French Medical Humanitarianism Law:
In 1998 France added an amendment to the Ordonnance of 2nd November 1945 no. 45-2658. Part of the amendment specifically applied to the section on Conditions of Entry and Residence of Foreigners; the new clause allowed the government to grant legal residency permits to people who were living in the country illegally with life-threatening conditions and who were not able to receive proper treatment in their home country. The new clause was added as a humanitarian provision, and it was only supposed to be used in exceptional circumstances. However, since its enactment, the “illness clause” as Ticktin calls it, has come to play a large role in the politics of France.
The “illness clause” is just one example of the recent movement of French polices from human rights to humanitarianism. These new changes have caused some controversy because by, definition, humanitarianism acts are supposed to be apolitical. In France though, these new humanitarianism clauses are intricately intertwined with politics. In his article, Nicolas Fischer describes the illness clause as “[L]egal resistance to the enforcement of deportations in the heart of the deportation process itself…” (1163). His quote shows how the “illness clause” directly interacts with political policies and practices. Both Fischer and Ticktin discuss how this clause was meant to deal with the ‘bare life,’ an idea introduced by Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben. The ‘bare life’ is meant to be a way to understand life solely based on the biological constraints with no social, economic, or political influence. However, this clause connects a ‘bare life’ to politics by causing people with no other options to reduce themselves to a suffering body, or their ‘bare life,’ in order to gain political recognition, and this leads to a “limited humanity” (Ticktin 42). To gain recognition from the government, illegal immigrants (also referred to as sans papiers) must potentially increase their social and economic suffering while at the same time clearly demonstrating a biological suffering.
In some cases, the “illness clause” does what it was intended; however, in the majority of the cases studied, it had adverse effects after a person was granted a residency permit. One of the most prominent problems was that while this clause allows people to legally live in France, often times it did not give them any legal work permits. Some of these residents are able to obtain work permits, but many are not able to. Ticktin states, “Although their papers formally allow them to rent apartments, open bank accounts, and travel on the metro without the risk of being arrested and deported, they do not have the substantive means to rent apartments, and they have nothing to put in bank accounts and no money to buy metro tickets.” (39). So, many of these residents have no way of legally making money to support themselves, and a majority of them turn to the black market or informal labor for work. By allowing these people into France, the country is fulfilling some of the labor demand in industries such as agriculture and construction, but since these people are working under the radar, the government is not required to set any working conditions or requirements for these workers. The government is therefore able to profit by allowing these people to stay in the country.
Another problem is that in order to make claims to the “illness clause,” sans papiers must reduce themselves to what their bodies are, and while this might allow them to stay in France, it can cause them to live with a reduced humanity. For example, Fischer describes how in his field work he has witnessed how people in detention centers will often act or claim to be sicker than they are so that they can increase their visibility among a large crowd of other sans papiers who may soon be deported. Ticktin also describes how many sans papiers who came into the clinic where she was studying would often act in a certain way to fulfill a common stereotype and gain compassion from the workers at the clinic. These people are forced to reduce themselves to be defined by their suffering body, and this can lead to stigmatization by certain communities and reduce their social and political interactions. This is what Ticktin calls “limited humanity.” This concept contrasts the humanitarianism clause because the clause was put in place to grant people the means that are necessary to have a full humanity. So, the sick immigrants of France are forced to decide whether they would rather forgo treatment and keep their social status intact, or whether they would get the treatment needed but lose their standing in their communities.
The “illness clause” directly relates to many of the concepts in politics of health, but it most clearly relates to the idea of a biological citizenship. The “illness clause” gives a clear construct for how a person can use their body to make claims to and be recognized by the government. Since the “illness clause” was put into law, the amount of people who have used a biological reason to gain recognition has increase exponential, and the amount of people who have made refugee or family claims has decreased very rapidly. This shows how the government is moving to legitimize the suffering body, and many people see this as their best chance to gain access to resources provided for by the French government.
Resources:
Fischer, Nicolas. Bodies at the Border: The medical protection of immigrants in a French immigration detention center. Ethnic and Racial Studies. May 30, 2013
Ticktin, Miriam. Where Ethics and Politics Meet: The violence of humanitarianism in France. American Ethnologist. Vol 33 (No. 1). February 2006
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