Broken-Windows Theory

Broken Windows Theory Encyclopedia Entry

Graham Ellis

Definitions/Background

Broken-Window Theory was developed by social psychologists and criminologists as a way of explaining the processes leading to disorder in local neighborhoods. The concept was first introduce to mainstream society by James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling in an article titled “Broken Windows,” in the March 1982 posting of The Atlantic Monthly. Put simply, Broken-Window theory states that disorder tends to lead to further and more extreme levels of disorder, especially in neighborhoods and residential areas (Wilson, Kelling). A broken window best exemplifies this phenomenon; if a window is broken and not fixed within a reasonable amount of time, the surrounding windows are more and more likely to be broken as well (Wilson, Kelling). According to Wilson and Kelling, a broken window that is not repaired in a reasonable amount of time sends a signal or disorder that prompts further levels of disorder and chaos. A broken window is a signal that no one cares about the community and the people in it, and therefore, there will be no costs for breaking more windows (Wilson, Kelling). This occurs on a larger scale as well. As communities are left without proper regulation and management in the form of graffiti on walls, abandoned cars left in the streets and overgrown weeds in yards and on sidewalks, the people in those communities receive signals that those unruly behaviors will go unpunished, prompting further levels of community decay (Wilson, Kelling). This phenomenon is best observed in inner city areas, where local governments have very few incentives to keep areas regulated and to control public disorder. The first research to support this phenomenon came from Philip Zimbaro, a Stanford psychologist, in 1969. In his study, abandoned cars were placed both in the Bronx in NY and in Palo Alto, California. As soon as the car was left unattended in the Bronx, vandals attacked the vehicle, and many people came to loot the car of valuable parts. Some citizens simply came to destroy the car for pleasure. In Palo Alto, the abandoned car remained untouched for a week, until the researched smashed a window with a sledgehammer. Then, passing citizens began taking their turn destroying the car as well, and soon, it was destroyed (Wilson, Kelling). According to Wilson and Kelling, this displays how disorder leads to more disorder; the Bronx was an area with past experiences of, “no one caring,” which led to the speed with which the car was destroyed. In Palo Alto, such disorder is uncommon and people largely believe private possessions are cared for; therefore, the car was left alone until its window was smashed. Wilson and Kelling end by stating that disorder does not lead to higher rates of crime but contributes to an environment in which crime thrives as residents inflict less social control. As a whole, broken windows theory provides a theoretical framework with which police forces can bring about quick change through changing their policies rather than relying on expensive, long-term economic and social policies to take place.

Historical Context

The broken windows theory has largely been used to inform police units on how to best monitor and serve their respective localities. While disorder hasn’t been shown to directly cause higher rates of crime, their associations were large enough to inspire police forces to adopt a system of enforcing order in inner cities. The most notable example of broken windows theory becoming a model of policing occurred in New York City in the late 1980s and has lasted until today (McKee). Bill Bratton, during his first and tenure as police commissioner has fully embraced broken windows policing as the strategy for lowering crime in New York City. In practice, at least in New York, broken windows policing takes the form of cracking down on low-level, petty crimes to create an atmosphere of respect for authority and lawfulness that combats sentiments of disorder (McKee). These low-level crimes included but weren’t limited to public urination, loitering, turnstile jumping, public drinking, street prostitution and unsolicited windshield washing on the streets. This crackdown on low-level policing has been named “quality-of-life” policing. These policies have been implemented over the past thirty years, and over that time, crime rates in New York City have steadily dropped. In 1990, approximately 530,000 crimes took place in New York City, contrasting the 106,000 that occurred in 2014 after nearly three decades of broken windows policing. Similarly, murders in New York City have dropped from 2245 in 1990 to 536 in 2010 (NYC.gov). This dramatic drop-off is made even more impressive when controlled for the rising population; in 1990, the population of NYC was approximate 7,300,000 people, whereas in 2014 the city is home to 8,475,500 citizens. Bratton largely attributed these drops in crime to broken windows policing. However, despite promising results, the methodology of the new policing tactics has been subject to an enormous share of controversy.

Controversy/Perspectives

The use of broken window policing has been the subject of intense scrutiny and criticism despite its apparent success in cities like New York. Research supporting the theory has been taken apart and questioned. For example, political scientist Wesley Skogan provided often cited research showing the relationship between social and physical disorder and crime rates (Braga). However, even he cautioned that his data should be used only sparingly. In addition, political theorist Bernard Harcourt reexamined Skogan’s data and found that the causal relationship found between disorder and purse snatching, assault, rape and burglary disappeared when the data was controlled for neighborhood stability, race and poverty (Harcourt). The only relationship that remained was the between disorder and robbery. Aside from Harcourt, several other political scientists have questioned the data surrounding broken windows theory. However, more importantly, many in the academic community question the ways in which the theory is applied to policing practices. According to critics, the crackdown on low-level crimes and misdemeanors only exacerbates existing inequalities between the powerful and the powerless (Wan). Furthermore, broken-windows policing often leads to the over-policing of areas with populations consisting of racial minorities rather than white areas, which political theorists explain contributes to the systematic racism that exists in the US criminal justice system (Harcourt). Importantly, research has found that lower levels of crime in New York City were not only due to police intervention. In fact, after these tactics were decreased in 2010, crime rates continued to drop in New York City, suggesting policing mechanisms had little to do with the drops in crime that New York had experienced in the past thirty years (NYC.gov). Finally, broken windows policing has also met controversy within policing units. DOI commissioner Mark Peters and NYPD Inspector General Philip Eure recently released a report criticizing New York’s emphasis on “quality-of-life” policing. They argue that cracking down on the petty crimes does nothing but take up the valuable time police officers could spend towards pursuing more major crimes and worsen relations between police officers and the communities that they serve (Wan). Over-policing and excessive ticketing often angers citizens.

Relation to Politics of Health

Finally, and most importantly, the broken windows theory of policing intersects and challenges several concepts from the politics of health. Most obviously, the questionable tactics of targeting crime hot zones that happen to be homes to minority communities brings up issues of racialization. Racialization is the process of assigning race to an arbitrary concept, and in this case, the police practicing broken windows theory largely align blackness with crime. Even the original theorists, Wilson and Kelling, cannot avoid racialization in their evidence for the theory; when explaining the types of people attacking the abandoned cars, they use words such as “respectable whites,” and “well-dressed whites,” furthering the idea that order is associated with whiteness and disorder with blackness. Aside from just racialization, the concept of broken windows theory relates the ways in which policing can impact health outcomes on minority communities, whether that be through the stress of having a higher presence of police in your life or the physical harm of being arrested or beaten by an officer. Policing and health outcomes are inherently intertwined, and broken windows theory has largely contributed to an overbearing conceptualization of how police should interact with citizens. Finally, broken windows theory relates to ideas of citizenship, or how citizens express their belonging to the state. A broken window signals that nobody cares, meaning that the government and the state are not interested in bettering the lives of citizens in those communities. Broken windows theory explains what happens when citizenship is not recognized or valued by the state; disorder leads to more disorder, eventually creating an environment in which crime can thrive.

Citations

NYC.gov. “Crime.” Accessed on April 4, 2017. http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/home/poa_crime.shtml

Adam McKee, “Broken Windows Theory,” Encyclopedia Britannica, June 13, 2013.

William Wan, “Does New York City’s ‘broken windows’ policing work? New report says no.” The Washington Post June 22, 2016.

Anthony Braga, “Can policing disorder reduce crime?” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 52 (2015): 567-588.

Bernard Harcourt, “Broken windows: New evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment,” University of Chicago Law Revie, 73 (2006): 51.

Wilson, James Q., and George L. Kelling. “Broken windows.” Critical issues in policing: Contemporary readings (1982): 395-407.