An Introduction to Teacher Retirement Benefits

Janet Hansen

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An Introduction to Teacher Retirement Benefits

JANET HANSEN
Committee for Economic Development

ABSTRACT

Teachers were among the earliest American workers to receive pension benefits from their employers. Like most other state and local government employees, today they participate primarily in defined benefit pension plans whose benefits are based on final average salaries and length of service. Such pensions have been replaced in many private sector firms by defined contribution pensions, but the legal and economic contexts for public and private sector pensions are sufficiently different that solutions appropriate in one sector may not be appropriate in another. Notably, a sizeable minority of teachers do not participate in Social Security and so do not enjoy that program's guarantee of a base retirement income and death and disability benefits.

State and local government pensions are “prefunded” to varying degrees. An important issue is whether these pension plans are financially sustainable. Concerns about governments’ ability to meet the future costs of current pension promises have arisen in light of unfunded liabilities, assumptions about future investment returns that may be unrealistic, and government obligations for retiree health care for which few funds have been set aside. Legal restrictions on altering pension benefits for public employees may limit policy makers’ options in addressing gaps between pension plan assets and the benefits that have been promised to plan participants.

Distinct from the question about financial sustainability is the question of how fairly teacher pension plans treat all the teachers they serve and what if any effects they have on schools’ ability to find qualified staff. While traditional defined benefit plans with their back-loaded benefits treat long-serving teachers well, they tend to short-change individuals who do not work a full career in teaching or who move from state to state. The structure of teacher pensions may not only be inequitable for individual teachers but can contribute to teacher shortages by discouraging people from moving to schools where their skills and knowledge are most needed.

Discussions about whether public pension plans need to be redesigned typically involve a debate over whether defined benefit plans should be replaced by defined contribution plans. Framing the question this way obscures the fact that the boundaries between various types of pensions are porous, and plans can be designed to include a variety of features depending on the objectives being sought. It also omits consideration of one form of defined benefit pension, the cash balance plan, that has features normally found in both defined benefit and defined contribution programs. Cash balance plans have replaced some traditional defined benefit plans in private firms but have received almost no attention in the public sector.
In the ongoing effort to improve American education, increasing attention is being given to policies aimed at staffing schools with high quality teachers capable of providing effective instruction to all students. Key among policies to attract and retain such teachers is compensation, in the form of both current pay and retiree benefits, the costs of which constitute the chief expenditure of public school districts. Having focused on possible reforms of current pay structures at its first annual conference in 2008, the National Center for Performance Incentives is devoting its second annual conference to a comparatively unfamiliar component of teacher compensation: retirement benefits. In this paper I provide an overview of these benefits, especially pension benefits, and introduce a number of issues which will be examined in more depth in subsequent conference presentations.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF PENSIONS FOR TEACHERS

Retirement benefits for teachers emerged earlier and evolved along a different path than benefits for other American workers.

Early Pension Plans

The earliest retirement benefits for state or local employees were offered by some large cities to police officers and firefighters (because of the hazardous nature of their work) in the mid-to-late 1800s. At the time there were no private retirement plans, nor did the federal government provide for the old-age needs of any of its employees other than members of the army and navy.

The first publicly provided teacher pension plans were also municipal ones. Previously, if teachers had any assistance for illness or old age, it came from voluntary associations to which the teachers contributed. Local school boards typically needed state permission in order to enter into the financial commitments entailed in offering retirement benefits. In the late nineteenth century states began granting this authority to selected districts, generally larger ones. Coverage was thus fragmentary, with no benefits available in many states and benefits in other states only offered in big-city districts. Clark (2003, 182) points out that “the United States was quite late in

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*This paper is a revised and updated version of a May 2008 paper, Janet S. Hansen, Teacher Pensions: A Background Paper, available at www.ced.org*
offering universal old-age pensions to its public schoolteachers.” In 1911 at least 20 other countries had pension plans for these employees.

Gradually states began enacting statewide pension plans for teachers. In some cases, the new state plan absorbed municipally based plans; in others, the pre-existing city teacher plan was permitted to continue operating separately. By the late 1920s, 23 states had pension plans for their teachers. Four other states allowed individual school districts to create plans, and in Missouri the teachers organized their own plan (Clark, 2003).

Retirement benefits for teachers expanded more rapidly did such benefits for private workers or federal and general municipal employees. Graebner (1980) suggests that the willingness of policy makers to help elderly teachers was related to the fact that so many teachers were women, and those who were still teaching in old age were likely to be unmarried (marriage was often a cause for dismissal) and too poor to take care of themselves after years in low-paying jobs. Private and public employers at the time were known to deal with the problem of pension-less aging workers by moving them around from job to job to keep them employed. But this caretaking function was not as well suited to schools as it was to other institutions. A corporation might shift an older worker to some less demanding task, or a government agency, existing outside a market framework, could absorb a limited number of older employees who did nothing at all; the result might not be productive, but neither was it particularly difficult to achieve physically nor was it of much negative impact. The teacher’s work, on the other hand, was perceived as an indivisible unit—one teacher, before one class, all day. That a teacher of declining skills or energies might teach less than a full day or assist in another’s classroom seems not to have been considered (Graebner, 1980, 91)

Graebner goes on to quote a 1917 Senate report on public education in the District of Columbia:

A school-teacher’s work is personal, direct, and positive. It works for the good or the ill of each pupil. To retain a superannuated teacher in the service is a positive harm to her pupils and a manifest injustice to the rising generation (Graebner, 1980, 91).

Early public pension plans were sometimes not much more than forced savings plans. Some of the pioneering municipal pensions, however, laid the groundwork for the plan design that dominated both public and private pension arrangements during the middle part of the 20th century.
This design was the “defined benefit” plan. In such plans, employers guarantee employees a specified annual retirement benefit based on a formula. The formula was generally one of three types, as described by the Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI, 2005, ch. 4):

* **Flat-Benefit Formulas**—These formulas pay a flat dollar amount for each year of service recognized under the plan.

* **Career-Average Formulas**—There are two types of career-average formulas. Under the first type, participants earn a percentage of the pay recognized for plan purposes in each year they are plan participants. The second type of career-average formula averages the participant’s yearly earnings over the period of plan participation. At retirement, the benefit equals a percentage of the career-average pay, multiplied by the participant’s number of years of service.

* **Final-Pay Formulas** (also called final-average salary formulas)—These plans base benefits on average earnings during a specified number of years at the end of a participant’s career; this is presumably the time when earnings are highest. The benefit equals a percentage of the participant’s final average earnings, multiplied by the number of years of service.

Non-unionized private sector employees and employees in public sector jobs (including teachers) typically participated in career-average-salary or final-average-salary defined benefit (DB) plans. DB plans dominated the pensions offered to both public and private workers into the 1970s.

**Public and Private Sector Pension Plans Diverge**

While public sector pensions remain largely of the defined benefit type, private sector pensions shifted strongly to defined contribution (DC) plans in the 1980s and 1990s. In DC plans, employers contribute specified amounts (often a percentage of salary) to an individual account established for participating employees. The benefit available to the employee at retirement depends on the amount contributed by the employer, any contribution by the employee, and the investment income earned on these contributions over the years. Usually the employee manages the investments in his/her individual account. The employer does not guarantee the employee any specific level of income in retirement (EBRI, 2005, ch. 4).
In 1979, 62 percent of private sector workers who participated in an employer-based retirement plan had only a DB plan. Another 22 percent had a DB plan along with a DC plan. Only 16 percent had only a DC plan. By 2004, these numbers were reversed. Only 10 percent of private sector workers with employer-based pensions had just a DB plan. Twenty-seven percent had both DB and DC plans, while three-fifths (63 percent) had only a DC plan (VanDerhei et al., 2006, v).

In addition, private sector employers sponsoring DB plans had moved away from their exclusive reliance on the traditional formulas for determining retirement benefits. In 2005, a quarter of private sector workers who participated in DB pension plans were in redesigned plans, mostly so-called cash balance (CB) defined benefit plans. These plans, which will be described more fully in a later section, resemble traditional DB plans in that employers make a guarantee to employees (in this case, they guarantee a certain investment return) and manage retirement assets for all participants. CB defined benefit plans, however, also have features (such as “hypothetical” individual accounts) that resemble DC plans. Table 1 shows that the percentages of private sector workers in DB plans using a CB formula to determine benefits was highest among white collar workers and workers in service producing industries.

One persistent feature of the American pension scene is that private sector workers generally have less access to employer-sponsored retirement plans than do public sector workers. Table 2 indicates that in 2007 only 70 percent of full-time workers in the private sector had access to an employer-sponsored retirement plan. Only 24 percent had access to a DB plan, although almost all workers with access to such a plan participated in it. While 64 percent of full-time private sector workers had access to a DC plan, only 50 percent participated in such a plan. For full-time state and government workers, on the other hand, virtually all had access to a retirement plan and 91 percent had access to a DB plan.

The Different Contexts for Public and Private Sector Pensions

The big shift in private sector pensions has caused some to ask whether public pensions ought to mirror private practice. The private and public sectors, however, operate in two very different environments that must be taken into account in discussions of future public pension policies.
Most important is that a sizeable number of teachers do not participate in the retirement part of the Social Security program. States whose teachers do not participate in Social Security include Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maine, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, and Texas. Teachers in the District of Columbia are also non-participants.

Workers who do participate in Social Security have a guaranteed, inflation-adjusted retirement income to under-gird whatever other pension and retirement savings they have. They are also eligible for Social Security death and disability benefits. Private sector employers and employees are required to participate in Social Security; each pays 6.2 percent of covered earnings annually into the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program. Each also pays 1.45 percent of earnings into Medicare’s Hospital Insurance program.

Most state and local government employees hired after 1986 participate in Medicare, but OASDI coverage for public workers depends on individual state decisions about participation. Public employees were originally excluded altogether from Social Security in the 1930s because of constitutional questions about whether the federal government could impose taxes on state and local governments. In the 1950s federal legislation allowed state and local governments to elect to enroll some or all of their employees in the program (Munnell, 2005).

In nonparticipating states, employees’ state or local retirement plans must meet retirement needs that elsewhere are met jointly by Social Security and employer-sponsored pension plans. Teachers without Social Security coverage must also look to their employer-sponsored plan for disability and survivors’ insurance if employees are to have access to such benefits. Thus, employer contributions to the teacher retirement plan tend to be higher in nonparticipating states (but of course these employers are not paying Social Security taxes for the OASDI program).

Another distinction between private and public retirement plans is whether employees as well as employers contribute to them. In the private sector, employees are only rarely required to

* Information on Social Security participation comes from the Public Fund Survey (2009) sponsored by the National Association of State Retirement Administrators (NASRA) and the National Council on Teacher Retirement (NCTR). In nonparticipating states, some school districts have chosen to participate in Social Security, and they and their employees pay OASDI taxes. The Austin (TX) Independent School District is one such example. States have not necessarily made the same decision about Social Security participation for different groups of public employees. For example, whereas Connecticut and Illinois teachers do not participate in Social Security, state workers do.
contribute to DB plans (but they do have to pay Social Security taxes). In the public sector, employee contributions are the norm. Teacher contributions range from nothing (in Florida and Utah) to 12 percent of earnings (in Missouri). Many plans are found in the 5 to 9 percent range for required employee contributions (Public Fund Survey, 2009).

In addition, private and public pensions operate within two distinct legal and regulatory frameworks. Private employers are not required to offer retirement plans. To receive favorable federal tax treatment (for themselves and their employees) for any plans they do sponsor, employers must abide by the provisions of the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974. ERISA rules (which supersede any related state rules) govern reporting, disclosure, fiduciary responsibility, eligibility, vesting, and funding. ERISA also established the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) and requires private employers to pay insurance premiums to this agency (EBRI, 2005, ch. 1:5). The PBGC oversees the termination process when private employers decide to end a pension plan. Normally, the employer terminating the plan pays out accumulated benefits either by purchasing annuities for plan beneficiaries or by making lump-sum payments. If the employer is in financial distress (as determined by the agency or a bankruptcy court), the PBGC may take over the terminated plan and pay out benefits up to federally determined limits. These benefits may be less than the employee had accumulated in the terminated plan (PBGC, 2008).

ERISA is frequently cited as a major reason for the shift among private employers from DB to DC pension plans. ERISA increased the costs of operating DB plans in the private sector, through provisions such as requiring full funding of pension liabilities, imposing administrative costs for processes that insure compliance with ERISA rules, and mandating termination insurance payments to the PBGC (Purcell, 2004). In the private sector, therefore, many employers found it cost effective to switch from DB to DC plans. In the public sector, however, because ERISA generally does not apply, the Employee Benefit Research Institute says that the costs of administering a DB plan are “decidedly less” than the costs of administering a DC plan (EBRI, 2005, ch. 40:17).

State and local pension plans are exempt from most of the provisions of ERISA, although sub-national governments must abide by certain Internal Revenue Code requirements to protect pension plan members from incurring tax liabilities on their pension contributions and on their accumulating pension benefits before retirement. More importantly, as will be discussed later,
state and local plans are governed by numerous state rules that are imbedded in state constitutions, laws, and regulations. These are regarded as generally offering public employees even stronger protections than those enjoyed by private workers.

Analysts note other differences between the private and public sectors that affect pension design. While the general public may not have a strong interest in whether a particular private firm can attract and retain needed personnel, citizens have a more direct concern for the ability of government agencies that provide vital public services such as police and fire protection and education to fill their positions with qualified workers (EBRI, 2005, ch. 39:7). Governments, as nonprofit entities, do not offer employees the same opportunities for extraordinary compensation through bonuses and profit sharing available to private workers. Thus, public employers tend to emphasize secure retirement income in their pension plans rather than wealth accumulation, which may be a higher priority in private plans (Crane et al., n.d., 19). Finally, public sector pension decisions are by definition political decisions. Whereas economic forces rather than political forces are the stronger influences on private pensions, the reverse is true in the public sector. Elected officials often make the key decisions about public plan structure and features. Furthermore, public employees are much more likely to be represented by labor unions than are private sector workers; and organized labor plays a prominent role in debates over government retirement benefits (EBRI, 2005, ch. 39:4; U.S. GAO, 2007, 21). Teachers, it should be noted, are even more heavily unionized than general state government workers.

TEACHER RETIREMENT BENEFITS TODAY

In fiscal year (FY) 2005-06, state and local government employees received pension benefits through 221 state plans and 2,433 local ones (of which 11 were run by school districts). Pennsylvania had 925 retirement plans while Hawaii and Maine had only 1 each. With about 18.5 million members, state and local plans averaged just under 7,000 members each (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2007).

Many of these plans, however, serve only state and local employees other than teachers. Teachers participate in only a very small number of public pension plans, mostly in larger programs operated at the state level. It is important that discussions of the characteristics and health of teacher pensions be based on the programs in which teachers actually enroll. Therefore, this paper draws on the Public Fund Survey (2009), a continuously updated online
compendium of data on 101 public retirement systems that operate 125 plans covering more than 85 percent of the state and local public retirement system community. From that database I have identified 59 of those 125 plans in which teachers participate. These 59 plans are listed in Appendix A and are the focus of this paper. In the following discussion and where indicated, Public Fund Survey data have been augmented with data from the latest survey of educator pension plans conducted by the National Association of Education (NEA, 2006). The only relevant difference in plan coverage between the Public Fund and NEA surveys so far as teachers are concerned is that the NEA survey includes two school district pension plans (Kansas City MO, and Omaha, NE) that are not included in the Public Fund Survey and are not included in statistics cited in this paper for the sake of comparability. The NEA survey of 99 education plans includes 40 plans that enroll non-teaching public school staff and/or higher education personnel, but not teachers.

Two clarifications are in order. First is the distinction between retirement “system” and retirement “plan” as these terms are used in the Public Fund Survey. Some systems (e.g., the Florida Retirement System) have just one plan within them; members from multiple types of public agencies are governed by the same rules concerning such things as contribution levels and benefits. In other cases (e.g., Colorado) one state system (the Colorado Public Employees Retirement System) has several plans within it: for example Colorado PERA includes the Colorado State Plan, the Colorado Municipal Plan, and the Colorado School Plan. Plans within a single system cover distinct groups of employees and are discrete entities with their own rules and assets and liabilities. In yet another model, a state may have several completely separate public pension systems. Thus, in California teachers belong to the California State Teachers Retirement System, while many other state and local employees are members of the nation’s largest pension system, the California Public Employees Retirement System. These distinctions are useful to keep in mind when people refer to public pension systems or plans, as generalized statements about a system, for example, may not apply to a specific plan within the system.

Second, school personnel other than teachers may be in different systems or plans. According to the NEA survey, 8 of the 59 plans in Appendix A include teachers only. The rest include various combinations of teachers and/or education support professionals and/or higher

* Information about the Public Fund Survey can be found at http://www.publicfundsurvey.org/publicfundsurvey/aboutus.htm
education faculty and/or higher education support professionals. It is not uncommon for public school education support professionals to be in different plans than public school teachers. Teachers in some states are in the same plan as other state and/or local workers (NEA, 2006, 10-21).

**The Basic Design of Teachers’ Primary Pension Plans**

In FY 2008, no state or school district but Alaska required teachers to participate in a DC pension plan as their primary retirement benefit. (Michigan made a DC plan the primary, exclusive pension for state employees in 1997 but did not include teachers in the conversion.) In FY 2008 most teachers participated in a traditional final-average-salary DB pension plan. Many had the option of making voluntary contributions (without any employer assistance) to a separate DC plan for supplemental savings. These supplemental plans are also tax advantaged under the Internal Revenue Code, but are not considered in this paper.

For teachers in traditional DB plans, their annual retirement benefits are determined by a formula that multiplies (1) their years of service by (2) some measure of their final salary (often a three-year final average) by (3) a so-called benefit factor or replacement rate (“R”). Thus:

\[
\text{Annual income in first year of retirement} = \text{service (years)} \times \text{final annual salary} \times R.
\]

For example, if a teacher retired with 30 years of service and a final average salary of $60,000 and her pension plan used an “R” of 2 percent, her annual income in her first year of retirement would be $36,000.

Several states have adopted “hybrid” plans as their primary plans for teachers. In Indiana, Oregon, and Washington State, some teachers (e.g., new hires after a specified date) participate in plans that have both a traditional final-average-salary DB and a DC component. Members of Washington’s Teachers Plan 3, for example, are teachers who joined the plan after July 1, 1996 or who chose to transfer from an older plan. Employer contributions on teachers’ behalf are made to the DB plan. Employees’ own contributions are invested in individual DC plan accounts (NEA, 2006, 10-21). The “R” in the DB benefit formulas in these hybrid plans is lower than the “R” found in typical teacher DB programs, because part of a teacher’s retirement income is expected to come from her individual DC account.
In Florida, Ohio, and South Carolina, teachers have the option of choosing a DC plan as their primary plan rather than participating in the DB plan (NEA, 2006, 10-21). This option is thought to be especially attractive to teachers who do not expect to spend a full career in teaching or in the same state or district, for reasons that will be discussed more extensively below and in the conference paper by Robert Costrell and Michael Podgursky.

Alaska and West Virginia represent two special cases.

As of July 1, 2006 all new members of the Alaska Teachers Retirement System (as well as other public employee newly enrolling in their own retirement system) will participate in a DC retirement plan. The previous DB plan is henceforth closed to teachers. Several other states have considered switching from DB to DC plans in recent years. Governor Schwarzenegger’s 2005 proposed switch for California’s teachers and other public employees is the most widely publicized example,* but to date only Alaska has made the move.

West Virginia has moved in the opposite direction. In 2005 the state decided to end a DC plan that had been the primary plan for teachers since the state froze a badly under-funded DB plan in 1991. Employees hired since 2005 enroll in the newly reopened DB plan. In 2006 teachers in the DC plan voted to switch into the DB plan, but some DC plan participants objected to the forced conversion and sued to stop it. The state legislature agreed to put the issue to a second vote of teachers. If at least 65 percent of the teachers in the retirement system approved, participants in the DC program would be able to move to the DB plan or stay with the DC plan. If fewer than 65 percent voted for the new arrangement, the DC plan would remain the primary plan for those who entered it while the DB plan was closed (Samuels, 2008). In 2008 the required number of teachers voted in favor of allowing DC plan participants to make the switch to the DB plan if they wished (Levitz, 2008).

Some Distinctive Features of Teachers’ DB Plans

Teachers’ DB plans have several features that are common in public sector pensions but rare in the private sector.

* For a description and analysis of the governor’s plan, see California Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2005.
Cost of living adjustments. Unlike private sector pensions, public sector pensions typically include cost of living adjustments (COLAs) that apply once retirees begin drawing on their annuities. The majority of teacher plans include some kind of automatic COLA: sometimes a fixed amount (e.g., 3 percent annually, compounded), in other cases tied in some way to the Consumer Price Index. In some states, the adjustments are ad hoc decisions made by the retirement fund governing board or the legislature. In a few plans COLAs are linked in part to the market returns on invested retirement assets.

Young ages for normal retirement. With just a few exceptions teacher retirement plans permit teachers to take “normal” retirement and receive their full pensions earlier than Social Security and many private sector programs. Many teacher plans permit normal retirement for long-serving individuals in their 50’s. Some states use formulas like the “rule of 80” or “rule of 85”: that is, teachers can retire with full benefits when the combination of their age and years of service equals the specified number. Some states have been moving to raise the age for normal retirement for new hires in order to reduce their future liabilities.

Early retirement benefits. Teachers can generally retire earlier than the normal retirement date and receive pension benefits. Usually these benefits are reduced by some formula. According to the National Education Association, “[e]arly retirement benefits are usually computed based on the normal retirement formula, and the benefit is then reduced by either a specified annual percentage or by an actuarial reduction applied according to the number of years that the early age retirement precedes the normal age retirement” (NEA, 2006, 36). As with the rules for normal retirement, the rules for early retirement are being changed in some states to reduce future costs to the pension plan.

Retiree health benefits. Virtually all public employers, unlike their private counterparts, offer some health benefits to their retirees. These are much more variable than pension benefits, however, and frequently differ for younger retirees not eligible for Medicare and older retirees who can participate in Medicare. Some states pay all the medical insurance premiums for their retirees; some make plans available but do not subsidize the costs; and others fall somewhere in the middle, sharing the costs between employer and employee.
ISSUES

Teacher pension plans, traditionally of interest mostly to those directly benefiting from or responsible for paying for them, are gaining wider public attention because of mounting concerns over such issues as their financial sustainability, their treatment of mobile employees, and their possible contribution to teacher shortages. In considering whether policy changes might be desirable, the issue of just what kind of plan modifications can legally be made, given the unusual legal protections generally awarded public pensions, must also be addressed.

Financial Sustainability

Are teacher pensions in financial trouble? Reports entitled “the gathering pension storm” facing government pensions (Passantino and Summers, 2005) and “the public pension crisis” (Weiss et al., 2006) suggest that they are. “[A] bill coming due [for state retiree pensions and other benefits] over the next few decades that can be conservatively estimated at $2.73 trillion” certainly might be cause for alarm (Pew Center on the States, n.d.). Current unfunded public pension liabilities of more than $350 billion cause some to argue that we have “a national, systemic problem” (Passantino and Summers, 2005, executive summary).

These figures are based on public retirement plans generally, however, not the specific plans that teachers belong to. Conclusions about whether changes are warranted in teacher pension plans specifically depend on how well structured these particular plans are to meet their current and future commitments, in light of their own unfunded liabilities and the stresses that governments may be facing from other sources.

A first look at fiscal sustainability. Lawrence Kotlikoff will take up the sustainability of teacher pensions in more depth in his conference paper. Here I note that, disquieting headlines or report titles aside, recent studies by credible, objective organizations (written, it should be remembered, before the major financial market upheavals of 2008) did not find a broad crisis in the public pension arena. The Pew Center on the States (n.d., 4), author of the $2.73 trillion estimate just cited, concluded that “[f]rom a national perspective, states’ pension plans seem to be in reasonable shape.” Likewise, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) said in late 2007 that state and local governments appeared able to fully fund their pension obligations on an
ongoing basis with only a small increase (0.3 percent of salaries) above their current contributions (U.S. GAO, 2007, 27).

When a plan’s assets match its liabilities, the plan is said to be fully funded. If the ratio of assets to liabilities is less than 100 percent, the plan is described as under-funded. Some plans may also be over-funded, with (from an actuarial perspective) assets that are greater than those needed to meet the present value of current liabilities. The Florida Retirement System, for example, reports a funding ratio of 105.6 and has been fully funded since 1998. This accomplishment appears due at least in part to “legislation that basically reserved a portion of the pension surplus to serve as a safeguard against unexpected increases in liabilities, providing the state with extra financial security” (Pew Center on the States, n.d., 20).

According to the Public Fund Survey (2009), the latest available data on all 125 plans in its report indicate that public pension systems have $2.471 trillion in actuarial assets and $2.864 trillion in actuarial liabilities, giving an aggregated actuarial funding ratio for all the plans of 86.3 percent. This is very close to the aggregated actuarial funding ratio of 85.6 percent for the 59 teacher pension plans and to the funding ratio the Pew Center for the States found in its independent survey of public sector pensions which included a wider range of public employees and plans.

As Table 3 shows, however, funding ratios in teacher pension plans vary widely. Four plans have funding ratios of below 60 percent while nine are fully or over-funded.

Actuarial funding ratios are useful indicators, but they must be interpreted with caution. They are statements at a particular time about how the assets in a pension plan compare to the present value of the benefits that plan members have accrued. Ratios do not indicate anything about whether a plan is moving in a healthy or unhealthy direction. If a plan is amortizing previous unfunded liabilities, for example, it may appear at a given point to have a large unfunded liability; but in fact its funding ratio might be on target with a planned schedule for achieving financial soundness. Since unfunded liabilities are typically amortized over 30 years, the key question for an under-funded plan is whether it is making progress in reducing its unfunded liabilities.

Moreover, funding ratios are not strictly comparable from plan to plan. How a specific ratio is calculated depends on a variety of methods used by actuaries to determine such things as the cost method, future investment returns, and the asset valuation method. Calculations about a
plan’s financial strength can be quite sensitive to the assumptions made about the future rate of return on invested pension funds, and this becomes increasingly true as a plan matures. GAO, for example, determined that public pension plans at current contribution levels (9.0 percent of salaries) would need to be raised only to 9.3 percent of salaries for employers to be able to meet their future obligations, if investment returns followed past patterns. If the future real rate of return is 1 percentage point higher or 2 percentage point lower than the historic rate, however, annual contribution levels would have to be 5.0 percent of salaries or 13.9 percent of salaries, respectively (U.S. GAO, 2007, 28). Figures 1 and 2 show the variation in nominal and real (inflation-adjusted) rates of return currently used in teacher pension plans.

Finally, questions are growing within the pension community about whether a wholly new approach, based on concepts from the field of financial economics, is needed to measure accurately the funded status of public pension plans. While a fuller discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth taking note of the controversy and pointing out that “mark to market” rather than standard actuarial methods for valuing assets and liabilities appear likely to indicate that current liabilities are understated and that higher contribution rates are called for.

The opinions cited above that many public pensions are adequately funded are based on the fact that many plans (including many of the larger ones) report funding ratios of at least 80 percent. As GAO noted, “A funded ratio of 80 percent or more is within the range that many public sector experts, union officials, and advocates view as a healthy pension system” (U.S. GAO, 2007, 30). The point-in-time snapshot for the 59 teacher plans indicates that 26 fell below the 80 percent threshold under current assumptions about investment returns, even before the financial market turmoil that began in late 2007.

The author of the Public Fund Survey suggests that:

Underfunding is a matter of degree, not of kind. That is, underfunding is not necessarily a sign of fiscal or actuarial distress; many pension plans remain underfunded for decades with no detrimental consequences….

*The critical factor in assessing the current and future health of a pension plan is not so much the plan’s actuarial funding level, as whether or not funding the plan’s liabilities

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* The assets available to pay promised pension benefits to retirees consist of contributions from employers and employees (which are relatively predictable) plus investment returns on these assets minus plan expenses. As a pension plan matures, the proportion of its annual income that comes from investment returns becomes larger relative to the annual contributions made on behalf of plan members. Thus assumptions about investment returns have an increasing impact on calculations about the plan’s ability to meet its obligations.
creates fiscal stress for the pension plan sponsor [emphasis in original] (Brainard, 2007, 1)

This idea of viewing the health of a teacher pension plan through the lens of the stress it currently or potentially poses for the plan sponsor seems like a very constructive starting point for evaluating individual plans. It reflects the fact that sustainability will depend on a number of factors outside of the pension plan itself, many of which will be specific to an individual sponsor (such as what is happening to the tax base in a particular jurisdiction and how population changes may be affecting the demand for public services of various kinds).

**General challenges to financial sustainability**

In addition to outside factors affecting specific jurisdictions, however, there are some general pressures that could pose challenges to financial sustainability for many pension plans.

**Employers’ failure to make actuarially required contributions.** To maintain or reach full funding in a pension program, the sponsor must annually make its actuarially required contribution (ARC). This consists of “the amount of funding needed to pay for new liabilities accrued in that year [“normal cost”] as well as to pay off a portion of the unfunded liabilities accrued in previous years” (Pew Center on the States, n.d., 24). State and local governments frequently fail to make these contributions in full. The Pew Center recently estimated that among the states there was about a 50-50 split between those meeting their funding requirements and those failing to do so (Pew Center on the States, n.d., 25). Not only do pension plans with unfunded liabilities fall even further behind in years when they do not pay ARCs, but these missed payments can create a financial drag on the pension plan for many years to come.

Illinois, for example, is reported to have the largest unfunded pension obligation in the nation for its five state employment plans, one of which covers teachers. The Center for Tax and Budget Accountability reports that the practice of failing to meet even the normal cost for the pension plans dates back over 35 years. Despite some efforts to reduce liabilities, the state took so-called pension holidays in FY 2006 and 2007 to avoid fully meeting its pension obligations (Mancini and Martire, 2006). Such holidays are not uncommon, especially when states or cities are under fiscal pressure from other spending demands and tax revenues fail to keep up. In Illinois, the compounding problem of repeated failures to fully fund pensions puts the state in
ever-deeper financial peril, since it is one of the states with a constitutional prohibition against diminishing or impairing pension benefits under an enforceable contractual relationship between pension plan participants and the government. Later I will say more about this legal issue.

The Wisconsin Retirement System has some unusual protections against under-funding. The consulting actuary, with approval of a board of trustees, sets contribution levels. In other states, legislatures often have this responsibility. If local governments do not pay their share, the state will deduct what they owe from state aid programs. Moreover, retirees receive COLAs only when investment returns are sufficient to pay them, and COLAs can be taken back if investment returns are negative (Wirtz, 2006).

Unfunded “benefit bumps.” As previously noted, public pension policies are made in a highly politicized environment. One result is a penchant among lawmakers to increase pension benefits, especially when economic times are good and investment returns are outpacing immediate needs. Too often, however, these decisions are made without sufficient attention to their effect on the pension plan “bottom line” over the long term.

For example, the Pioneer Institute for Public Policy Research (Ardon, 2006) reports that in 2000 the Massachusetts legislature passed “a massive enhancement of benefits for teachers.” The contribution rate for new teachers was increased and benefits were raised for long-time teachers. At retirement, the pensions of teachers with 30 or more years of service would be increased by 2 percent per year for each year of service in excess of 24. Teachers already in the system could opt into the new arrangements by paying the higher contribution rate. The buy-in rules for teachers nearing retirement were generous. The Pioneer Institute shows how a 30-year veteran with 30 years of service could increase her expected lifetime annuity payments by $165,000 for a buy-in cost of $18,000.

This is only one of many “benefit bumps” in public pension programs around the country.

Some states have taken action designed to force costs as well as benefits to be considered when pension benefit increases are being debated. Georgia’s state constitution requires that public retirement plans remain actuarially sound. To accomplish this, the state requires that pension legislation with a fiscal effect can be introduced only in the first year of the General Assembly’s two year term and can be passed only in the second year (and these actions have to
take place in regular, not special, sessions). Such legislation cannot be considered by the full House or Senate unless its actuarial cost has been determined. Retirement bills become null and void if their first-year funding costs are not appropriated in the year of enactment. Finally, the state is required to contribute its ARC (i.e., both normal cost and the amount necessary to amortize any unfunded liability) (Brainard, 2006). Oklahoma has similar requirements. Missouri does not allow public pension plans to increase benefits if the plan is less than 80 percent funded.

“Gaming” the system to increase pension benefits. DB pension benefits that are based on final average salaries are vulnerable to manipulation by employees seeking to increase their pension benefits. Some examples involving teachers have to do with teachers in non-Social Security states exploiting loopholes in order to qualify for spousal Social Security benefits for which they would otherwise be ineligible. It is unclear how much “spiking” (inflating end-of-career salaries) goes on in teaching, but the phenomenon is generally acknowledged as a concern in public pension systems. One way individuals can “spike” their salaries is to move into higher paying jobs in the years that count for pension determination. In North Carolina, for example, researchers heard about teachers who move from low-paying to high-paying counties for the last few years of their careers to qualify for higher benefits under the state retirement system (Hansen et al., 2007).

Some states have enacted laws to circumvent spiking in public pension systems. Missouri, for example, limits (with some exceptions) the maximum annual percentage increase that will be counted for pension purposes in the final salary period to 10 percent. Illinois also caps end-of-career salary increases.

Stresses from non-pension unfunded commitments. How burdensome pension liabilities will be for states and local governments depends on other unfunded commitments. The “600 pound gorilla” here is retiree health care. As the recent Pew Center for the States report demonstrates, unfunded liabilities for retiree health care costs are finally being tallied up thanks to new reporting requirements from the Government Accounting Standards Board. Most governments are just realizing for the first time how large these liabilities are. While governments can change health care commitments much more easily than pension commitments,
the political costs of reducing expected benefits will be high. Robert Clark will say more about teacher retiree health insurance issues in his conference paper.

**Pension Plans and Mobile Teachers**

Distinct from the question of whether teacher pension plans are financially sustainable is the question about how fairly they treat all the teachers they serve and what if any effect they have on schools’ ability to find qualified staff. The almost universal adherence of public pension plans to the final-average-salary DB design is frequently justified on the grounds that it is desirable to have a long-term, stable public workforce to serve community needs and that it is important to ensure loyal career employees that they will have a secure source of income once they retire. The back-loaded benefits embedded in the traditional final-average-salary DB formula are designed to meet these objectives for long-serving teachers. What is increasingly unclear, however, is how well the traditional design serves the teaching force as a whole, especially those teachers who do not teach for 25 or 30 years or who do not remain in the same location throughout their careers. In a 21st century world where employee mobility is increasingly a feature of modern economic life (and where many young adults expect to hold multiple jobs during their lifetimes), the question of how well the current pension system serves all teachers merits re-examination.

Robert Costrell and Michael Podgursky will have more to say about this issue in their conference paper. Their earlier work (Costrell and Podgursky, 2007) has set the stage by highlighting the fact that participants in traditional final-average-salary defined benefit pension plans do not accrue benefits evenly over their careers. They have shown this by measuring the growth in a teacher’s pension wealth over her career; Figure 3 provides the results for an illustrative teacher in the Ohio retirement system. Pension wealth is a measure of the present value of a stream of pension payments or the market value of an equivalent annuity. In the example of the Ohio teacher, pension wealth accumulates very slowly for 20 or so years and then rises rapidly. Although the exact shape of the wealth curve reflects specific features of the Ohio plan, the overall shape is characteristic of traditional DB plans. One crucial feature to note is that pension wealth can actually begin to decline in a traditional DB plan if the teacher stays on the job long enough. This occurs because at some point the additional pension wealth accumulated for an additional year of teaching is not sufficient to offset the loss of income the
teacher experiences by shortening by one year the time she can be expected to receive pension income in retirement.

    Even though in this example pension wealth rises throughout most of a long career, the annual increase in pension wealth net of the earnings on the previous year’s wealth (“deferred compensation”) changes in idiosyncratic ways compared to annual salary (“current compensation”) late in a teacher’s career. Costrell and Podgursky also show this phenomenon for the illustrative Ohio teacher in Figure 4. The “peaks and cliffs” portrayed in this figure occur because of the way early and normal retirement provisions operate. Again, this particular pattern is illustrative of Ohio’s pensions, but similar peaks and cliffs are found in other state plans.

    In general, and despite their idiosyncrasies, the structure of the traditional DB plans treats teachers well if they work a full career in teaching. For those who do not, however, the benefits are much less generous. These individuals are less well served than they would be under a pension framework (such as a DC plan) that accumulates benefits more evenly throughout a teaching career.

    A teacher who leaves her job short of a full career generally can (and sometimes must) remain in a DB plan as an “inactive” member and receive a pension later at retirement age. The pension formula used to calculate the retirement benefit, however, will reflect the final average salary at the time the teacher left the system. Since this could have been many years earlier, inflation will have taken a severe toll on the benefit level.

    Some plans allow a departing teacher to cash-out the retirement benefit in some way. Seldom, however, will this teacher receive full credit for his or her own contributions, the employer contribution, and a market rate of return on these investments. Generally, a teacher withdrawing from a pension plan will lose all of the employer contributions made on her behalf. A few states have modified their plans to be more generous to departing employees. In South Dakota, for example, teachers leaving after three years of credited service but before retirement can select a “portable retirement option” which allows them to take with them their accumulated contributions (both employee and employer shares) and credited interest. The Colorado Public Employees Retirement Association allows a departing teacher (before retirement or age 65) to receive her own accumulated contributions (including interest at a 5 percent rate) plus a 50 percent “match” that gives the employee at least partial credit for the employer’s contribution.
The typical teacher pension plan can exact a toll on individuals who are geographically mobile. Since there is virtually no cross-state reciprocity in teacher pensions (and sometimes limited reciprocity between local and state systems within the same state), a teacher could work for a full career in a succession of jobs in different states and never receive anything near the pension benefits she would have earned by staying in the same place. Long vesting periods (in some states as long as ten years) can further penalize a mobile teacher who may leave before becoming vested.

“Purchase of service credit” provisions exist in virtually all teacher pension plans and in theory compensate for some of these disadvantages. The provisions are cumbersome and limited, however, and differ from plan to plan. A mobile teacher who cashes out of one plan without receiving full credit for all employer and employee contributions and interest may not have enough money to pay the price of purchasing credit in the new system. An individual who enters teaching in mid-career and whose prior service was not in teaching or public employment may not be allowed to purchase credits. This person may be doubly disadvantaged, because he or she may not be given much if any credit on the “salary scale” for work in another field, so the final pension benefit will reflect both a limited number of years of service and a lower salary than a long-term teacher of the same age would have. For all new entrants to a pension plan, the number of years of prior service credits that can be purchased is likely to be restricted.

Fairly limited attention has been paid to pension penalties incurred by “short termers” because teachers have generally been perceived as spending their careers “close to home.” There is little empirical evidence available to date on the proportion of teachers who may suffer financial penalties from moving across state lines or from having shorter working lives because they “stop out” for a while for family or other personal reasons. A cursory look at financial reports from several state pension plans suggests, however, that a significant minority of their current retirees left the workforce with fewer than the 20 to 25 years of service that would qualify them for the good benefits that a back-loaded DB system provides a long-serving individual. There is also no way to measure the extent to which teachers are locked into their current jobs because of the financial price they would pay if they left their current pension plan. Superintendents, who often have careers spanning several states, have long been aware of the pension cost that mobility imposes.
Pension Structure and Teacher Shortages

The back-loaded and “spiky” pension benefits described above may not only be inequitable for individual teachers but can make schools “losers” under current pension plans as well because these plans may contribute to teacher shortages. The penalties paid by “short-term” teachers discourage individuals from moving from areas where their skills may be in surplus to areas which may be suffering from difficulties in filling their teaching slots. As we have just seen, these penalties can also serve as a disincentive to individuals who might want to spend a significant time as teachers but who do not see teaching as their single lifetime career.

Provisions for early retirement and pension provisions that (perhaps unintentionally) create financial incentives for teachers to retire at specific times in their careers may also induce these individuals to leave their jobs even though the resulting vacancy may be difficult to fill. The 2000 Massachusetts pension changes mentioned earlier were associated with about an 80 percent increase in the number of retirements in the first year that teachers could receive the new, higher benefits. The increase in retirement levels above those experienced before the 2000 reforms has continued in subsequent years (Arden, 2006, 11).

Legal Obstacles to Pension Reform

It is widely believed that pension benefits cannot easily be reduced for current public sector employees because of the legal frameworks governing public sector pensions. Amy Monahan will present a detailed assessment of this issue in her conference paper. The context for her analysis can be found in comments like the following: “Given that public pensions are often legally defined as an accrued benefit earned over the life of an employee’s service, cutting benefit levels that have accrued to employees is often legally restricted. Roughly 40 states have some form of nonimpairment clause that makes restructuring existing pension benefits essentially impossible. While pension benefits can be restructured for future employees, it is virtually impossible to reduce them for existing workers” (Mattoon, 2007, 13). One example of such a “nonimpairment clause” is Article XII, Section 7 of the Alaska state constitution, which provides that: “Membership in employee retirement systems of the State or its political subdivisions shall constitute a contractual relationship. Accrued benefits of these systems shall not be diminished or impaired.”
Table 4 indicates that every state has some kind of constitutional clause, statute, or case law that restricts policy makers’ ability to reduce public pension benefits. In a state such as California where voter-initiated ballot propositions are permitted, citizens also have the option of directly determining public pension rules through the electoral process.*

Thus, public sector employers appear to face barriers to doing as many private sector employers have done and terminating one kind of plan (e.g., DB) while moving current workers into a new kind of plan (e.g., DC). Likewise, states may not be able to change other aspects of a current worker’s plan. So, for example, states may find that while they can impose higher required contribution levels or less-generous early retirement rules on employees hired after a certain date, they must allow employees hired before that date to continue under the old arrangements. This may result either in public pension plans with “tiers” of contribution requirements and/or benefits, depending on when employees were hired, or in the existence of separate plans for earlier and later hires.

RETHINKING TEACHER PENSION PLAN DESIGN

The debate over whether public pensions need to be redesigned has frequently taken the form of an argument over whether defined benefit pensions should be replaced, as they largely have been in the private sector, by defined contribution plans. Moreover, the argument is, as the authors of a TIAA Institute report note, often characterized by “heated rhetoric—but little light.” They observe that:

Public policy makers are often bombarded with emotion-laden arguments as to the relative merits of defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC) plan designs. The “DB vs. DC” debate often includes strong and heated rhetoric from both sides….

Those who favor defined benefit plans have sometimes characterized defined contribution alternatives as “risky 401(k) plans” while those who favor defined contribution plans have, in turn, sometimes characterized DB plans as akin to welfare for public employees (Crane et al., n.d., 6).

Framing the debate as “DB vs. DC” obscures some important points. First is that each type of plan has advantages and disadvantages for employers and employees. Second is that the two types of plans are not as distinctive as they may at first appear. Many features that might justify a switch to a DC plan can also be built into a DB plan, and some DB-type features can

* For an example, see California Legislative Analyst’s Office (2005, 4).
also be added to DC plans. Finally, arguing in terms of the classic designs of traditional DB and DC plans fails to bring into the discussion new types of plans, such as the cash balance (CB) defined benefit plan. CB defined benefit plans can be designed with features that might address key interests of partisans on both sides of the DB/DC divide. The CB defined benefit alternative, which has been adopted by a number of private sector employers, has been used infrequently in the public sector. It is thus relatively unfamiliar to participants in public sector pension debates. Therefore, the final section of the paper will explain how this kind of plan works and why policymakers might want to consider it among the various options for pension plan redesign.

“DB vs. DC”: the Familiar Arguments For and Against

Table 5 lays out some of the key features of traditional DB and DC plans. Many of the familiar arguments for and against DB or DC pensions are rooted in the differences described in the table. Which features are seen as advantageous or disadvantageous depend on where one sits. Employers, for example, may welcome the fact that traditional DB plans provide their employees with benefits that cannot be outlived. Employers and employees may appreciate the fact that on average DB fund managers are likely to be able to achieve higher investment returns at lower costs than individuals can obtain on their own in managing DC accounts. Employers and taxpayers may question, however, whether benefits such as early retirement and inflation-protected pensions can be provided at contribution levels they are willing to support. Many employees may like the guaranteed lifetime income of a DB plan, but some may wish for more direct control over their investments or prefer more freedom to take lump-sum payouts rather than the traditional DB annuity. As we have already seen, long-term employees are likelier than their shorter-term colleagues to prefer DB over DC plans. Public citizens, who pay for the employer share of pension contributions, will have different views on such issues as whether it is appropriate for public sector workers to have more generous pension benefits than many taxpayers now enjoy.

While Table 5 is a common way of contrasting traditional DB and DC plans, a different and useful perspective is provided by Crane et al. in their TIAA Institute study. They compare the plans specifically through the lens of who bears the risks in each type of plan. As Crane et al. (n.d., 27) describe them, risks include:
Investment and Funding Rate Risk

Investment risk—the risk that investment returns will be less than necessary to provide the desired benefit levels.

Funding rate risk—the risk that plan investment or benefits experience is worse than expected requiring higher contributions to properly pay for the promised or desired benefits.

Longevity and Inflation Risk

Longevity risk—the risk that the participant will live longer than expected.

Inflation risk—the risk that inflation will decrease the value of the earned benefit.

Mortality and Disability Risk

Mortality risk—the risk that the participant will die before expected.

Disability risk—the risk that the participant will become disabled before becoming eligible for regular retirement benefits.

Termination Risk—the risk that the participant will end employment before vesting and forfeit accrued benefits.

Table 6 shows how these risks are divided among plan sponsors and participants in traditional DB and DC plans. This way of comparing plan types brings to the forefront the fact that plan sponsors bear most of the risks in DB plans, whereas plan participants bear most of the risks in DC plans. The uneven division of risk underlies a lot of specific objections to the two traditional types of public pension plans. It also helps explain the opposition of affected parties when proposed pension changes threaten to shift to them risks that they previously did not have to bear.

Why DB/DC Distinctions Are Not As Clear-Cut As Generally Perceived

It is customary for discussions of DB and DC pensions to draw a bright line between the two plan designs, as the previous section does in describing characteristics of the traditional form of each pension type. But discussions of possible pension reforms also should consider that both types of plans can be modified to include features that embrace desirable elements of the other.

A few examples* indicate how this could be accomplished, depending on what specific concerns are being addressed. We have already seen how some states have modified their DB

* The following discussion about new features of DC plans is based partially on Olleman (2007).
plans to work in tandem with a DC plan so that employees can enjoy the benefits of both and employers and employees can more evenly share pension risks. One of those states, Washington, has also tackled the concern that DC plan investors may suffer from lower investment returns because they do not have the bargaining clout of a big pension fund and do not have the same investment options (such as real estate, private equity, and hedge funds) that institutional investors do. Investors in Washington’s Plan 3 DC account can choose to invest their funds in a total allocation portfolio (TAP) that is continuously managed and rebalanced by the Washington State Investment Board. TAP mirrors the investments in the state’s DB plan.

DC plans can also be structured to include death and disability benefits of a kind traditionally found only in DB plans. In Florida, employers pay a separate surcharge that enables the state to give DC plan participants who become disabled the option of surrendering their DC account balances and receiving the same disability benefits as offered in the DB plan. Alaska has built benefits for occupational death and disability into its new primary DC plan.

Traditional final-average-salary DB plans can also be redesigned to have some DC-type features. The Wisconsin Retirement System allows DB plan participants to put 50 percent of their and their employer’s contributions into a Variable Trust Fund, giving them some control over investments but subjecting them to some investment risk. In some DB plans, beneficiaries are now offered the opportunity at retirement to take a lump-sum distributions rather than being required to take a life-time annuity. Teachers in Colorado’s state pension plan, for example, are credited with a fixed interest rate (currently 5 percent compounded annually) on their own contributions. If an individual chooses to withdraw her account after retirement eligibility or age 65 rather than take an annuity, she receives the amount credited to her account along with a 100 percent match (effectively accounting for the employer’s contribution as well).

The California Legislative Analyst’s Office (2005) assessed Governor Schwarzenegger’s proposal to shift the state’s public employees from a DB to a DC plan and made a number of suggestions for ways in which concerns raised by the governor could be addressed within the structure of the DB program. For example, the LAO indicated that concerns about benefits could be addressed by such steps as closing some formulas to new entrants, moving from a final year salary to a final-average salary with a three-year instead of a one-year base for calculating pensions, and restricting retroactive benefit enhancements. Funding concerns could be addressed
by setting aside funds in years when investment returns are better than expected to cover years when returns are below expectations, making employee contributions variable (as employer contributions are), and reasserting statutory rights to change employee contributions. The LAO also raised the possibility that the state might want to consider making its primary pension plan a cash balance defined benefit plan instead of the existing final-year salary DB plan.

**Cash Balance Plans: The Road Seldom Taken (in the Public Sector)**

Cash balance plans are legally treated as defined benefit programs. They have certain characteristics in common with traditional DB programs (including guarantees about retirement income benefits); but they also have characteristics of DC programs. Generally described as a “hybrid” pension design, CB plans share many of the risks in pension plans between employers and employees. DB and DC plans, by contrast, place various kinds of risks exclusively on one or the other party.

As indicated earlier, private employers who continue to sponsor defined benefit pensions have moved nearly a quarter of their workers into cash balance plans. In the public sector, however, I could find only two such plans. California has a cash balance plan, administered by the California State Teachers Retirement system, for part-time teachers. Nebraska has implemented a CB plan for its state and local employees, though not for teachers. Nebraska’s state and local employees were in a DC plan from 1964 to 2003. Investment returns in the DC lagged those in the state’s other DB programs over that period. About half of the DC participants were in the default investment fund, a low-risk but comparatively low-yield stable value fund. Partially because of this, DC participants were receiving significantly less replacement income in retirement than had been projected. Nebraska made a new cash balance plan the primary pension plan for state and local employees hired on or after January 1, 2003 (Olleman, 2007, 21).

One reason for the slow spread of cash balance plans into the public sector may be that, after an initial burst of interest in them in the private sector, legal questions arose that effectively stopped their implementation for a number of years. These issues appear to be largely resolved now. As will be described below, some early features that were unpopular with employees are no longer legal. The question of whether CB plans constitute age discrimination seems to have been put to rest. Implementation of CB plans by a number of private employers has shown that
these plans can be structured in ways that benefit younger workers while not harming older workers who expected back-end-loaded benefits based on their long service.

**What are cash balance defined benefit pensions?** The U.S. Department of Labor (2008) defines cash balance plans as follows:

A cash balance plan is a defined benefit plan that defines the benefit in terms that are more characteristic of a defined contribution plan. In other words, a cash balance plan defines the promised benefit in terms of a stated account balance. In a typical cash balance plan, a participant's account is credited each year with a pay credit (such as 5 percent of compensation from his or her employer) and an interest credit (either a fixed rate or a variable rate that is linked to an index such as the one-year Treasury bill rate). Increases and decreases in the value of the plan's investments do not directly affect the benefit amounts promised to participants. Thus, the investment risks and rewards on plan assets are borne solely by the employer.

When a participant becomes entitled to receive benefits under a cash balance plan, the benefits that are received are defined in terms of an account balance. For example, assume that a participant has an account balance of $100,000 when he or she reaches age 65. If the participant decides to retire at that time, he or she would have the right to an annuity. Such an annuity might be approximately $10,000 per year for life. In many cash balance plans, however, the participant could instead choose (with consent from his or her spouse) to take a lump sum benefit equal to the $100,000 account balance.

In addition to generally permitting participants to take their benefits as lump sum benefits at retirement, cash balance plans often permit vested participants to choose (with consent from their spouses) to receive their accrued benefits in lump sums if they terminate employment prior to retirement age.

Traditional defined benefit pension plans do not offer this feature as frequently.

If a participant receives a lump sum distribution, that distribution generally can be rolled over into an Individual Retirement Account (IRA) or to another employer's plan if that plan accepts rollovers.

While both traditional defined benefit plans and cash balance plans are required to offer payment of an employee’s benefit in the form of a series of payments for life, traditional defined benefit plans define an employee's benefit as a series of monthly payments for life to begin at retirement, but cash balance plans define the benefit in terms of a stated account balance. These accounts are often referred to as hypothetical accounts because they do not reflect actual contributions to an account or actual gains and losses allocable to the account.

Like traditional defined benefit pensions, cash balance pensions in private firms are insured by the PBGC.
Why CB plans may appeal to some employers and employees. Cash balance plans look in some ways like DC plans to workers but are funded, administered, and regulated as defined benefit plans (Clark and Schieber, 2004). Private firms had some tax incentives to convert from traditional DB plans to CB plans rather than to DC plans, but research suggests that firms that operated in tight labor markets with younger, more mobile workers were more strongly motivated by a desire to serve the needs of their employees (Coronado and Copeland, 2004). CB plans do not penalize worker mobility yet do not force workers to take on the investment risk associated with managing their own investment accounts. CB plans do not remove all investment risk from employers, especially for plans that guarantee a fixed interest credit; but the risks are much less than with traditional DB plans. With CB plans, employers do not have to worry that employees will unwisely choose not to participate. They also find that employees understand CB plans better than they understand traditional DB plans and therefore give the employer more credit for providing the retirement benefit (Clark and Schieber, 2004).*

Employers, increasingly concerned about how to attract and/or retain older workers, also tend to appreciate the fact that CB plans do not penalize older employees who work beyond normal retirement age and do not create incentives for early retirement (Johnson and Steuerle, 2004).

Objections to CB plans. The editors of a special journal issue devoted to hybrid pensions in the United States introduced the volume by saying:

…hybrid pensions have proven very controversial in the United States. At least some of the controversy is not about hybrid designs per se but about the process of converting from a defined benefit to a hybrid plan and whether the legislation adequately protects workers in the conversion process. In addition, hybrids are a relatively new form of provision and it has proven challenging to handle hybrid pensions within the existing U.S. regulatory framework. Further, it is clear to us that understanding of the features of hybrids is not as advanced as for more traditional forms of benefit provision (Brown et al., 2004, 269).

Older workers in companies that were converting from DB to CB plans had a number of concerns. Some employees objected to the loss of early retirement benefits, since early retirement incentives are not generally part of CB plans. Some objected to being moved into a plan that provided similar benefits to workers of all ages (e.g., similar employer contribution

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* Mattoon (2007, 12) cites findings from the University of Michigan Health and Retirement Study indicating that half of the respondents who were enrolled in a retirement plan did not know if it was a DB or a DC plan and most did not know the value of their pension or their eligibility date for early retirement.
rates) as they were nearing the point in their careers when their pension wealth would have started to grow significantly under a traditional back-loaded defined benefit plan. In some companies, the value of older workers’ transition accounts were calculated in such a way that the worker would not be eligible for new employer contributions for some period of time (a situation called “wear away”). Congress held hearings and considered bills to stop conversions. A number of lawsuits were filed against employers attempting to stop CB plans on a number of grounds, including age discrimination. A trial court in a case against IBM ruled in 2003 that cash balance plans inherently and illegally discriminated on the basis of age. The age discrimination ruling was, however, overruled by an appellate court in 2006; and in 2007 the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear arguments challenging that decision.

Amid the controversy, however, the Internal Revenue Service in 1999 stopped approving new cash balance plans, approval which is required in order to protect the tax-advantaged status of these plans. Companies that had already adopted such plans were free to continue them but lived in the shadow of what the courts and Congress might decide about age discrimination and other issues.

In 2006 Congress passed the Pension Protection Act, which resolved a number of outstanding issues about cash balance plans created after June 30, 2005. Among other things, it prohibits “wear away” in new plans and makes it clear that these new plans will not be subject to age-discrimination challenges as long as they include certain features.

The controversies that have arisen with regard to private sector CB plans seem, in any event, less likely to apply to public sector plans. Because, as previously noted, state constitutions and statutes may make it difficult to change public pension benefits for current workers, states may not be as likely as private firms to consider converting their existing employees from one type of pension plan to another. Governments, however, can and arguably should consider whether a different pension structure for future workers would be desirable.

There has been some research on the cost of CB defined benefit plans vs. traditional final-average-salary DB plans. One study of firms that had converted to CB as of 1998 concluded that pension liabilities for the majority increased. The authors note that this would not have been the case if benefits were held to the amounts employees had a legal claim to; so they concluded that employers increased benefits during the conversion (Coronado and Copeland, 2004). This might have been done, for example, to compensate older workers for some of the
future benefits they would have received under the old DB plan. Another study determined that the costs of grandfathering older workers’ benefits can be substantial (Mitchell and Mulvey, 2004). Whether or not pension costs increase for employers under a CB plan, however, costs become more predictable because the percentage of salary the employer is required to contribute is known and the rate of return the employer must credit to the employees’ hypothetical accounts is tied to market rates.

CONCLUSION

A number of years ago an ERISA Advisory Council working group on hybrid pensions observed that “cash balance plans and other account-base defined benefit plan formats are no more than retirement-plan design tools, which in themselves are neither ‘good’ nor ‘bad’ ” (ERISA Advisory Council, 1999). This is a useful caveat to keep in mind about teacher pension plans in general. As we have seen, the boundaries among the various types of pensions are porous. Rather than arguing about whether existing arrangements are good or bad, discussions about whether pension reform is needed might more usefully begin by seeking agreement on the objectives being sought in a retirement benefits program. Then it would be appropriate to examine various plan types and features with an eye on whether existing arrangements or some new combination would best meet those objectives. Where teacher pensions are concerned, this paper has raised some questions about objectives that merit re-examination, some arising from the financial pressures placed on plan sponsors and some from the distribution pattern of current plan benefits. It has also offered an initial look at some of the options available for rethinking teacher pension design, including one that to date may have received too little attention in the public sector.
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<td>DC</td>
<td>District of Columbia Retirement Board / DC Teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>Delaware Public Employees Retirement System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FL</td>
<td>Florida Retirement System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA</td>
<td>Georgia Teachers Retirement System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>Hawaii Employees Retirement System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA</td>
<td>Iowa Public Employees Retirement System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Idaho Public Employee Retirement System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL</td>
<td>Illinois Teachers Retirement System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL</td>
<td>Chicago Public School Teachers Pension and Retirement Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN</td>
<td>Indiana State Teachers Retirement Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KS</td>
<td>Kansas Public Employees Retirement System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KY</td>
<td>Kentucky Teachers Retirement System</td>
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<td>Louisiana Teachers Retirement System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Massachusetts Teachers Retirement Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD</td>
<td>Maryland State Retirement and Pension System / Maryland Teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ME</td>
<td>Maine Public Employees Retirement System / Maine State and Teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI</td>
<td>Michigan Public School Employees Retirement System</td>
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<td>MO</td>
<td>Missouri Public Schools Retirement System / Missouri Teachers</td>
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<td>St. Louis School Employees Retirement System</td>
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<td>Mississippi Public Employees Retirement System</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Montana Teachers Retirement System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC</td>
<td>North Carolina Retirement Systems / North Carolina Teachers and State Employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND</td>
<td>North Dakota Teachers Fund for Retirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NE</td>
<td>Nebraska Retirement Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NH</td>
<td>New Hampshire Retirement System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>New Jersey Division of Pension and Benefits / New Jersey Teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NM</td>
<td>New Mexico Educational Retirement Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NV</td>
<td>Nevada Public Employees Retirement System / Nevada Regular Employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NY</td>
<td>New York City Teachers Retirement System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NY</td>
<td>New York State Teachers Retirement System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH</td>
<td>Ohio State Teachers Retirement System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OK</td>
<td>Oklahoma Teachers Retirement System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR</td>
<td>Oregon Employees Retirement System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Pennsylvania Public School Employees Retirement System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RI</td>
<td>Rhode Island Employees Retirement System / Rhode Island ERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>South Carolina Retirement Systems / South Carolina RS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>South Dakota Retirement System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TN</td>
<td>Tennessee Consolidated Retirement System / TN State and Teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TX</td>
<td>Teacher Retirement System of Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UT</td>
<td>Utah Retirement Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Retirement System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA</td>
<td>Virginia Retirement System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA</td>
<td>Educational Employees’ Supplementary Retirement System of Fairfax County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VT</td>
<td>Vermont Teachers Retirement System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA</td>
<td>Washington Department of Retirement Systems / Washington Teachers Plan 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA</td>
<td>Washington Department of Retirement Systems / Washington Teachers Plan 2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WI</td>
<td>Wisconsin Retirement System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WV</td>
<td>West Virginia Consolidated Public Retirement Board / West Virginia Teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WY</td>
<td>Wyoming Retirement System</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REFERENCES


TABLE 1—Defined benefit plans--primary formula, all private industry workers, 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Traditional plans</th>
<th>Cash balance</th>
<th>Pension equity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All workers</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Worker characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White collar</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue collar</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>less than 0.5 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonunion</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Establishment characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goods producing</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service producing</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. DOL/BLS, 2007a, Table 44.
### TABLE 2—Retirement benefits: access and participation, full-time private industry and state and local government workers, 2007

(All full-time workers in each sector= 100 percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>All private industry workers</th>
<th>All state and local government workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All retirement benefits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defined benefits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defined contributions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: U.S. DOL/BLS, 2007b, Table 1; U.S. DOL/BLS, 2008, Table 1.
### TABLE 3—Actuarial funding ratios for teacher pension plans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Number of plans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plan funded at 100% or more</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan funded at 90% – 99%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan funded at 80% to 89%</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan funded at 70% to 79%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan funded at 60% - 69%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan funded below 60%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 4—Legal restrictions on altering public employee pension benefits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States with specific constitutional prohibitions against the impairment of public employee pensions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States with general constitutional prohibitions against the impairment of contracts (applicability to pensions depends on whether courts view pensions as contractual obligations; also states that do not have their own constitutional contract clause often rely on the contract clause of the U.S. Constitution)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States with statutes or case law prohibiting impairment of public employee pensions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District of Columbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Spiotto, 2006.
### Table 5—Characteristics of defined benefit and defined contribution pension plans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Defined Benefit</th>
<th>Defined Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Determined in advance</td>
<td>Pension benefit</td>
<td>Pension contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions are tax deferred</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourages longer tenure</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portability</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Full</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of living adjustments (COLAs)</td>
<td>Common</td>
<td>Uncommon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typical vesting period</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>0 - 2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timing of pension wealth accruals</td>
<td>Mostly late in career</td>
<td>Smooth accrual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect of salary changes</td>
<td>Affect past and future benefits</td>
<td>Affect future contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control over investments</td>
<td>Plan sponsor</td>
<td>Employee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form of pension benefit</td>
<td>Annuity</td>
<td>Lump sum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Partially based on Friedberg and Owyang, 2002, Table 1, and National Conference of State Legislatures, 2008.
Table 6—Retirement plan risk allocation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk Area</th>
<th>Who Bears the Risk</th>
<th>DB</th>
<th>DC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Investment</td>
<td>Plan Sponsor</td>
<td>Participant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding Rate</td>
<td>Plan Sponsor</td>
<td>Participant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortality</td>
<td>Plan Sponsor</td>
<td>Participant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longevity</td>
<td>Plan Sponsor</td>
<td>Participant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>Participant*</td>
<td>Participant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Termination</td>
<td>Participant*</td>
<td>Participant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annuitization</td>
<td>Plan Sponsor</td>
<td>Participant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disability</td>
<td>Plan Sponsor</td>
<td>Participant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Many public defined benefit plans provide some level of inflation protection benefit for retirees, but rarely do so for participants who leave covered employment with deferred vested benefits to be paid in the future.

Source: Crane et al., n.d., Table 1.
Figure 1—Assumed nominal rate of investment returns in teacher pension plans

Source: author’s calculations from the Public Fund Survey, 2009. The majority of plans reported these data as of 2007.
Figure 2—Assumed real rate of investment returns in teacher pension plans

Source: author’s calculations from the Public Fund Survey, 2009. The majority of plans reported these data as of 2007.
FIGURE 3—Pension wealth in dollars

Source: Costrell and Podgursky, 2007, Figure B.
FIGURE 4—Annual deferred income, as percentage of earnings
(age of first pension draw indicated)

Source: Robert Costrell and Michael Podgursky, 2007, Figure C.
Faculty and Research Affiliates

Matthew G. Springer  
Director  
*National Center on Performance Incentives*  
Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Education  
*Vanderbilt University’s Peabody College*

Dale Ballou  
Associate Professor of Public Policy and Education  
*Vanderbilt University’s Peabody College*

Leonard Bradley  
Lecturer in Education  
*Vanderbilt University’s Peabody College*

Timothy C. Caboni  
Associate Dean for Professional Education and External Relations  
Associate Professor of the Practice in Public Policy and Higher Education  
*Vanderbilt University’s Peabody College*

Mark Ehler  
Research Assistant Professor  
*University of Missouri – Columbia*

Bonnie Ghosh-Dastidar  
Statistician  
*The RAND Corporation*

Timothy J. Gronberg  
Professor of Economics  
*Texas A&M University*

James W. Guthrie  
Senior Fellow  
*George W. Bush Institute*  
Professor  
*Southern Methodist University*

Laura Hamilton  
Senior Behavioral Scientist  
*RAND Corporation*

Janet S. Hansen  
Vice President and Director of Education Studies  
*Committee for Economic Development*

Chris Hullman  
Assistant Professor  
*James Madison University*

Brian A. Jacob  
Walter H. Annenberg Professor of Education Policy  
*Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy*  
*University of Michigan*

Dennis W. Jansen  
Professor of Economics  
*Texas A&M University*

Cory Koedel  
Assistant Professor of Economics  
*University of Missouri-Columbia*

Vi-Nhuan Le  
Behavioral Scientist  
*RAND Corporation*

Jessica L. Lewis  
Research Associate  
*National Center on Performance Incentives*

J.R. Lockwood  
Senior Statistician  
*RAND Corporation*

Daniel F. McCaffrey  
Senior Statistician  
PNC Chair in Policy Analysis  
*RAND Corporation*

Patrick J. McEwan  
Associate Professor of Economics  
Whitehead Associate Professor of Critical Thought  
*Wellesley College*

Shawn Ni  
Professor of Economics and Adjunct Professor of Statistics  
*University of Missouri-Columbia*

Michael J. Podgursky  
Professor of Economics  
*University of Missouri-Columbia*

Brian M. Stecher  
Senior Social Scientist  
*RAND Corporation*

Lori L. Taylor  
Associate Professor  
*Texas A&M University*
NATIONAL CENTER ON
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EXAMINING PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES IN EDUCATION

National Center on Performance Incentives
Vanderbilt University Peabody College

Peabody #43
230 Appleton Place
Nashville, TN 37203

(615) 322-5538
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