Bondareva, Olga (1937-1991)

By

Myrna Wooders

This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition. The definitive publisher-authenticated version,


is available online at:
Bondareva, Olga (1937–1991)

Myrna Wooders  
Edited by Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume

Keywords  
balancedness; approximate balancedness; Bondareva, O.; clubs; coalitions; cooperative games; core equivalence; cores; duality; essential superadditivity; game theory; linear programming; local public goods; market games; price-taking equilibrium

Article

Olga Nikolayevna Bondareva was born in St Petersburg on 27 April 1937. She joined the Mathematical Faculty of the Leningrad State University in 1954, and completed a Ph.D. in mathematics at the Leningrad State University in 1963, in part under the supervision of Nicolaj Vorobiev. Her thesis was entitled ‘The Theory of the Core in an n-Person Game’. Bondareva rose through the ranks at Leningrad State University to become a senior research fellow in 1972 and a leading research fellow in 1989. Because she sympathized with a student who wished to emigrate to Israel, however, she was prohibited from teaching from 1973 until 1989. With perestroika and increased freedom to travel outside the Soviet Union, she became an active and energetic international figure in game theory. She died as a result of a traffic accident on 9 December 1991.

Bondareva published over 70 works on game theory and mathematics, supervised seven Ph.D. students, and was a member of the editorial board of Games and Economic Behavior. Her work on the core of a cooperative game plays a central role in game theory, and her insights can be seen underlying recent work on the theory of price-taking equilibrium and the core.

The following is a brief description of Bondareva’s celebrated result. To allow us to see the relationship of this result to more recent research on games and economies with many players, it is stated for games with player types and requiring only ‘essential superadditivity’ in the definition of feasible payoffs.

Define a (pre)game with T types of players as a function $\psi$ from vectors of non-negative integers $\mathbb{Z}_+^T$, $\nu \geq 0$, called profiles of coalitions, into the non-negative real numbers $\mathbb{R}_+$. Given a vector $m \in \mathbb{Z}_+^T$, representing the total player set of the game and $z \in m$, $\psi(z)$ is interpreted as the total payoff to a coalition of players consisting of $z_i$ identical players of type $i$, $i = 1, \ldots, T$. Let $(\delta_1, \ldots, \delta_T)$ denote the collection of all profiles $\delta_i \leq m_i$. A partition of a profile $s$ is determined by a collection of non-negative integers $(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_r)$ satisfying the condition that $\sum \tau_i \delta_i = s$. With the domain of $\psi$ restricted to profiles $\delta_i \leq m_i$, the pair $(m, \psi)$ determines a cooperative game. Let $\psi^*(\{m\})$ denote the maximum, over all partitions of $m$, of $\sum \tau_i \delta_i$. A payoff vector $\bar{\pi} : \bar{\pi} \leq m$ is in the (equal treatment) core if and only it holds that, $\bar{\pi} \leq \psi^*(\{m\})$ (it is feasible) and for each $s, \psi(s) \leq \bar{\pi}$.

Now consider the following linear programming (LP) problem:

$$\min \bar{\pi} : \bar{\pi} \leq m$$

subject to $\psi(s) \leq \bar{\pi}$ for all profiles $s \leq m$.

A vector $\bar{\pi}$ is in the core if it is a solution to the above LP problem and $\bar{\pi} = \psi^*(\{m\})$. The dual LP problem is:

$$\max \sum_{i=1}^r \tau_i \delta_i : \sum_{i=1}^r \tau_i \delta_i = m$$

subject to $\psi(s) \geq \sum_{i=1}^r \tau_i \delta_i$ for all $s \leq m$.

From the fundamental duality theorem of linear programming, there is a solution to the first LP problem if and only if there is a solution to the second, and, in this case, it holds that the optimal values of the objective functions in the two LP problems are the same.

For the second LP problem, let $\omega_{\bar{\pi}}$ denote the solution for the ‘balancing weights’ $(\omega_{\bar{\pi}})$. The game is balanced if and only if $\sum \omega_{\bar{\pi}} \psi(s) = \psi^*(\{m\})$. It follows that a game is balanced if and only if it has a non-empty core, Bondareva’s result. (See also Shapley, 1967.)

Numerous applications of game theory to economics have employed the concept of balancedness. An outstanding contribution is Shapley and Shubik (1954), who show an equivalency between the set of totally balanced games (balanced games with the property that every subgame also has a non-empty core) and market games (cooperative games derived from economies where all players have concave utility functions). Bondareva’s result as formulated above is a key ingredient in Wooders (1994), showing that under mild conditions games with many players are market games. Scarf (1967) demonstrates non-emptiness of the core of a balanced game without side payments (where the payoff set for a coalition $S$ is a subset of $R^S$ rather than a real number). Bondareva’s result also underlies the approximate balancedness of economies with clubs or relatively small effective or nearly effective coalitions. While this result has been demonstrated in much generality, the key is simple. Since the coefficients of the dual LP problem are integers, when the total player set is replicated (becomes $rm$, $r = 1, 2, \ldots$) and no new effective coalitions are permitted (that is, if $\psi(z) \geq 0$ then $z \leq m$) then there is an integer $k$ such that all replicated games with total player profiles given by $rm$ are balanced (Wooders, 1994, and references therein). The integer $k$ clears the denominators of the (rational) extreme points of the convex set of balancing weight vectors of the dual LP problem. In recent works on the theory of clubs and local public goods, balancedness plays a crucial role; see Demange and Wooders (2005) for several recent examples and additional references.

We refer the reader to Rosenmueller (1992) for some additional details of Olga Bondareva’s life. See also Kannai (1992) for an excellent review of research on the core and balancedness.

See Also

- game theory

Selected works


http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_B000323


1990. Game theoretical analysis of one product market with similar utilities. *Kibernetika* No. 5.


**Bibliography**


**How to cite this article**