



Education, Participation, and Support for Democratic Norms

Edward N. Muller; Mitchell A. Seligson; Ilter Turan

Comparative Politics, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Oct., 1987), 19-33.

Stable URL:

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0010-4159%28198710%2920%3A1%3C19%3AEPASFD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I>

Comparative Politics is currently published by Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html>. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at <http://www.jstor.org/journals/PhD.html>.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

JSTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Education, Participation, and Support for Democratic Norms

Edward N. Muller, Mitchell A. Seligson, and Ilter Turan

The relationship between political participation and support for the norms and institutions of democracy is a central question of democratic theory. Classical theorists of democracy such as Rousseau and J. S. Mill stressed the importance of participation as an agent of socialization—a “training ground” for the general public in the principles of democracy.¹ Contemporary scholars also have presumed that participation is relevant to the development of support for democratic norms.² However, taking note of the relatively strong empirical correlation between education (and socioeconomic status more generally) and support for democratic norms, a so-called “elitist” school of democratic theory concluded that a high rate of participation by persons of low social status might threaten the stability of a democratic political system, since such individuals might be especially susceptible to the appeals of antidemocratic movements.³ The presumption was that among persons of low social status the experience of political participation would not be sufficient to counteract low support for democratic norms resulting from lack of education and the presence of authoritarian personality traits. Where the classical participatory theory implies a direct effect of participation on support for democratic norms that is independent of a person’s level of education (or social status), the “elitist” argument implies an interaction between participation and education, such that low education will inhibit the learning of support for democratic norms as a result of participatory experiences, while high education will facilitate the socialization effect of participation. These theories thus imply two different models—additive and interactive—linking education, participation, and support for democratic norms.

Despite much speculation, surprisingly little rigorous empirical study has been devoted to the question of the socialization function of participation. The review of research on political participation by Milbrath and Goel claims in a cautious phrasing that “several bits of research suggest that participation in politics builds a commitment to democratic values and that elites are much more likely to understand and adhere to specific applications of general democratic principles than are average citizens.”⁴ However, of three studies cited, two must be judged purely speculative, since they did not empirically investigate even the bivariate relationship between participation and support for democratic norms,⁵ and the third is difficult to evaluate because the participation “variable” consisted of a sample of delegates to national party conventions compared with a sample of the American general public and no explicit analysis was reported of relationships between participation and support for democratic norms controlling for level of education.⁶

Some contrary evidence was reported by Jackman, who performed a more rigorous statistical reanalysis of surveys originally conducted by Stouffer of the American adult population and a national sample of community leaders.⁷ Support for democratic norms was

measured by an index of political tolerance, defined as willingness to extend civil liberties to nonconformists, principally Communists. Political participation was not measured directly. Instead, Jackman compared expected political tolerance scores, which were derived from the regression of political tolerance on education and some control variables (gender, region, city size), for the general public and the sample of community leaders. Within categories of education, expected tolerance scores of the general public differed little from those of community leaders, so Jackman inferred that the presumed higher participation rate of community leaders had no effect on their level of political tolerance.

Evidence more directly relevant to the question of the relationship between participation and support for democratic norms, controlling for education, was reported for a 1978 national sample of Americans by Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus.⁸ A political participation scale was constructed from the number of "yes" responses to questions about participation in a variety of political activities. Political tolerance was measured by a "content-controlled" procedure that allowed the respondent to choose his/her least-liked group, which then served as the reference or "target group" for a set of questions about the extent to which a respondent agreed or disagreed with restrictions on the civil and political liberties of members of the group. Although a cross-classification of three levels of participation by four levels of education suggested the possibility of a modest fit to the interaction model,⁹ Sullivan and his associates concluded from a multivariate analysis that the greater tolerance of activists was a result of their personality characteristics rather than the experience of participation per se.

Our analysis of the relevant literature thus leads us to conclude, in contrast to the optimistic reading of Milbrath and Goel, that extant research suggests little or no relationship between participation in politics and support for democratic norms. If this generalization is valid, then a major assumption of democratic theory is incorrect. One must be cautious in advancing this pessimistic null hypothesis, however, since it is based entirely on research conducted in a single country.

The question of the relationship between political participation and support for democratic norms will be investigated here in comparative perspective across a set of heterogeneous countries: the United States, Costa Rica, and Turkey. Such a design is the most effective method for determining the external validity of relationships.¹⁰ Multiple indicators of the concept of support for democratic norms also are available for two countries, the United States and Costa Rica, which enables us to test the generalizability of relationships when measurement procedure is varied.¹¹

If the hypothesis that participation stimulates support for democratic norms has universality, it should hold for all democracies, regardless of their stability or their level of socioeconomic development. Each country included in this study represents a different combination of values on stability of democracy and level of economic development. The United States has enjoyed a long history of democratic stability and has attained a very high level of economic development; Costa Rica has maintained democratic stability for almost forty years and ranks at an intermediate level of economic development (it is a "middle income" developing country according to the classification of the World Bank); Turkey has been unable to maintain a stable democratic regime and ranks also at an intermediate level (middle income) with respect to economic development. Thus, although these countries are

not the only cases that could be used to test the participation hypothesis, they do fulfill the criteria for a “least-similar systems” type of analysis.¹²


Alternative Hypotheses

Figure 1 depicts the principal rival hypotheses about relationships between support for democratic norms, education, and political participation. Model A represents an additive effect of participation. This is a model for the “classical” participatory version of democratic theory which postulates that participation trains citizens in democratic skills and procedures, thereby integrating them into the democratic political community and promoting support for democracy. The essence of Model A is the hypothesis that participation has a direct effect on support for democratic norms, independent of education and other explanatory variables. An important implication of Model A is that the experience of participation in democratic politics will compensate for the low educational attainment of working-class citizens, enabling them to develop support for democratic values that surpasses what would be expected on the basis of education alone.

Model B, of course, stands in direct contrast to Model A. According to Model B, formal education, not political participation, performs the socialization function. If differences in political participation are observed to be associated with differences in support for democratic values, the relationship is spurious, due to the fact that participation is associated with education, the true causal variable. This is the model that, in Jackman’s interpretation, the Stouffer data support, and it is consistent with the more complex multivariate model of Sullivan and his associates.

Model C represents our interpretation of the “elitist” school of democratic thought. It portrays an effect of participation occurring only among citizens with nonlow education, and this effect is amplified by level of education. On the one hand, education is shown as affecting support for democratic values regardless of the amount of participation—even among the politically inactive, differences in educational background are expected to

Figure 1 Models of Relationships between Support for Democratic Norms, Participation, and Education



produce differences in support for democratic values. On the other hand, however, education per se is not sufficient to produce high support for democratic values, since the well-educated but politically inactive are expected to be less supportive of democratic values than citizens who are both well-educated *and* politically active. Thus, both participation and education are expected to perform a socialization function, but the distinctive socialization effect of participation is not present among the poorly educated, for whom it is expected that the experience of participation will be of insufficient influence to override low support for democratic values resulting from restricted cognitive development, authoritarian predispositions, and the like. Under Model C, therefore, formal education plays the role of a threshold variable. Some medium amount of education in the academic sense is presumed to be a necessary condition for citizens to begin to appreciate the importance of democratic values. Once that threshold level of education is attained, other variables such as participation can then contribute to the development of support for democratic norms.

Data

Our U.S. data are from a survey administered to a probability sample of 778 residents of the five boroughs of New York City in 1978.¹³ The Costa Rican data are from a 1980 survey administered to a probability sample of 280 residents of the major urban center of the country, Greater San Jose, where 65 percent of Costa Rica's urban population and nearly one-third of its entire population resides.¹⁴ The Turkish data are from a nationwide survey of the adult population (N=1294) and a supplementary sample of community leaders (N=249) administered in 1974.¹⁵

The San Jose interview schedule is for the most part identical in format to the New York City interview schedule (much of the item wording for it was adapted from the New York City Spanish-language protocol). The Turkish survey contains a measure of political participation that is very similar to the measures in our New York City and Costa Rican data, and it is possible to construct a measure of support for democracy from items in the Turkish survey that are conceptually equivalent to the items used in New York City and urban Costa Rica.

If the experience of political participation does perform a socializing function, we would expect that support for democracy most likely would be acquired through involvement in behaviors that expose citizens to diverse points of view and entail some degree of active social interaction in pursuit of collective outcomes. Therefore, of the various modes of democratic participation distinguished cross-nationally by Verba, Nie, and Kim,¹⁶ we focus specifically on campaign activity. In the New York City survey particular attention was given to the development of a reliable measure of political participation, since a methodological limitation of the Jackman reanalysis of the Stouffer data was the absence of direct measurement of participation. A novel feature of our measure is a consistency check to eliminate respondents who exaggerate their self-report of behavior. The measure of campaign activity in the survey from Turkey is similar to the New York City measure except that the possibility of exaggerated self-report is not controlled. The measure of campaign activity in Costa Rica is a dichotomous variable, inactive versus active (see Appendix for additional details).

We expect that, of the various components of social status, education is the most important causal agent for enhancing commitment to democratic institutions and procedures. Three levels of education—compulsory, secondary, and university—are distinguished in the New York City and Costa Rican data. In the Turkish sample there are many respondents without any formal education, so the education variable in Turkey includes a separate category for no education, in addition to the compulsory, secondary, and university levels.¹⁷

The essence of liberal democracy is freedom to oppose, guaranteed by the procedural political freedoms of speech, assembly, and organization, as well as the right to vote and run for office. Our indicator of support for the norm of freedom to oppose in the New York City and Costa Rican surveys is the mean response, on a scale of 1–10, to a set of items that measures the degree to which respondents disapprove or approve of allowing people who are critical of the political system to vote, to hold public demonstrations, to run for political office, and to speak on television. In the Turkish survey the measure of support for the norm of freedom to oppose focuses on the rights specifically of opposition parties: Is there any point to having them? Do they endanger democracy? Do they divide the country? Do they expose the existence of critical social problems? Should they ever be allowed to become governing parties? The prodemocracy response to each of these questions is scored 1, and the composite Support for Freedom to Oppose variable is the sum of the prodemocracy responses (range = 0–5). (For more details on the Support for Freedom to Oppose variables, see Appendix.)

The political tolerance measure developed by Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus focuses on the extent to which specific dissident groups should be allowed freedom of opposition.¹⁸ In New York City and Costa Rica, a card listing various political groups was presented to respondents who were asked to identify the group they liked the least. The least-liked group then served as the referent for a set of questions about political freedoms. Using a 1–10 scale of disapproval-to-approval, respondents were asked how they felt about members of their least-liked group having rights of freedom of expression and assembly and the right to hold political office. Our Political Tolerance variables are the mean response to four questions about extending political freedoms to specific disliked groups. (See Appendix for further details.) A measure of the political tolerance concept is not available in the Turkish data.

Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus report the percentage of a national sample that registered a tolerant response to items comparable to four of the items that were included in the New York City study.¹⁹ Table 1 compares the proportion tolerant as of 1978. The first, teaching in public schools, is not included in the Political Tolerance scale because it is not specifically political. The proportion of New Yorkers giving a tolerant response to this item is quite similar to the national proportion. Only on the third item, making a speech, do New Yorkers differ appreciably (more intolerant) from the national sample. New Yorkers are generally intolerant of their least-liked group, but they do not seem to be significantly more intolerant than Americans as a whole. Thus our New York City data would seem to be reasonably comparable to a national cross-section.

Results

A model for testing the additive, interaction, and spurious hypotheses with the data from New York City and Costa Rica can be expressed as:

Table 1 Levels of Tolerance in New York City and in the United States, 1978

Approval ^a of least-liked group:	New York City (N=778)	United States (N=1509)
1. Teaching in public schools	12%	19%
2. Holding political office	15%	16% ^b
3. Buying TV time for a speech	28%	50% ^c
4. Having books banned from libraries	42% ^e	not ascertained
5. Holding a peaceful demonstration	39%	34% ^d

^aFor the NYC sample, approval is defined by scores in the range 6-10 on a 1-10 scale of disapproval to approval; for the USA sample, it is defined by agreement or strong agreement on a 5-point scale.

^bThe referent was: "Being President of the U.S."

^cThe referent was: "Make a speech in this city."

^dThe referent was: "Hold public rallies in our city."

^ePercentage registering disapproval.

$$SDN = a + b_1(SEC) + b_2(UNI) + b_3(PART) + c_1(SEC*PART) + c_2(UNI*PART) + E$$

where SDN denotes support for democratic norms, SEC denotes secondary education, UNI denotes university education, PART denotes campaign participation, a , b_i , and c_i are causal effect parameters, and E is an error term, since the model is stochastic. If the estimates of the c_i parameters are not significantly different from zero, then the interaction hypothesis can be rejected; if the estimate of the b_3 parameter is not significantly different from zero, then the additive hypothesis can be rejected; if the estimates of the b_1 and b_2 parameters are significantly different from zero, while the estimates of the b_3 and c_i parameters are not significantly different from zero, then the spurious hypothesis can be accepted.

Parameter estimates for the New York City sample are reported in Table 2, with values of the t ratio in parentheses. For a two-tailed test at the .05 level of significance, t should be at least 1.96. We see from equation 1.1 that in the case of the Support for Freedom to Oppose variable (FREEOPP) the interaction hypothesis can be rejected, since the parameter estimates for the SEC*PART (S*P) and UNI*PART (U*P) interactions are not significantly different from zero. The interaction hypothesis also can be rejected for the Political

Table 2 Regressions* of Support for Freedom of Opposition (FREEOPP) and Political Tolerance (POLTOL) on Education and Participation: New York City

		EXPLANATORY VARIABLES						R ²	\bar{R}^2	(N=)
RESPONSE VARIABLE		Intercept	SEC	UNI	PART	S*P	U*P			
(1.1)	FREEOPP =	5.73	+ .77 (2.50)	+1.39 (3.12)	+ .09 (.54)	+ .08 (.44)	+ .19 (1.04)	.11	.10	(616)
(1.2)	FREEOPP =	5.66	+ .78 (2.89)	+1.71 (4.75)	+ .21 (4.20)			.10	.10	(616)
(1.3)	POLTOL =	3.11	+ .70 (2.60)	+1.53 (3.80)	+ .18 (1.27)	+ .02 (.10)	+ .15 (.96)	.16	.15	(629)
(1.4)	POLTOL =	3.07	+ .67 (2.79)	+1.86 (5.64)	+ .25 (5.00)			.15	.15	(629)

*t-statistic for parameter estimates in parentheses.

Tolerance variable (POLTOL), as the t values for the S*P and U*P parameter estimates are considerably less than 1.96 (equation 1.3). After deletion of the interaction terms, the parameter estimates for levels of education (SEC, UNI) and for Campaign Participation (PART) are significant in each instance (equations 1.2 and 1.4), so the additive hypothesis can be accepted.

Analysis of the Costa Rican data produces rather different findings. The regression equations reported in Table 3 show that the interaction hypothesis can be rejected (equations 2.1 and 2.4), but the additive hypothesis is not supported either, since the parameter estimate for the participation variable is insignificant in the additive equation for FREEOPP (equation 2.2) as well as that for POLTOL (equation 2.5). The spurious model (equations 2.3 and 2.6), according to which causal agency is attributable only to levels of education, fits the Costa Rican data.

Since the survey from Turkey includes a sample of local notables in addition to a cross-section of the general public, the hypothesis-testing model for Turkey must include additive and interaction terms that represent the possibility of distinctive socialization effects due to elite status. Educational levels in Turkey also include the category of no formal education, so the model is:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{SDN} = & a + b_1(\text{COM}) + b_2(\text{SEC}) + b_3(\text{UNI}) + b_4(\text{NOT}) + b_5(\text{PART}) \\
 & + c_1(\text{COM}*\text{NOT}) + c_2(\text{SEC}*\text{NOT}) + c_3(\text{UNI}*\text{NOT}) + c_4(\text{COM}*\text{PART}) \\
 & + c_5(\text{SEC}*\text{PART}) + c_6(\text{UNI}*\text{PART}) + c_7(\text{COM}*\text{NOT}*\text{PART}) \\
 & + c_8(\text{SEC}*\text{NOT}*\text{PART}) + c_9(\text{UNI}*\text{NOT}*\text{PART}) + E
 \end{aligned}$$

where COM denotes compulsory education, NOT denotes the status of being a local notable, and the other variables are as defined above. Additive effects are represented by the a and b_i parameters; the interaction of education and elite status is represented by the c₁-c₃ parameters; the interaction of education and participation is represented by the c₄-c₆

Table 3 Regressions* of Support for Freedom of Opposition (FREEOPP) and Political Tolerance (POLTOL) on Education and Participation: Urban Costa Rica

		EXPLANATORY VARIABLES						R ²	\bar{R}^2	(N=)
RESPONSE VARIABLE		Intercept	SEC	UNI	PART	S*P	U*P			
(2.1)	FREEOPP =	5.12	+ .67 (1.61)	+2.08 (3.14)	+ .49 (1.08)	+ .11 (.18)	- .84 (- .92)	.07	.05	(258)
(2.2)	FREEOPP =	5.14	+ .74 (2.39)	+1.61 (3.58)	+ .43 (1.48)			.07	.06	(258)
(2.3)	FREEOPP =	5.30	+ .78 (2.52)	+1.70 (3.78)				.06	.05	(258)
(2.4)	POLTOL =	3.67	+ .90 (2.24)	+2.55 (3.97)	+ .54 (1.17)	+ .36 (.56)	-1.24 (-1.38)	.12	.10	(236)
(2.5)	POLTOL =	3.68	+1.08 (3.45)	+1.84 (4.09)	+ .53 (1.83)			.11	.10	(236)
(2.6)	POLTOL =	3.85	+1.14 (3.71)	+1.97 (4.46)				.10	.09	(236)

*t-statistic for parameter estimates in parentheses.

parameters; and the three-way interaction of education, elite status, and participation is represented by the c_7 - c_9 parameters. In comparison to the method of Jackman where elites and the general public are analyzed separately, estimation of the parameters of the above model affords a more direct test of the hypothesis of distinctive elite socialization effects.²⁰

The regression results for Turkey, reported in Table 4, show no statistically significant interaction effect of any kind (equation 3.1). However, after deletion of the interaction terms, the parameter estimates for additive effects of levels of education, campaign participation, and elite status all are significant (equation 3.2). On the basis of purely statistical criteria, one may therefore accept the additive hypothesis in the case of Turkey, but with a peculiar wrinkle, namely an estimated negative effect of participation on support for democratic norms.


The direction of the participation effect in the additive model for Turkey thus runs counter to the participatory theory of democracy. Yet it is also apparent from the graph of the Turkish results in Figure 2 that the magnitude of the negative participation effect is so small as to be of trivial substantive significance.

Table 4 Regressions* of Support for Freedom of Opposition (FREEOPP) on Education and Participation: Turkey

		EXPLANATORY VARIABLES													R ²	\bar{R}^2	(N=)		
RESPONSE VARIABLE		Intercept	CON	SEC	UNI	HOT	PART	C*H	S*H	U*H	C*P	S*P	U*P	C*H*P				S*H*P	U*H*P
(3.1)	FREEOPP =	3.78	+ .30 (1.54)	+ .44 (2.16)	+ .68 (2.30)	+ .72 (1.56)	- .05 (-1.77)	- .46 (- .92)	- .27 (. 53)	- .66 (1.14)	+ .01 (.67)	+ .02 (.70)	+ .06 (1.79)	+ .04 (1.11)	+ .05 (1.03)	+ .03 (.36)	.13	.12	(1421)
(3.2)	FREEOPP =	3.62	+ .42 (3.25)	+ .64 (7.11)	+ .94 (7.83)	+ .43 (4.78)	- .03 (-3.75)										.12	.12	(1421)

*t-statistic for parameter estimates in parentheses.

Figure 2 Expected Scores on Support for Freedom to Oppose by Campaign Participation, Level of Education, and Elite Status: Turkey



A substantively more significant finding from the Turkish data is the effect of elite status. Being a local notable renders a person more likely to subscribe to democratic norms even when the effect of education is controlled. Notables with only a compulsory education have about the same expected Support for Freedom of Opposition scores as members of the general public with a university education.²¹ Notables with secondary or university education are expected to score in the range of 4.5 to 5.0 on Support for Freedom of Opposition, which means that, rounded to integer values, the expected response of notables with at least secondary education is the maximum number of possible prodemocracy answers. Thus it appears that local notables in Turkey, who presumably constitute a political “transmission belt” between the general public and the leadership of national political and administrative organizations, have considerable opportunity to learn and internalize the values of a political system that provides a central linkage role for them.

Discussion

Comparative analysis of the relationship between political participation and support for democratic norms, controlling for education, reveals support for the additive model of classical participatory democratic theory only in the case of a general public sample drawn from New York City. Data from a general public sample of the major metropolitan area of Costa Rica fit a spurious model, which predicts no relationship between participation and support for democratic norms after the educational background of a respondent is taken into account. And data from a sample of both the general public and local notables in Turkey tend to fit the spurious model. Thus, a positive relationship between political participation

and support for democratic norms appears to be idiosyncratically American. Moreover, in considering the case of the United States one should bear in mind that our New York City sample did not take personality characteristics into account. In line with the finding of Sullivan and his associates for a national sample of Americans,²² it is possible that the positive effect of participation on support for democratic norms could be a spurious reflection of omitted personality variables that are the "real" cause of the association.

When viewed in cross-national perspective, the relationship between political participation and support for democratic norms seems at best to be weak, and it clearly is system-specific. Our findings indicate that the experience of political participation cannot be expected necessarily to produce allegiance to democracy either in general (that is, regardless of education or social status), as predicted by the classical version of democratic theory, or given a certain threshold level of education, as predicted by the contemporary version.

To be sure, we do find evidence in the Turkish data of a positive effect of elite status on support for democratic norms, a result that is consistent with one prediction of the contemporary theory. But rather than being a result of the educational attainments or participatory experiences of elites, the effect of elite status must be presumed to reflect differential socialization to democratic norms resulting from elite status per se, since it operates independently of education and participation.

In the case of Turkey the distribution of support for democratic norms raises an interesting question in regard to the micro-macro linkage between support for democracy and the stability of democratic regimes. A cornerstone of the contemporary theory of democracy is the presumption that the stability of a democratic regime depends fundamentally on the distribution of support for democratic norms among elites: when consensus prevails, regime stability can be maintained despite severe problems of political performance (crises of "effectiveness") and even despite lack of consensus on democratic norms among the general public. In Turkey we observe from Figure 2 not only a very high level of support for the democratic norm of freedom to oppose among the sample of notables, but also a quite high level of support among the general public, extending even to those with no formal schooling (who average 3.5 out of a possible 5 prodemocracy responses). Hence the distribution of belief in the legitimacy of democracy in Turkey circa 1974 would seem to have been highly favorable on all accounts to the maintenance of regime stability. Yet six years later, when faced with a severe crisis of economic performance, democracy in Turkey succumbed to a coup d'état by the military, who dissolved parliament and placed the country under martial law, thus abrogating to a considerable extent the norm of freedom to oppose.

The question of whether belief in the legitimacy of democracy constitutes a sufficient condition for the maintenance of democratic regime stability may be addressed in the Turkish case both from a short- and a long-range perspective. In the long run the Turkish political system tends to gravitate toward a competitive framework, as evidenced by the restoration of democratic rule after the direct military interventions of 1960–61 and 1980–83 and the indirect intervention of 1971–73. In each of these instances it should be kept in mind that the military leadership legitimated its intervention not only by the claim that the democratic political process had degenerated into an unbridled contest for power (carrying with it the potential for fratricidal conflict), but also felt compelled to effect a transition back to competitive politics within a defined period of time.²³ Moreover, democratically elected governments have ruled during thirty-four of the forty years that have elapsed since the

inauguration of democracy in Turkey after World War II. The presence of widely shared attitudes favoring democratic norms may be an important variable in accounting for the resilience of competitive politics in Turkey.

For the short run, the key question is how to explain the short interludes of democratic failure despite the presence of a democratic culture. The answer may lie not in the deficiency of democratic values among the citizenry but in the great importance political parties attach to achieving political power and their unqualified insistence on retaining it. Why this is so has been explained in some detail elsewhere,²⁴ but a summary may be offered here. First, the state plays a key role in the Turkish economy in setting interest rates and exchange rates, as a source of investment funds, import and export licenses, and quotas, as the allocator of limited hard currencies, and as the provider of substantial employment. In a centralized system such as Turkey, those in government can allocate an immense amount of resources by distribution, redistribution, and regulation. Thus, those in power and their clients have much to lose if they lose an election, and this leads to a tendency to subvert the rules of the game in order to be able to remain in government.

Political parties themselves have appeared in the past to rely on being in power for their organizational prosperity. This has derived from the fact that they often have been a coalition of groups and interests aspiring to form a clientelistic network through which government benefits would be distributed. Being in power has constituted the cement by which parties hold together, especially the smaller ones.

Individual deputies also have exhibited an undue reluctance to lose their incumbency in an environment in which the turnover rate was consistently above 50 percent during the 1970s. Getting elected is a costly process for the deputy, who usually finances his campaign with personal means, incurring heavy debts. He is amenable to maximizing his gains while in office, since his tenure is uncertain, and he also is willing to support all means that may prolong his tenure.

In short, leaders of political parties, backed by their clients and their members in the legislature, have been prone to initiate a free-for-all competition for power that leads to the degeneration of the democratic process and eventually to intervention by the military, which plays the role of a *deus ex machina*, correcting the deficiencies of the competitive system in order to restore more effective democratic rule. This is a cyclical process that seems to be influenced to a considerable extent by the wide support that values of democracy enjoy among both elites and the mass public.

The finding of essentially no relationship between campaign participation and support for democratic norms in Costa Rica and Turkey, our two Third World countries, raises another question of general significance. If the spurious model correctly describes the Third World pattern, then how are democratic norms established and nurtured in these countries? Is education alone the crucial condition for the development and maintenance of democratic norms in the Third World? Or could it be that different forms of participation are relevant in different cultural and socioeconomic contexts?

One might argue that the absence of an association between participation and support for democratic norms in the Costa Rican and Turkish data could have been the result of the kind of participation selected for analysis. Perhaps campaign activity is less relevant to support for democratic norms in the Third World context as compared with the Anglo-European context because campaign activism in many Third World countries may be associated

principally with clientelism in the minds of participants. The slight negative relationship found in the Turkish data between campaign activism and support for democratic norms could be interpreted as evidence in favor of such a conjecture.

Forms of political participation other than campaigning may have greater socializing influence in less developed countries, where, for example, communal participation often seems to be of greater importance than it is in wealthier parts of the world. In Third World democracies, norms of democratic governance may be learned through participation in local organizations such as town councils, community development associations, and rural cooperatives. In any event, one important implication of our results is that the movement toward democracy now underway in Latin America and elsewhere in the Third World will not likely be enhanced and deepened merely through the fact of participation in the electoral process itself.

Appendix: Measurement Details

Campaign Activity: New York City Respondents were queried about the extent of their actual participation on behalf of a party or candidate in elections. Specifically, respondents were asked whether they had ever (1) attempted to convert others to their own political view, (2) attended political meetings or rallies, and (3) worked for a particular party or a candidate. A potential problem with such self-report measures is that some respondents may exaggerate their behavior. The incidence of overreporting can be at least partially assessed by cross-classifying report of participation in general with questions that asked respondents about the extent of their participation in these activities during the last five years, administered earlier in the interview.

The joint distribution of report of participation in general and report of participation frequency during the past five years is given in Table 5. Attempting to convert others is overreported by seventy-one respondents; attending meetings and rallies is subject to less exaggeration, as this kind of behavior is overreported by twenty-eight respondents; and the least exaggeration is evidenced for self-report of working for a party or a candidate, since only thirteen respondents overreport this activity. Exaggeration of behavioral self-report is clearly present, and self-report measures of political participation should control for it. The campaign activity variables are scored such that respondents who report a given behavior in the past five years but not in general are assigned a "missing" code, since their responses are considered unreliable. The procedure for assigning behavior scores is shown in the lower panel of Table 5. A total of 649 persons could be scored on all three campaign activity variables, leaving 16.6 percent missing data.

Campaign Activity: Costa Rica The two items used were: "Did you attend a meeting or political parade during the last election campaign?" "Did you work for a political party during the last election campaign?"

Campaign Activity: Turkey Items and response options (with the score assigned to the response in parentheses) are: (1) During the last election did you ever talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for one of the candidates? Never—0; rarely—1; sometimes—2; often—3. (2) During the last election campaign did you attend any political rallies or meetings? Never—0; one or two times—1; many times—2. (3) Have you ever done work for a candidate in an election? Never—0; one election—1; two elections—2; three or more elections—3.

Support for Freedom of Opposition: New York City and Costa Rica This variable was constructed using the first three items below in New York City and all four items in Costa Rica. Respondents were

Table 5 Distribution of Campaign Activities: New York City

1. Attempting to convert others to my own political views:

In Last Five Years	In General	
	have not done	have done
3 or more times	15	71
1 or 2 times	56	90
never	<u>434</u>	<u>89</u>
TOTAL	505	250

2. Attending a political meeting or rally:

In Last Five Years	In General	
	have not done	have done
3 or more times	4	45
1 or 2 times	24	97
never	<u>458</u>	<u>128</u>
TOTAL	486	270

3. Working for a political party or candidate in an election campaign:

In Last Five Years	In General	
	have not done	have done
3 or more times	2	29
1 or 2 times	11	52
never	<u>576</u>	<u>95</u>
TOTAL	486	270

Scoring Procedure:

Frequency in Last Five Years	Behavior in General		
	have not done	have done	missing data
3 or more times	missing	3	missing
1 or 2 times	missing	2	missing
never	0	1	missing
missing data	missing	missing	missing

asked: "To what degree (on a scale of 1 to 10) would you approve or disapprove of the following?" (1) People who say bad things about our form of government having the right to appear on television to make a speech. (2) People who say bad things about our form of government having the right to vote. (3) People who say bad things about our form of government being allowed to hold peaceful demonstrations for the purpose of expressing their views. (4) People who say bad things about our form of government being allowed to run for political office.

Political Tolerance: New York City and Costa Rica After selecting their least-liked group, respondents were asked: "To what degree (on a scale of 1 to 10) would you approve or disapprove of the following?" (1) Members of least-liked group being allowed to hold political office. (2) Members of least-liked group being permitted to buy time on television to make a speech. (3) Books written by members of least-liked group being banned from public libraries (direction of scoring reversed). (4) Members of least-liked group being allowed to hold a peaceful demonstration.

Support for Freedom to Oppose: Turkey Respondents were asked, first, to respond "Yes" or "No" to the following question: "As you may know, by 'opposition parties' one means parties which are not members of the Government. Is there any point to having opposition parties?" Then they were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statements. (1) Opposition parties endanger democracy. (2) Opposition parties expose the existence of critical social problems. (3) Opposition parties divide the country. (4) Opposition parties may one day become governing parties.

NOTES

This research was supported by the National Science Foundation, award SOC77-00187. The Costa Rican data were collected with the support of the Socioeconomic Research Unit of the Office of Information of the Presidency of Costa Rica. We are grateful for the assistance of Miguel Gomez B. in collecting these data. The research in Turkey was supported by the Comparative Legislative Research Center of the University of Iowa as part of a broader project on linkages between citizens and legislatures in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey.

1. See Carole Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970), chap. 2.

2. E.g., Charles F. Cnudde and Deane E. Neubauer, "New Trends in Democratic Theory," in Charles F. Cnudde and Deane E. Neubauer, eds., *Empirical Democratic Theory* (Chicago: Markham, 1969); Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); V. O. Key, Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1961); William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (New York: Free Press, 1959); Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 58 (1964), 361-82.

3. E.g., Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); Dahl, *Who Governs?*; Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1963); McClosky; James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," *Journal of Politics*, 22 (1960), 276-94; Giovanni Sartori, *Democratic Theory* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1962).

4. Lester W. Milbrath and M. Lal Goel, *Political Participation*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1977), p. 147.

5. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Prothro and Grigg.

6. McClosky.

7. Robert W. Jackman, "Political Elites, Mass Publics, and Support for Democratic Principles," *Journal of Politics*, 34 (1972), 753-73; Samuel A. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (New York: Doubleday, 1955).

8. John L. Sullivan, James E. Piereson, and George E. Marcus, *Political Tolerance and American Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

9. Among college graduates there was a difference of 20 percentage points in tolerance between those who were inactive and those who were highly active; the difference in tolerance between inactive and highly active citizens was 12 percentage points among those with only a high school level of education; hardly any respondents with a grade school education or less participated at a high level.

10. See D. T. Campbell and J. C. Stanley, "Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research on Teaching," in N. L. Gage, ed., *Handbook of Research on Teaching* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963).

11. See D. T. Campbell and D. W. Fiske, "Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix," *Psychological Bulletin*, 56 (1959), 81–105.

12. See Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* (New York: Wiley, 1970).

13. For further details see Edward N. Muller, Thomas O. Jukam, and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Diffuse Political Support and Antisystem Political Behavior: A Comparative Analysis," *American Journal of Political Science*, 26 (1982), 240–64.

14. The Costa Rican data are from a survey planned by Seligson and carried out in June 1980 by Professor Miguel Gomez B. of the Universidad de Costa Rica. Personal interviews were conducted with a probability sample of 280 residents of metropolitan San Jose. The sample was drawn from a sampling frame stratified according to an index of socioeconomic status, based upon housing characteristics and ownership of electrical artifacts as reported in the 1973 national census. Primary sampling units were then selected at random using the PPS method. Within each unit all dwellings were visited, and a list of all residents 18 years and over was prepared. The final selection of respondents was then drawn at random from these lists. The average duration of the interviews was thirty-one minutes. Response rate was very high, as up to nine call-backs were made, although the average number of call-backs was 2.2.

15. A three-stage sampling procedure was employed for the surveys of adult citizens in Turkey. First, sixty-seven multimer electoral districts (the boundaries of which are coterminous with Turkey's sixty-seven provinces) were classified into eight categories according to their socioeconomic level of development. The eighth category, which contained only the two least developed districts, was eliminated. Two districts then were randomly selected from each of the remaining seven categories for a total of fourteen. After selecting the fourteen sample constituencies, different procedures were employed in the second stage for selecting respondents in metropolitan, urban, and rural areas. In the rural areas, the second stage consisted of a random selection of five villages in each province, followed by the random selection of one cluster of ten adjacent households from official village registers. In large metropolitan areas such as Ankara and Istanbul, one cluster of households was randomly selected for each 100,000 population. In smaller cities, six clusters of households were selected where the population was greater than 100,000, while four clusters were selected where the population was less than 100,000. Many provinces also have several small municipalities ranging from 10,000 to 25,000 inhabitants. In each province, two such municipalities were selected from the group, and one cluster of households was randomly selected for each. In the third stage of the sampling procedure, ten adults (persons over 21 years) were randomly chosen (with no more than one respondent per household) within each cluster of ten adjacent households. Sampling for the local notable surveys was accomplished through the use of both "positional" and "reputational" techniques. Eighty-five percent of the local notables interviewed were selected on the basis of their formal positions. Individuals added to the notable sample as a result of their reputation as influential citizens were those who received at least three mentions as such during the constituent surveys.

16. Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-On Kim, *Participation and Political Equality* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978).

17. Levels of education in the New York City data are defined in accordance with the classification used for the United States in Samuel A. Barnes and Max Kaase et al., *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979), p. 588, where Compulsory Education = 1–10 grades, Middle and Further Schooling = 11–14 grades, and Higher Education = 15–17 grades or more. Levels of education in the data from Costa Rica are defined as Compulsory = 1–6 grades, Secondary = 7–11 grades, and University = 12 grades or more. In the Turkish data, levels of education are No Formal Education, Compulsory = 1–5 grades, Secondary = 6–12 grades, and University = more than 12 grades. We have analyzed the New York City data with Higher Education defined as more than 12 grades and Middle and Further schooling defined as 9–12 grades, but this difference in operational definition produced no substantive difference in results.

18. John L. Sullivan, James E. Pierson, and George E. Marcus, "An Alternative Conceptualization of Political Tolerance: Illusory Increases 1950s–1970s," *American Political Science Review*, 73 (1979), 781–94.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 787.

20. Jackman, "Political Elites, Mass Publics, and Support for Democratic Principles."

21. Figure 2 does not show expected scores for notables with no formal education because only eight cases exist in this category.

22. Sullivan et al., *Political Tolerance and American Democracy*.

23. See Ilter Turan, "Attitudinal Correlates of Political Democracy: The Case of Korea and Turkey," *Orient*, 21 (1980), 77–88; "Turkey: The Shaping of Domestic and External Politics," in *The Middle East Annual*, vol. 2 (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1983); "The Evolution of Political Culture in Turkey," in Ahmet Evin, ed., *Modern Turkey: Continuity and Change* (Opladen: Leske Verlag, 1984); "Cyclical Democracy: The Turkish Case," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 11–14, 1984.

24. Cf. Turan, "The Evolution of Political Culture" and "Cyclical Democracy."