This report presents findings from the final D.A.T.E. program evaluation, which describes the experiences and outcomes for Cycle 1 districts participating in the first two years of the program. Findings focus on the decisions made by districts whether or not to participate in the program, the local design preferences of D.A.T.E. incentive pay plans, and the program’s influence on teachers and students (i.e., student achievement gains, teacher turnover, and educator attitudes and practice). An overview of key evaluation findings presented in this final evaluation report follows. First, information regarding actual dissemination of incentive awards to teachers is presented. This is followed by key findings from analysis of the program’s impact on students and teachers. Finally, background information on program participation decisions and implementation experiences, the design of D.A.T.E. incentive pay plans, and educator and administrator attitudes about D.A.T.E. incentive plans is presented.

To view the entire report, please click here.
Note: See Chapter 6 for student achievement outcomes

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The Project on Incentives in Teaching (POINT) was a three-year study conducted in the Metropolitan Nashville School System from 2006-07 through 2008-09, in which middle school mathematics teachers voluntarily participated in a controlled experiment to assess the effect of financial rewards for teachers whose students showed unusually large gains on standardized tests. The experiment was intended to test the notion that rewarding teachers for improved scores would cause scores to rise. It was up to participating teachers to decide what, if anything, they needed to do to raise student performance: participate in more professional development, seek coaching, collaborate with other teachers, or simply reflect on their practices. Thus, POINT was focused on the notion that a significant problem in American education is the absence of appropriate incentives, and that correcting the incentive structure would, in and of itself, constitute an effective intervention that improved student outcomes.

By and large, results did not confirm this hypothesis. While the general trend in middle school mathematics performance was upward over the period of the project, students of teachers randomly assigned to the treatment group (eligible for bonuses) did not outperform students whose teachers
were assigned to the control group (not eligible for bonuses). The brightest spot was a positive effect of incentives detected in fifth grade during the second and third years of the experiment. This finding, which is robust to a variety of alternative estimation methods, is nonetheless of limited policy significance, for as yet this effect does not appear to persist after students leave fifth grade. Students whose fifth grade teacher was in the treatment group performed no better by the end of sixth grade than did sixth graders whose teacher the year before was in the control group. However, we will continue to investigate this finding as further data become available, and it may be that evidence of persistence will appear among later cohorts.

To read the executive summary, please [click here](#).
To view the entire report, please [click here](#).

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*Texas Educator Excellence Grant (TEEG) Program: Year Three Evaluation (2009).*

The Texas Educator Excellence Grant (TEEG) program was state-funded and provided annual grants to schools to design and implement performance pay plans during the 2006-07 to 2009-10 school year. This report builds on the previous TEEG evaluation reports, presenting findings from three years of the TEEG program. Overall, the report discusses the participation decisions of eligible schools, the implementation experiences of TEEG participants, the manner in which performance pay plans were designed, and the program's outcomes. Findings suggest that school and personnel characteristics, the criteria used to select schools into the TEEG program, and the plan design features of TEEG schools' performance pay plans influenced many outcomes of interest. The attitudes and behaviors of school personnel, school environment, and teacher turnover were certainly affected by these factors. However, evidence suggests that there is no strong, systematic treatment effect of TEEG on student achievement gains. Nor are there consistent associations between TEEG plan design features and student achievement gains.

To view the entire report, please [click here](#).
Note: See Chapter 9 for student achievement outcomes

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*Governor's Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) Program: Year Three Evaluation (2009).*

This report presents findings from the third-year evaluation of the Governor's Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) program. The GEEG program was federally- and state-funded and provided three-year
grants to schools to design and implement performance pay plans from the 2005-06 to 2007-08 school years. GEEG was implemented in 99 high poverty, high performing Texas public schools.

This report builds on the previous GEEG evaluation reports, presenting findings from a three-year evaluation of the program. Overall, the report discusses the implementation experiences of GEEG program participants, paying close attention to the manner in which participating schools designed their performance pay plans, and program outcomes. Findings suggest that school and personnel characteristics and GEEG plan design features influenced many of the outcomes of interest for evaluating the GEEG program. The attitudes and behaviors of school personnel, school environment, and teacher turnover were certainly affected by these factors. However, there is limited evidence that GEEG had an effect on student achievement gains, and no evidence that GEEG plan design features influenced student achievement gains. Examination of GEEG’s impact on student achievement is limited by the criteria for selecting schools into the program, other state-funded performance pay programs operating concurrently with GEEG, and the likely volatility of student performance measures available to measure student performance outcomes.

To view the entire report, please click here.
Note: See Chapter 8 for student achievement outcomes

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Governor’s Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) Program: Year Two Evaluation (2009).

This report presents findings from the second-year evaluation of the Governor’s Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) program. The GEEG program was federally- and state-funded and provided three-year grants to schools to design and implement performance pay plans from the 2005-06 to 2007-08 school years. GEEG was implemented in 99 high poverty, high performing Texas public schools.

Overall, the report discusses the implementation experiences of GEEG program participants, paying close attention to the manner in which participating schools designed their performance pay plans and the program outcomes from those plans. The contents of this report addresses each of the following questions: (1). What is the national and state policy context – especially in regards to the use of performance pay programs – in which the GEEG program operates?; (2). What is the nature of performance pay plans developed by GEEG participants?; (3). What are the attitudes and behavior of school personnel in GEEG schools?; and (4). How do GEEG participation and design features of GEEG plans influence teacher turnover and student achievement gains?

To view the entire report, please click here.
Note: See Chapter 8 for student achievement outcomes

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In this paper, we examine the impact of New York City's School-Wide Performance Bonus Program (SPBP) on student outcomes and the school learning environment. The SPBP is a pay-for-performance program that was implemented in approximately 200 K-12 public schools midway into the 2007-08 school year. Participating schools can earn bonus awards of up to $3,000 per full-time union member working at the school if the school meets performance targets defined by the city's accountability program. Our sample includes 186 SPBP-eligible elementary, K-8, and middle schools and 137 control-condition schools in New York City over a two-year period. Overall, we find that the SPBP had little impact on student proficiency or school environment in its first year. However, it is important to remember the short-run results reported in this study provide only very limited evidence of the SPBP's effectiveness. An evaluation of the program's impact after two years should provide more meaningful information about the impact of the SPBP.

To view the entire report, please click here.


This report presents findings from the second year of a multi-year evaluation of the Texas Educator Excellence Grant (TEEG) program and background information about the design and implementation of the District Awards for Teacher Excellence (DATE) program. The TEEG and DATE programs operating in Texas make up the largest state-funded performance pay system in U.S. public education. Starting in the 2006-07 school year, the TEEG program operates annually in more than 1,000 schools, while 203 districts implemented district-wide performance pay plans using DATE funds in the 2008-09 school year.

Report findings suggest that school and personnel characteristics, schools' participation patterns in the TEEG program, and design features of schools' performance pay plans influence program outcomes. The attitudes and behaviors of school personnel and teacher turnover are certainly influenced by these factors. While evidence on any relationship between plan design features and student achievement gains is currently inconclusive, further analysis using additional years of data will continue to examine this matter.

Overall, the TEEG and DATE programs provide unique opportunities to learn about the differential effects performance pay plans have on the attitudes and experiences of school personnel, organizational dynamics within schools, teacher turnover, and student achievement gains.
Does the Missouri Career Ladder Program Raise Student Achievement? (2008).

Although Missouri has had a career ladder program for teachers since 1987, there has been little research examining the program’s effects. This paper examines the program’s effect on student achievement using longitudinal data on district math and reading scores for 524 Missouri school districts over a nine-year period. Our primary specification compares achievement levels in participating districts with a matched group of non-participating districts. We also examine alternative specifications, including controlling for prior district scores and using variation in district participation over time to look at within-district effects. Across the range of specifications, the estimated effects range from small positive effects to no effect in both subjects. We conclude that if the Career Ladder has a positive impact on test scores, it is probably very small.

Teacher Incentives in Developing Countries: Recent Experimental Evidence From Kenya (2009).

This paper reviews recent evidence on the impact of a teacher incentives program in Kenya. The results are based on a randomized trial, which removes many sources of bias that can arise in analyses of non-experimental data. One hundred schools in a rural area were randomly divided into 50 that participated in a teacher incentives program and 50 that served as controls. Students in the schools that were selected the teacher incentives programs had higher test scores on exams linked to incentives during the time the program was in place, but test scores did not increase significantly on exams that were not linked to incentives, and test score gains on exams linked to incentives did not persist after the program ended. Teachers in the 50 program schools did conduct more test preparation sessions, and students in those schools were more likely to take exams. Overall, there is little evidence that the teacher incentives program increased student learning.

Performance pay for teachers is frequently suggested as a way of improving educational outcomes in schools, but the empirical evidence to date on its effectiveness is limited and mixed. We present results from a randomized evaluation of a teacher incentive program implemented across a representative sample of government-run rural primary schools in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. The program provided bonus payments to teachers based on the average improvement of their students’ test scores in independently administered learning assessments (with a mean bonus of 3% of annual pay). Students in incentive schools performed significantly better than those in control schools by 0.19 and 0.12 standard deviations in math and language tests respectively. They scored significantly higher on "conceptual" as well as "mechanical" components of the tests suggesting that the gains in test scores represented an actual increase in learning outcomes. Incentive schools also performed better on subjects for which there were no incentives. We find no significant difference in the effectiveness of group versus individual teacher incentives. Incentive schools performed significantly better than other randomly-chosen schools that received additional schooling inputs of a similar value.

To view the entire report, please click here.

Impact of the Teacher Advancement Program on Student Test Score Gains: Findings From an Independent Appraisal (2008).

This article presents findings from the first independent, third-party appraisal on the impact of the Teacher Advancement Program (TAP) on student test score gains in mathematics. TAP is a comprehensive school reform model designed to attract highly-effective teachers, improve instructional effectiveness, and elevate student achievement. We use a panel data set to estimate a TAP treatment effect by comparing student test score gains in mathematics in schools that participated in TAP with student test score gains in non-TAP schools. Ordinary least squares estimation reveals a positive TAP treatment effect on student test score gains in elementary grades, with weaker but still positive point estimates in the secondary grades. When estimation methods control for selection bias, the positive effect remains at the elementary level, but most estimates for grades 6 through 10 turn negative. Our findings are qualified by the lack of information on the fidelity of implementation across TAP schools and on variation in features of TAP programs at the school level.

To view the entire report, please click here.


Since the 1996/97 school year, the state of North Carolina has awarded bonuses of up to $1,500 to teachers in schools that exhibit test score gains above certain thresholds. This article reviews the details of the bonus program, describes patterns of differences between schools that qualify for bonuses of
differing amounts, and presents basic data to address the question of whether the bonus program has improved student achievement, or has led to a narrowing of racial or socioeconomic achievement gaps. There is some evidence to suggest an improvement in overall test scores, particularly in math, but less evidence to suggest that achievement gaps have narrowed. The bonus program has been associated with higher rates of turnover in low-performing schools; differential pay programs may be one way to avoid this unintended consequence.

To view the entire report, please click here.

The Effect of Performance-Pay in Little Rock, Arkansas on Student Achievement (2008).
Nashville, TN.

This paper examines evidence from a performance-pay program implemented in five Little Rock, Arkansas elementary schools between 2004 and 2007. Using a differences-in-differences approach, the evidence shows that students whose teachers were eligible for performance pay made substantially larger test score gains in math, reading, and language than students taught by untreated teachers. Further, there is a negative relationship between the average performance of a teacher’s students the year before treatment began and the additional gains made after treatment. That is, performance-pay in Little Rock appears to have improved student achievement and to have done so more for students of teachers who were previously less effective at producing learning gains.

To view the entire report, please click here.