time soon, at least absent fundamental changes in the current system of campaign financing. Indeed, the decline of broadcast news coverage of political campaigns seems likely to put an even greater premium on paid advertising as the only feasible way for candidates to communicate with a mass electorate. As Thomas Mann (2000) put it, “The extensive use of party soft money and issue advocacy in the 1998 congressional elections conforms that the 1996 experience was less an anomaly than a harbinger of a new world of campaign strategy and finance.”

Another important development in modern political communication is that the *tone* of campaign advertising has become increasingly negative. A variety of scholars using different primary data sources, methods of content analysis, and definitions of advertising tone (for example, Finkel and Geer 1998; Hart 2000; and Jamieson 2000) have documented this trend in recent presidential campaigns. For example, Figure 3, shows the balance of positive and negative appeals in the major candidates’ television ads in each presidential election since 1968 as coded by John Geer. Geer’s index of ad tone is constructed to vary between +100 (for

entirely positive ads) and -100 (for entirely negative ads). By this measure, the tone of presidential campaign ads has declined steadily from a level of +35 in 1976 to approximately zero – that is, an even balance of positive and negative appeals -- in 1992 and 1996.

***** Figure 3 *****

Whether the trend toward increasingly negative political advertising evident in Figure 3 will continue into the future is unclear. Political observers and would-be reformers have bemoaned the negativity of contemporary electoral politics and urged politicians to run more positive campaigns. Moreover – and probably more importantly – campaigners themselves have begun to question the effectiveness of negative ads in the current political climate. Meanwhile, one careful survey of the scholarly literature (Lau et al. 1999) has suggested that campaigners' confidence in the special potency of negative ads was probably misplaced all along. Thus, while it seems quite possible that campaign ads will continue to become increasingly negative in tone, we would not be surprised to see a return to the more positive advertising tone of the 1980s, if not of the 1970s. In any case, our analysis will suggest that the increasing volume of paid political advertising, in combination with the decline of network news audiences and campaign coverage, has made the tone of campaign ads increasingly important in determining the impact of campaigns on public attitudes toward candidates, elections, and government.

Data and Analysis

Our analysis is based on survey data from the 1988, 1992, and 1996 American National Election Studies supplemented with contextual data reflecting the quantity and tone of network news coverage and political advertising in the 1988, 1992, and 1996 general election

campaigns.⁵ We focus on the effects of news coverage and ad exposure on four distinct dependent variables representing public attitudes toward the candidates, the electoral process, and the broader political system.

Citizen engagement in politics, trust in governmental authority, and confidence in existing political arrangements have been the focus of much scholarly attention of late, as many indicators of citizen satisfaction and involvement reached new nadirs in the mid-1990s. For example, a spate of recent scholarship has examined declining confidence in government, both in the United States (Nye et al. 1997; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2000) and abroad (Norris 1999; Pharr and Putnam 2000). The explanations for the decline vary, but a critical news media is often a leading suspect (see also Patterson 1994; Cappella and Jamieson 1997). In addition, increasingly negative political campaigns have been alleged to have deleterious effects on voter turnout rates and some voter attitudes (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; 1999), although there is continued scholarly controversy over whether and how much these declines can be blamed on political advertising (see, e.g., Finkel and Geer 1998, Freedman and Goldstein 1999, Kahn and Kenney 1999, Lau et al. 1999, and Wattenberg and Brians 1999).

Because surveys have registered declines in so many indicators of American political and social life (see Putnam 2000 for a comprehensive overview), there is an understandable tendency among many analysts to treat the manifest symptoms of crumbling civic health as caused by the same underlying disease or to single out a particular symptom, such as voter turnout or trust in government, as the most necessary to fix or as emblematic of the rest. These sorts of approaches ignore the complex, and quite often contradictory requirements of democratic political life, and risk fueling reform efforts that could well have consequences no one intends, a point to which we will return in our conclusion. If we are to understand more completely how the decline of network political coverage has affected citizens'

⁵ Our data are from the Cumulative Data File on the 1948-1997 NES CD-ROM issued October 1998. These data are also publicly available from the NES website, <http://www.umich.edu/~nes>.

connection to the political system, we need to examine several different aspects of that relationship rather than assume that a changed campaign information environment influences each indicator in the same way or to the same degree.

For our investigation, we chose the following variables from the NES:

CAMPAIGN INTEREST is measured by an item in the NES pre-election surveys asking respondents whether they “have been very much interested, somewhat interested, or not much interested in following the political campaigns so far this year” (Cumulative File v310).

CANDIDATE EVALUATIONS are measured by the average ratings (in pre-election surveys) for the two major-party presidential candidates on the 100-point NES feeling thermometer (Cumulative File v424 and v426).

FAITH IN ELECTIONS is measured by the NES post-election item asking “how much ... having elections makes the government pay attention to what the people think – a good deal, some, or not much” (Cumulative File v624).

TRUST IN GOVERNMENT is measured by the NES post-election item asking “how much of the time ... you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right – just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time” (Cumulative File v604).

All four of these variables are recoded to range from zero to 100.

Table 1 presents our regression results for campaign interest and candidate evaluations; Table 2 presents the corresponding results for faith in elections and trust in government. In each case, the analyses include a variety of demographic control variables (birth cohort, education, race, and gender) as well as strength of partisanship, newspaper reading, and network television

news viewing. (All of these variables are coded to range from zero to one except for birth cohort and education, which are coded in years.) In addition, each analysis includes a dummy variable for panel respondents (in the 1992 and 1996 NES surveys) and a variable reflecting each respondent's date of interview. Pre-election interview dates (in Table 1) are represented by a *CAMPAIGN TIME* variable running from zero on Labor Day to one on Election Day. Post-election interview dates (in Table 2) are represented by a counter indicating how many days after Election Day each respondent was reinterviewed. The post-election analyses in Table 2 also include two dummy variables indicating whether each respondent voted for the winning presidential candidate or for a losing presidential candidate (including minor-party candidates).

***** Tables 1 and 2 *****

Each of our regression analyses includes a measure of specific exposure to campaign coverage on network news programs in addition to the basic measure of network news viewing (which we include to capture any distinctive characteristics of news viewers as well as any long-term effects of news viewing). For the post-election variables in Table 2, the measure of specific exposure is an interaction between the total amount of fall campaign coverage in each election year (as measured by Zaller and reproduced in Figure 2) and individual news viewing. Thus, frequent news viewers in 1992 are assumed to have been more affected by network coverage than either less-frequent news viewers in 1992 or equally-frequent news viewers in 1996 (because in 1996 the networks devoted much less coverage to the presidential campaign) than they had in 1992.

For the pre-election variables in Table 1, the measure of specific exposure is a three-way interaction between total campaign coverage, individual news viewing, and *CAMPAIGN TIME*

(which ranges from zero for respondents interviewed at the beginning of the fall campaign to one for respondents interviewed on Election Day). The NES pre-election survey respondents who get the highest scores on this three-way interaction variable are frequent network news viewers interviewed close to Election Day in 1992; respondents interviewed earlier in the 1992 campaign period get lower scores, as do less-frequent news viewers and those interviewed in less-heavily-covered campaign seasons.

Each of our analyses also includes two distinct measures of exposure to campaign advertising. For the analyses of pre-election variables in Table 1, the first advertising variable is an interaction between *CAMPAIGN TIME* and Daron Shaw's (1999) measure of total ad buys by both major-party candidates in each respondent's state between September 1 and Election Day (denominated in 100s of gross rating points).⁶ The second variable is a three-way interaction between *CAMPAIGN TIME*, Shaw's measure of ad volume, and Geer's measure of ad tone (shown in Figure 3). For the post-election variables in Table 2, the first variable is Shaw's measure of ad volume and the second variable is an interaction between ad volume and ad tone. These specifications allow us not only to discern the impact of campaign advertising, but also to distinguish the specific effects of exposure to positive and negative ads.

Our use of interaction terms involving the *CAMPAIGN TIME* variable for the pre-election analyses in Table 1 is intended to reflect the fact that news coverage and advertising over the two months of the fall campaign should only gradually affect the NES survey respondents' interest in the campaign and evaluations of the candidates. Respondents interviewed at the beginning of the campaign, on Labor Day, should not be affected by the

⁶ 100 gross rating points is the amount of advertising necessary to produce an average of one exposure for each person in a viewing area. Shaw's data suggest that an average viewer was exposed to about 48 ads by both candidates in 1988, 84 in 1992, and 60 in 1996. For further details and limitations of the data

subsequent volume of campaign news coverage, or by the subsequent volume or tone of campaign advertising. Conversely, respondents interviewed on Election Day should display the full effects of the flow of political communication over the course of the fall campaign.

We make the simple, but not unreasonable, assumption that the impact of news and ads increases in a linear fashion between Labor Day and Election Day.⁷ Given this assumption, variation in the timing of pre-election interviews provides an additional dimension of analytical leverage for the analyses reported in Table 1, in addition to those provided by year-to-year variation in news coverage and ad tone, by year-to-year and state-to-state variation in the volume of campaign advertising, and by individual variation in news exposure.

We provide in an Appendix a comparison between the results presented in Tables 1 and 2 and results produced by using alternative measures of ad volume and news coverage. Our alternative measure of ad volume normalizes Shaw's data to produce the same average level of ad exposure in each election year; we use this alternative measure to test the sensitivity of our results to potential inconsistencies from year to year in the completeness of Shaw's data sources. Our alternative measure of news coverage uses the results of the auxiliary regression presented in the preceding section to adjust Zaller's data to take account of the sensitivity of network news coverage to pre-existing differences across election years in levels of public interest in the campaign. In both cases, the alternative measures produce results similar to those reported in Tables 1 and 2.

see Shaw (1999, especially 348-349 and 358-359).

⁷ The assumption of linear increases in media effects over the course of each fall campaign would be most tenable if our contextual data on news coverage and advertising reflected a steady flow of political communication over exactly the same two-month period. As it happens, Shaw's measure of ad exposure is based upon the period from September 1 to Election Day while Zaller's measure of network news coverage is based upon the period from October 1 to Election Day, and neither source allows us to gauge temporal fluctuations in the flow of communication within each campaign season. However, we do not expect these limitations of the available data to have any significant impact on the results of our analysis.

Attitudinal Consequences of the Shift from News to Ads

For our purposes, the key results in Tables 1 and 2 are the coefficients reflecting the estimated impact on each of our four dependent variables of news coverage, ad volume, and the interaction between ad volume and ad tone. Given the large sample sizes in our pooled analyses -- each regression includes approximately 5500 survey respondents -- all of these coefficients appear to be reasonably precisely estimated (with absolute *t*-statistics ranging from 1.6 to 4.3) despite the fact that none of the regressions provides a good overall fit.

The estimated effects of news coverage are positive for *CAMPAIGN INTEREST* and *FAITH IN ELECTIONS* and somewhat less strongly negative for *CANDIDATE EVALUATIONS* and *TRUST IN GOVERNMENT*. We interpret these results as indicating that exposure to network news stimulates engagement in the electoral process but increases viewers' cynicism about politics and politicians. The former pattern is of a piece with Vavreck's (2000) finding that attention to campaign media and interest in the campaign tend to be mutually reinforcing. The latter effect seems to provide some empirical support for the complaints of Patterson (1993) and others regarding the "negativity" of media coverage of campaigns. However, the magnitude of the impact implied by our results turns out to be rather modest: our coefficients suggest that eliminating news coverage *entirely* would only increase the average level of candidate evaluations in the 1996 NES sample by about one point and the average level of trust in government by less than two points.

It may be considered surprising that news coverage appears to have (even small) opposite effects on *FAITH IN ELECTIONS* and *TRUST IN GOVERNMENT*, since these two dependent variables seem to tap related feelings of confidence in the political process. Perhaps network

attention to the campaign increases the perceived importance of elections through a simple process of agenda-setting, while the *content* of news coverage makes viewers more distrustful of politicians and government. Alternatively, news viewers may be impressed by “how much ... having elections makes the government pay attention to what the people think” precisely *because* they believe that politicians unconstrained by elections cannot be trusted “to do what is right.” In any event, a variety of other explanatory variables in our analysis – including exposure to political advertising – seem to have similarly contrasting effects on these two attitudes, reinforcing our belief that it is mistake to view the various indicators of citizen satisfaction with democracy as interchangeable simply because they are correlated both cross sectionally and temporally. The impact of exposure to campaign ads is represented by two coefficients in each of our regression analyses – one reflecting the impact of exposure to “neutral” ads and the other capturing the differential effect of predominantly positive or negative ads. Since the average tone of ads in both the 1992 and 1996 campaigns was almost exactly neutral by Geer’s measure, the first of the two ad coefficients in each regression provides a good indication of how exposure to campaign advertising affected viewers’ political attitudes in those campaigns.⁸ The estimated effects are positive for *CAMPAIGN INTEREST* and *FAITH IN ELECTIONS* and negative for *CANDIDATE EVALUATIONS* and *TRUST IN GOVERNMENT*. As with news coverage, however, the magnitudes of these effects are rather modest. For example, exposure to sixty ads – the sum total of both candidates’ advertising campaigns in a typical state in 1996, as measured by Shaw -- would be expected to increase a viewers’ campaign interest by about three points and her faith in elections by about one point, while decreasing her candidate evaluations and trust in government by about one point each.

⁸ The *AD TONE* scores on Geer’s –100 to +100 scale are +0.8 in 1992 and –1.0 in 1996.

These effects are illustrated in Figure 4, which traces the impacts of varying levels of news coverage and advertising volume implied by the parameter estimates in Tables 1 and 2. Each panel of the figure simulates the impact of marginal increases or decreases in network news coverage (the left-side panels) or campaign ad volume (the right-side panels) from the levels actually observed in 1996 on the mean levels in the 1996 NES sample of two of our dependent variables. (In each panel, the simulated level of news coverage or ad volume ranges from zero on the left to the observed 1996 level in the middle to twice the observed 1996 level on the right; the average tone of campaign ads is assumed in each case to remain balanced .)

***** Figure 4 *****

In addition to providing a graphical representation of the effects of news coverage and advertising volume implied by our regression parameter estimates, Figure 4 makes it possible to *compare* the estimated effects of news (in the left-side panel) and ads (in the right-side panel) for each of our dependent variables. If we are correct in asserting that contemporary political communication has been and will continue to be marked by a significant *shift* from news to ads, comparisons of this sort should shed light on the implications of that shift.

Consider, for example, the estimated effects on campaign interest of news coverage (in Figure 4a) and advertising (in Figure 4b). The positive slope of the darker line in Figure 4a indicates that doubling the total quantity of network news coverage of the 1996 campaign would have increased the average level of campaign interest in the NES sample by 4.2 points on the zero-to-100 scale. The slope of the corresponding darker line in Figure 4b indicates that doubling the total quantity of campaign advertising would have increased the average level of

campaign interest by 3.0 points.⁹

A comparison of these two slopes suggests that exposure to news and exposure to ads had qualitatively similar effects on campaign interest. Thus, substituting ads for news, or vice versa, would have had very little impact on the level of public interest in the campaign. Increasing the volume of news coverage of the 1996 campaign by, say, 50 percent would have increased campaign interest by more than two points on the zero-to-100 scale; but increasing the volume of news coverage by 50 percent *while also decreasing the volume of campaign advertising by 50 percent* would have increased campaign interest by only about half a point.

The apparent functional equivalence of news and advertising is even more striking in the case of candidate evaluations. The calculations presented in Figures 4c and 4d suggest that decreasing the volume of advertising in the 1996 campaign by 50 percent would have increased the average thermometer rating for the major-party candidates by almost half a point; but increasing the volume of network news coverage by 50 percent would have *decreased* the average thermometer rating by almost exactly the same amount. Faith in elections and trust in government both appear to have been somewhat more strongly affected by news coverage than by advertising; but even for these attitudes the changes produced by increasing (or decreasing) news coverage would be significantly mitigated by corresponding decreases (or increases) in advertising volume.

The tendency of campaign news coverage and campaign ads to produce qualitatively similar effects on a variety of political attitudes is surprising on at least two counts. First, it is

⁹ The projected mean levels of each dependent variable shown in the center of each panel of Figure 4 differ slightly from the actual 1996 sample means for two reasons. First, the calculations reflected in Figure 4 are adjusted to represent the expected level of each variable for non-panel respondents as of Election Day. Second, the simulations assume a precisely neutral ad tone of zero rather than the observed 1996 value of -1.0.

surprising because news and ads tend to convey different kinds of information using different formats and styles for different purposes. Just et al. (2000) contrast the aims of journalists and candidates and provide a systematic comparison of the focus and sophistication of network news coverage, political ads, and a variety of other partisan and non-partisan forms of campaign communication in the 1996 presidential election. Among other things, they find that ads focused predominantly on policy issues, whereas network news coverage focused primarily on the campaign process, campaign strategy, and the “horserace” -- but that news coverage was much more likely than ads to touch upon the social and (especially) political implications of candidates’ records, proposals, and issue stands.

The functional equivalence of news and ads is also surprising because so many campaign observers and would-be reformers have seemed to assume as a matter of course that news coverage is beneficial to the electoral process while the proliferation of campaign ads is unhealthy. When *Salon* columnist Sean Elder wrote a piece on the decline of broadcast news coverage of the 2000 campaign, he worried that a “working-class voter with the old-fashioned antenna on his shingled roof is left with only a few seconds on the nightly news – and, at election time, a barrage of misinforming, mind-numbing ads” (Elder 2000). When a study by the Alliance for Better Campaigns showed that news viewers in the 2000 New Jersey Senate primary campaign “were 10 times more likely . . . to see a campaign ad than a campaign story,” the organization’s press release quoted executive director Paul Taylor bemoaning the fact that “substantive issue discussion is disappearing from the public square of broadcast television” (Alliance for Better Campaigns 2000). In a subsequent news story, Taylor complained that “what viewers are getting is the money-driven, synthetic discourse of ads” (Marks 2000b).

While commentators’ alarm about the demise of news coverage and the proliferation of

campaign ads seems on its face to be well justified, our analysis suggests that, judged solely by observable consequences, the discourse of campaign news is not so clearly superior to “the money-driven, synthetic discourse of ads.” At least in their respective current forms, campaign news and campaign ads both seem to have modest *positive* effects on levels of political engagement and modest *negative* effects on public support for politicians and government.

The Tension between Political Engagement and Political Allegiance

In *The Civic Culture*, Almond and Verba (1963/1989) described the civic culture as a blend of active citizen participation on one hand and allegiance to and support for political authorities and institutions on the other. They considered the more passive orientation, or subject role, necessary to balance “the intensity of the individual’s political involvement and activity. Political activity is but one part of the citizen’s concerns, and usually not a very important part at that” (page 339) In their view, the tension between passive and active orientations in the civic culture reflects the inescapable tension within democracy itself between governmental power and governmental responsiveness. Democratic governments must demand and receive obedience to their decisions; yet they must also be responsive to the wishes of those whose obedience they require. Almond and Verba noted that different situations might require shifting the balance – for example, placing more stress on governmental power (and on civic allegiance) during times of war, when compliance is perhaps more necessary than political responsiveness.

Almond and Verba suggested that it may be possible to resolve the tension between the necessary but contradictory impulses of democratic government if the political process is viewed dynamically:

If significant issues arise only sporadically *and* if the government is able to respond to the demands stimulated by these issues, an equilibrium can be maintained between citizen influence and government influence. In ordinary times, citizens are relatively uninterested in what governmental decision makers do, and the latter have the freedom to act as they see fit. However, if an issue becomes prominent, citizen demands on officials will increase. If officials can respond to these demands, the importance of politics will fall again and politics will return to normal (p. 350, emphasis in original).

It seems to us that the results of our investigation suggest just such a cycle at work. The 1992 election was one in which public interest in the campaign and public perceptions of the efficacy of elections were both notably higher than in other recent campaign seasons. At the same time, evaluations of the candidates and trust in government were unusually low. By 1996, however, politics had reverted to more “ordinary times.” Citizens (and the press) became “relatively uninterested” in politics and the presidential campaign. However, prevailing levels of support for politicians and government did not return to their pre-1992 levels, at least in part because the overall tone of the 1996 race was considerably more negative than in previous election years.

The coefficients for the interactions between ad volume and ad tone presented in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that the effects of ad exposure depend crucially upon the tone of campaign advertising. For example, exposure to neutral ads in 1996 seems to have made viewers more cynical about politicians and government; but the net effect of exposure to an equal number of ads as positive in tone as those aired in 1988 would apparently have *increased* average candidate evaluations by 2.5 points and trust in government by about half that amount. On the other hand, exposure to ads in 1996 seems to have increased engagement in the electoral process; but the net effect of exposure to an equal number of ads as positive in tone as those aired in 1988 would apparently have *decreased* interest in the campaign by more than three points and faith in

elections by almost three points. In each case, the estimated effect of (mildly) “positive” ads is in the opposite direction from that of “balanced ” ads.

The implications of these estimated effects of ad tone are presented graphically in Figure 5, which traces how the political attitudes prevailing in 1996 would have been affected if the tone of campaign advertising had been significantly more positive or significantly more negative (holding both ad volume and news exposure at actual 1996 levels). The figure suggests that more positive ads would indeed have made people feel better about the candidates and the political system. But it also suggests that more positive ads would have been a decidedly mixed blessing, significantly reducing interest in the campaign and faith in the electoral process.

***** Figure 5 *****

Some of the most-discussed and apparently appealing proposals for campaign reform focus on reducing the “negativity” of campaigns. But for would-be reformers who aim to increase levels of citizen engagement in the electoral process, the results presented in Figure 5 suggest that the familiar call for more positive campaign ads is quite likely to be counterproductive. If anything, the decline of network news coverage has placed a greater premium than in the past on stimulating public interest in the electoral process; more positive campaign ads would have the opposite effect. Thus, in a post-network world, a good deal of negative advertising may be necessary to sustain public engagement in the electoral process. But if it is, an unhappy byproduct may be an electorate that is increasingly dissatisfied with its leaders and increasingly distrustful of its government. It seems clear that serious would-be reformers of the campaign process will need both “a clearer sense of the causal connections relating the behavior of campaigners to the reactions of prospective voters” and “some way of adjudicating among potentially conflicting standards for evaluating campaign quality. ... Genuine

improvements in campaign quality will require more than righteous indignation about the state of contemporary campaign discourse” (Bartels 2000).

Because citizen engagement in politics has been falling at the same time political cynicism has been rising, it is tempting to assume that the same forces are responsible for both trends. But it seems clear from our results that one popular culprit -- changes in the political communication environment, whether news or ads -- cannot simultaneously account for both declining political engagement and increasing political cynicism. Declining news coverage of the electoral process has probably reduced political engagement, but *increased* allegiance to politicians and government. Increasingly negative and pervasive campaign advertising has probably reduced allegiance to politicians and government, but *increased* interest and faith in the electoral process. Neither by itself, nor both together, can account for the fact that we seem to find ourselves in the “worst of all possible worlds” – with citizens who tend (at least in comparison to citizens of the earlier era studied by Almond and Verba) to lack both the participant and allegiant orientations of a healthy civic culture. Those who hope to understand and ameliorate the double-barreled crisis of contemporary American civic culture will have to look elsewhere for their villains and their remedies.

That is not to say that the volume and tone of campaign communication are irrelevant in shaping the political attitudes of ordinary citizens. But they do seem to be of marginal importance within the broader currents of civic culture, and they do seem to have effects that most observers are likely to view as decidedly mixed from a normative perspective. Would-be reformers would, no doubt, prefer a simpler story with a clearer moral; but our results suggest that the tension between political engagement and political allegiance cannot be easily escaped.

Appendix: Alternative Measures of Ad Volume and News Coverage

The analyses reported in Tables 1 and 2 were produced by pooling the available data from 1988, 1992, and 1996 in order to exploit both individual-level variation (in news exposure and ad exposure) within each campaign and aggregate-level variation (in news coverage and ad tone) across the three campaigns. However, this approach raises two potential concerns about the comparability of the data across election years.

First, Shaw's data on ad exposure may not provide a reliable indication of the total volume of campaign advertising in each election year due to shortcomings in Shaw's data sources.¹⁰ We examined the ramifications of this sort of error by replicating the analyses presented in Tables 1 and 2 using an alternative measure of ad volume normalized to have the same mean value in each election year.¹¹ The results, which are presented in Table A1, are generally quite similar to those presented in Tables 1 and 2. The magnitudes of the estimated effects for *AD VOLUME* and *AD VOLUME* \times *TONE* are reduced by an average of 18 percent and 17 percent, respectively. (The standard errors of the coefficients for *AD VOLUME* are increased by an average of 15 percent, while the standard errors of the coefficients for *AD VOLUME* \times *TONE* are *reduced* by an average of 24 percent.) The magnitudes of the estimated effects for *NEWS COVERAGE* \times *EXPOSURE* are increased by an average of 7 percent. In every

¹⁰ Shaw (1999, 349) noted that his data exclude ad buys by parties and independent groups, which have become increasingly important since 1988. Since the data for different candidates and years come from different sources (Shaw 1999, 358) they may vary in completeness for other reasons as well. In any case, Shaw's figures suggest that total ad exposure increased by about 75 percent between 1988 and 1992 and *decreased* by about 28 percent between 1992 and 1996; the latter figure seems especially implausible in view of the rapid escalation in total campaign spending between 1992 and 1996.

¹¹ We constructed the normalized ad exposure variable by multiplying Shaw's Gross Rating Points by 1.379 in 1988, .786 in 1992, and 1.090 in 1996.

case, the goodness-of-fit statistics (not shown in Table A1) are virtually identical for the two specifications. These comparisons suggest that the results presented in Tables 1 and 2 are not unduly sensitive to the overall level of reported ad exposure in each election year.

***** Table A1 *****

A second potential source of concern is our use of Zaller's measure of total campaign coverage, which seems likely (judging from our auxiliary regression analysis) to reflect, to some extent, pre-existing differences among campaigns in levels of public interest. If public interest in the campaign influences both network news coverage and the subsequent evolution of public attitudes, simply using observed coverage as an explanatory variable might overstate the extent to which coverage affects interest in the campaign and other political attitudes. To allay that concern we replicated our analyses using an adjusted version of Zaller's measure constructed by subtracting the amount of coverage that appears, on the basis of our auxiliary regression analysis, to be attributable to greater-than-average (or less-than-average) levels of public interest at the start of each fall campaign.

Table A2 presents a comparison between the estimated effects of news coverage and ad exposure produced by this alternative estimation strategy and those reported in Tables 1 and 2. As it turns out, using the adjusted news coverage data instead of Zaller's data produces very modest differences in the pattern of parameter estimates. The magnitudes of the estimated effects for *NEWS COVERAGE* \times *EXPOSURE* are increased by an average of 2 percent. (The standard errors of these estimates are increased by an average of 15 percent.) Even for the analysis of *CAMPAIGN INTEREST*, which ought to be most sensitive to the potential endogeneity of news coverage, the coefficient for *NEWS COVERAGE* \times *EXPOSURE* using the

adjusted data is only 3 percent smaller than the corresponding coefficient in Table 1. The average magnitudes of the estimated effects for *AD VOLUME* and *AD VOLUME* \times *TONE* are each increased by 6 percent. The goodness-of-fit statistics (not shown) are virtually identical to those reported in Tables 1 and 2. Taken together, these results suggest that none of our conclusions depend importantly upon whether or not we take explicit account of the networks' responsiveness to the level of public interest in each year's campaign.

***** Table A2 *****

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Table 1**Determinants of Campaign Interest and Candidate Evaluations**

Regression parameter estimates (standard errors in parentheses)

| | Campaign Interest | Candidate Evaluations |
|----------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Intercept | -39.8 (16.9) | 63.4 (7.4) |
| Campaign Time | -4.24 (2.67) | -.15 (1.17) |
| Panel Respondent | 2.59 (1.03) | -.36 (.45) |
| Birth Cohort (2000 – Birth Year) | -.327 (.313) | .155 (.137) |
| Square Root of Birth Cohort | 6.77 (4.65) | -2.17 (2.03) |
| Education (years) | 3.130 (.180) | -.289 (.079) |
| Black | -.20 (1.38) | 1.70 (.60) |
| Female | -4.30 (.90) | 1.08 (.39) |
| Strength of Partisanship | 19.45 (1.36) | 2.89 (.60) |
| Newspaper Reading | 4.79 (1.14) | .15 (.50) |
| Network News Viewing | 14.17 (2.04) | 3.42 (.89) |
| News Coverage × Viewing × Time | .0332 (.0077) | -.0080 (.0034) |
| Ad Volume × Time | .0492 (.0161) | -.0141 (.0070) |
| Ad Volume × Tone × Time | -.00875 (.00278) | .00472 (.00121) |
| std error of regression | 32.7 | 14.3 |
| adjusted R-squared | .18 | .02 |
| N | 5526 | 5523 |

Table 2
Determinants of Faith in Elections and Trust in Government

Regression parameter estimates (standard errors in parentheses)

| | Faith in Elections | Trust in Government |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Intercept | 35.0 (17.6) | 45.0 (9.7) |
| Days Post-Election | -.0010 (.0330) | .0446 (.0183) |
| Panel Respondent | 2.23 (1.13) | -.79 (.62) |
| Birth Cohort (2000 – Birth Year) | -.083 (.330) | -.037 (.182) |
| Square Root of Birth Cohort | 1.55 (4.90) | .36 (2.70) |
| Education (years) | .731 (.198) | -.283 (.109) |
| Black | -3.29 (1.46) | -3.07 (.80) |
| Female | -3.64 (.94) | -.24 (.52) |
| Strength of Partisanship | 9.01 (1.46) | 3.72 (.81) |
| Voted for Winner | 11.24 (1.26) | 3.44 (.70) |
| Voted for Loser | 2.97 (1.27) | -1.46 (.70) |
| Newspaper Reading | 1.64 (1.20) | .64 (.66) |
| Network News Viewing | -3.26 (3.27) | 5.65 (1.80) |
| News Coverage × Viewing | .0213 (.0077) | -.0137 (.0043) |
| Ad Volume | .0163 (.0102) | -.0166 (.0056) |
| Ad Volume × Tone | -.00510 (.00173) | .00310 (.00095) |
| std error of regression | 34.1 | 18.8 |
| adjusted R-squared | .05 | .03 |
| N | 5486 | 5487 |

Table A1
Comparison of Results for Normalized Ad Exposure

Regression parameter estimates (standard errors in parentheses)
for news coverage and ad exposure; control variables included but not shown


| | Shaw's Data (Tables 1 and 2) | Normalized Ad Exposure |
|--------------------------------|---|---|
| Campaign Interest | | |
| News Coverage × Viewing × Time | .0332 (.0077) | .0355 (.0077) |
| Ad Volume × Time | .0492 (.0161) | .0250 (.0187) |
| Ad Volume × Tone × Time | −.00875 (.00278) | −.00753 (.00210) |
| Candidate Evaluations | | |
| News Coverage × Viewing × Time | −.0080 (.0034) | −.0084 (.0033) |
| Ad Volume × Time | −.0141 (.0070) | −.0135 (.0082) |
| Ad Volume × Tone × Time | .00472 (.00121) | .00380 (.00092) |
| Faith in Elections | | |
| News Coverage × Viewing | .0213 (.0077) | .0225 (.0075) |
| Ad Volume | .0163 (.0102) | .0106 (.0116) |
| Ad Volume × Tone | −.00510 (.00173) | −.00406 (.00131) |
| Trust in Government | | |
| News Coverage × Viewing | −.0137 (.0043) | −.0152 (.0042) |
| Ad Volume | −.0166 (.0056) | −.0192 (.0064) |
| Ad Volume × Tone | .00310 (.00095) | .00272 (.00072) |

Table A2
Comparison of Results for Adjusted News Coverage

Regression parameter estimates (standard errors in parentheses)
for news coverage and ad exposure; control variables included but not shown


| | Zaller's Data (Tables 1 and 2) | Adjusted News Coverage |
|--------------------------------|---|-----------------------------------|
| Campaign Interest | | |
| News Coverage × Viewing × Time | .0332 (.0077) | .0322 (.0085) |
| Ad Volume × Time | .0492 (.0161) | .0519 (.0160) |
| Ad Volume × Tone × Time | −.00875 (.00278) | −.00931 (.00278) |
| Candidate Evaluations | | |
| News Coverage × Viewing × Time | −.0080 (.0034) | −.0077 (.0037) |
| Ad Volume × Time | −.0141 (.0070) | −.0147 (.0070) |
| Ad Volume × Tone × Time | .00472 (.00121) | .00485 (.00122) |
| Faith in Elections | | |
| News Coverage × Viewing | .0213 (.0077) | .0231 (.0093) |
| Ad Volume | .0163 (.0102) | .0176 (.0101) |
| Ad Volume × Tone | −.00510 (.00173) | −.00545 (.00173) |
| Trust in Government | | |
| News Coverage × Viewing | −.0137 (.0043) | −.0148 (.0051) |
| Ad Volume | −.0166 (.0056) | −.0175 (.0056) |
| Ad Volume × Tone | .00310 (.00095) | .00333 (.00095) |

Figure 1
Combined Network Evening News Ratings




Source: Nielsen Market Research. One rating point is equal to 1% of the potential viewing audience.

Figure 2
Network News Coverage of Fall Campaigns



Source: John Zaller.


Figure 3
Tone of Presidential Campaign Advertising






Source: John Geer.

Figure 4
Simulated Effects of News Coverage and Advertising Volume
 (Assuming Balanced Ad Tone)

**Effects of
News Coverage**




**Effects of
Advertising Volume**



Source: Computed from parameter estimates in Tables 1 and 2.

Figure 5
Contrasting Effects of Ad Tone on Engagement and Allegiance



Source: Computed from parameter estimates in Tables 1 and 2.