Political Culture and Democratization in Latin America

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In the past, most scholars have tried to understand the culture of a society through its historical experience, its political behavior, and its intellectual contributions. Some have even argued that mass political values, if inclined toward democratization, not only provide a fertile ground for its growth but also are essential in producing a democratic model. Seligson—who teaches at the University of Pittsburgh, is coauthor of Authoritarians and Democrats: The Politics of Regime Transition in Latin America (1987), and has been using survey techniques for two decades to better understand Latin American societal values—presents some of his findings on democratic attitudes in Costa Rica and Mexico. As he suggests, although democratic values alone do not account for the transition to democracy in these countries, they play a significant role in explaining the complex interaction of variables that determine political behavior and systems.

The shift from dictatorship to democracy in Latin America has been rapid, nearly universal, and almost completely unanticipated by scholars, diplomats, and Latin American politicians themselves. Since, however, this is not the first time that elected civilian regimes have been predominant in the region, many scholars are convinced that we are today observing nothing more than another phase in a cyclical pattern. These observers believe that just as the military regimes of the 1960s and 1970s were replaced by elected civilians in the 1980s, a new wave of golpes de estado [coup d'état] will soon return the military to power.

The reasons for the current pessimism regarding the longevity of electoral democracy in Latin America are many, but the principal ones have to do with the expected adverse impact of the debt crisis on regime stability. The enormity of the external debt, its omnipresence throughout the region, and the steadfast unwillingness of creditor nations to accept any major modification in the terms of repayment, have convinced many that civilian democratic regimes will not long survive.\(^1\) But at a deeper level, however prescient these predictions of the negative impact of the debt crisis turn out to be, they are of little assistance to those who seek to develop more universal theories of democratization and democratic breakdown. Even if one generalizes the debt crisis into a category of phenomena related to severe disruption in national economies, it is quite clear from the historical evidence that democratic breakdown in Latin America has often not been linked to economic breakdown.

While the current debate revolves around the impact of economic crisis on democratic stability, the traditional focus has been on the relationship between economic growth and democratization. It has been in that area of inquiry that the largest volume of highly regarded scholarship has been produced. Economic theories of democratization have taken markedly contradictory positions.\(^2\) Classic Marxist scholarship envisions the advancement of industrial capitalism as ultimately leading to a workers' revolution and the establishment of dictatorship (albeit of the proletariat). Modern empirical democratic theory, on the other hand, sees economic growth as strongly linked to democratic growth. One should add to this synthesis the perspective popularized by O'Donnell, with specific reference to the Latin American region, in which advancing economic growth there would result in neither revolution from below nor democracy from above, but in a special form of military-dominated authoritarianism, which he has termed "bureaucratic-authoritarianism."\(^3\)

The evidence contradicting each of these widely varying predictions is well known. The classic Marxist view has been widely contradicted by the emergence of proletarian revolutions among those countries where industrial capitalism was only poorly developed and its failure to emerge in the highly advanced industrial capitalist states. The O'Donnell hypothesis seems to be relevant only to a limited number of cases and only for a very limited period of time, and therefore is of little help in generating a more inclusive theory.

Far more persuasive has been the evidence for a link between economic growth and democratization. Western Europe and North America seem to be the classic cases that best fit the theory. In Latin America there is some evidence to support the theory as well. Costa Rica and Venezuela are two countries that have advanced economically and have seen stable
democracy take root. On the other hand, the pre-World War II breakdowns of democratic rule in much of Latin America conformed quite well to a theory that views these democracies as "premature." Throughout most of Latin America, per capita income in the pre-World War II period did not surpass the minimum threshold levels required by the theory.  

In the post-World War II period, however, continued economic growth has meant that most Latin American nations have surpassed the GNP (gross national product)-per-capita levels that were associated with the emergence of stable democratic rule in Western Europe and North America. Yet democratic regimes in economically advanced Latin American countries have repeatedly been swept aside by military coups. Thus countries as economically advanced as Argentina and Uruguay saw not only the breakdown of democracy but its replacement by exceptionally brutal military regimes. By the mid-1950s, Chile's level of per capita income was already far above the minimum, and it was enjoying a long period of democratic rule that extended back to 1932. Yet in 1973 a coup terminated elected rule in Chile. Cuba and Panama both enjoyed relatively high levels of economic development, but experienced only short periods of elected government. In sum, economic growth and democratization do not seem to be closely tied together in the Latin American region. One can agree fully with Soares, who after a summary analysis of economic development and democracy in Latin America (including the troubling cases of economically advanced socialist countries that have not democratized) concludes: "The relationship between economic development and electoral democracy is not simple nor universally valid. Empirically, the relationship is strong across all three subsets of countries [included in his study] and within the Core democratic subset. It is weak in the Latin American and socialist subsets. In these subsets, democracy awaits explanation."  

One conclusion that could be drawn from the preceding analysis is that a certain level of economic growth is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the establishment of stable electoral democracy. However, a moment of reflection will reveal that there are important exceptions to this notion as well. The case of India immediately comes to mind. As Dahl has noted, India's GNP per capita was only $73 in 1957, one-third to one-half of the threshold normally used in such research, but the nation nonetheless was enjoying a protracted period of stable electoral democracy. Weiner suggests that another variable needs to be entered into the mix in order to explain the case of India: "The British colonial model of tutelary democracy has been more successful than other colonial models in sustaining democratic institutions and processes in newly independent countries." Weiner's evidence for this conclusion is impressive; he
highlights six developing countries with populations of over 1 million that have had recent colonial experiences, and which currently have stable electoral democracies; the common denominator for these countries is that they had each experienced British tutelary democracy. Indeed, Weiner finds that among the smaller developing countries, most that have remained democratic were also colonies of Britain.10

Although Weiner's argument is persuasive, there are too many exceptions to make it totally convincing. Grenada, Tanzania, Uganda, Ghana, and Nigeria are British tutelary democracies that broke down. Within Latin America, Costa Rica and Venezuela are two important non-British cases in which democracy seems to have taken a firm hold. The explanation for these two Latin American cases, however, it can be argued, rests in the economic threshold theory rather than the British tradition theory. If so, then one is still left with exceptions. There is the case of Honduras, a country that holds the distinction of being the poorest country in Central America; yet, with the exception of Costa Rica, it is recognized as having the deepest democratic traditions in the region. Indeed, as I have reported elsewhere, the GNP per capita of Honduras, always near the bottom in the Latin American region, remained below the minimum threshold into the 1980s, when electoral democracy was gaining in strength.11

Vanhanen takes a somewhat different macroanalytic approach to the problem. He focuses on "the relative distribution of economic, intellectual and other crucial power resources among various sectors of the population. Democracy will emerge under conditions in which power resources have been so widely distributed that no group is any longer able to suppress its competitors or to maintain hegemony."12 While the explained variance is impressively high, he nonetheless finds that 14 out of 147 countries in the 1980–1983 period contradict his hypothesis. He argues that his approach is probabilistic and not designed to produce 100 percent accuracy of prediction. But among those who eschew quantitative methods, it is these nonconforming cases that are seen as undermining the utility of the entire approach.

It is worthy of note that 5 out of the 14, or 36 percent of the exceptional cases in the Vanhanen analysis, are found in the Latin American region, when the Latin American countries comprise only 17 percent of the total sample of nations.13 This finding is consistent with that of Soares, who sees Latin America as one major exception to the worldwide pattern. Indeed, Soares puts his finger on the core of the problem in Latin America, namely, the problem of regime stability. As Soares states, "Both democracy and dictatorship are unstable in Latin America."14 Viewed from this angle, Latin American exceptionalism may be more a problem of the in-
stability of regime, irrespective of the form it takes, rather than instability of democracy per se.

Instability certainly has been characteristic of Latin America for much of its history. Edward Muller and I have shown that instability (in the form of insurgency) is directly linked to inequality in income distribution. Since income inequality in Latin America is, on the whole, far higher than it is in other developing areas of the world, it stands to reason that instability would be endemic there.

While instability in Latin America can be explained, what is far less clear is the form that the instability takes. Specifically, why is Latin America frequently characterized by an oscillation between dictatorship and democracy? Other variants of the pattern are possible and have indeed occurred in Latin America. For example, Cuba moved from right-wing dictatorship under [Fulgencio] Batista in the 1950s to left-wing dictatorship under [Fidel] Castro beginning in the 1960s. In the 1970s, Nicaragua followed the same path with the downfall of [Anastasio] Somoza [Debayle] and the rise of the Sandinistas. Peru, beginning in 1968, experienced regime shifts from populist-left military rule to more traditional, rightist military rule. But the overall pattern has been one that oscillates between military rule and civilian, electoral democracy.

The problem of explaining Latin American exceptionalism is perhaps best viewed as a problem of understanding the factors that have been responsible for the cyclical pattern for much of this century among countries that have achieved the minimal levels of economic development. In Latin America, no country has sustained electoral democracy for any substantial period of time without having crossed the economic threshold. While most of the nations in the region have crossed the threshold, only Costa Rica and Venezuela have sustained electoral democracy since first establishing it in the post-World War II period. Hence, in Latin America, crossing the economic threshold may be a necessary condition for democratization, but it is clearly far from a sufficient condition. As Inglehart has forcefully argued with reference to the general question of the origins of stable democracy, “There is no question that economic factors are politically important—but they are only part of the story.”

According to Inglehart, the other “part of the story” is political culture. This much-maligned variable of political analysis has recently begun to regain some of the attention it once received. Serious political culture research has its origins in Almond and Verba’s *The Civic Culture*, one of the few books of modern political science that remains an object of discussion and debate a quarter of a century after its publication. As Verba has stated, the many weaknesses in method and theory in the book
"derive from the boldness" of the effort. Almond and Verba attempted in The Civic Culture to draw a direct micro-to-macro linkage between attitudes and regime type. The leap was enormous and entirely premature given the infant state of survey research at the time. Nonetheless, the challenge it presented is one that remains with us today.

In the literature on Latin America, some of the strongly negative reactions against political culture research are generated by works that are culturally reductionist in the extreme, and which view culture as largely immutable and a constant throughout the region. For such authors, the so-called Iberic tradition is the central explanatory variable for political instability and authoritarian rule. But these perspectives are incapable of explaining cases such as Costa Rica and Venezuela, since constancy of cultures ought not to produce variable political outcomes. Inglehart's argument is that "political culture is an intervening variable that helps explain why economic development is conducive to, but does not necessarily lead to, the emergence of modern or mass-based democracy." Inglehart's attention is not focused on generalized cultural traditions, but on a specific subset of "norms and attitudes supportive of democracy." His evidence is based upon a two-decade study of a sample of fifteen nations. The overall conclusion of the study is especially important for the Latin American cases. He argues that "a long-term commitment to democratic institutions among the public is . . . required, in order to sustain democracy when conditions are dire." In Latin America, the conditions are almost always dire, and have been particularly bleak during the 1980s debt crisis in which democracies have been struggling to survive.

Inglehart attempts to prove his case for the importance of political culture by using data from a sample of twenty-one nations over the period 1900–1986. His conclusion is that the impact of economic growth on democracy is mediated through political culture. A far more direct relationship has been shown by Gibson, who shows that intolerant attitudes of political elites in the United States are strongly associated with repressive public policy. Gibson found that in the 1950s, states with political elites more intolerant on the issue of the rights of Communists were far more likely to have adopted legislation restricting the rights of Communists.

Although political culture as an important variable determining the stability of democracy is regaining support in the United States and Western Europe, it meets strong resistance in Latin America. There are a number of good reasons for this. First, political culture research is invariably quantitative in nature and therefore reflects the mainstream of the positivist, empirical paradigm of North American social science, an approach
which runs against the grain of humanist tradition predominant in Latin American universities. Second, Latin American scholars view such work as having a condescending tinge to it, symbolized by studies of modernization and civic culture which place the United States at the most preferred end of the continuum and Latin American countries at the least preferred end. Third, the research is often seen as characterized by “victim-blaming,” in which the problems of Latin American politics are a result of their own (pathological) cultures. Fourth, acceptance of the North American paradigm implies a deepening of cultural dependency. Fifth, a residue of suspicion, generated initially by Project Camelot, lingers over the motivations of scholars who probe public opinion in Latin American countries. Finally, there is the reality of the extraordinary difficulties, both methodologically as well as pragmatically, in conducting valid survey research on political opinions in regimes characterized by repressive police and military forces.

While political culture research meets strong resistance within Latin America, it is also unpopular among North American Latin American experts. The masterful critique by Craig and Cornelius of the Mexican component of The Civic Culture summarizes the many problems inherent in that study that have come to symbolize the weaknesses of survey research on Latin America.\(^{25}\) The limitation of the sample to urban areas, the serious errors in translation from English to Spanish, the failure to be attentive to regional variation, and the lack of sensitivity to the authoritarian context in which Mexican politics are conducted are all problems that appear in the Mexican survey. Consequently, when Latin Americanist graduate students are exposed to the notion of political culture, they are likely to be introduced to it via The Civic Culture and to be shown why such research is of little use.

A further difficulty is that in the training of area specialists so much effort and time are needed to acquire the requisite language and culture skills that little room is left over in graduate curricula for a heavy dose of statistics, sample design, and survey research methodology.

Finally, Latin Americanist graduate students who are considering a survey research–based approach for their dissertations quickly realize that they do not have access to the functional equivalent of the widely available and highly respected political and social surveys conducted in the United States by the Institute of Social Research at the University of Michigan or the National Opinion Research Center at Chicago. Hence, while their fellow graduate students who are studying American and Western European governments can obtain a gold mine of survey data neatly stored on computer tapes, Latin Americanist graduate students must contemplate the daunting prospect of financing, organizing, administering, and
processing a survey all by themselves. Those who forge ahead in spite of these obstacles often end up being forced to content themselves with tiny, unrepresentative samples, and more often than not are unable to find the resources to process the raw data into machine-readable format. In the end, these students often disregard their surveys altogether and base their dissertations on more traditional sources of data such as interviews, archival research, and newspaper clippings. Students who have confronted an experience such as this often end up teaching their own students that good surveys cannot be done in Latin America and hence propagate the bias against political culture research.

Yet, in spite of all of these limitations, there is an unmistakable increase in interest in political culture research in Latin America. The publication of Norbert Lechner’s edited volume entitled Cultura política y democratización, is one important indication, while another is the recent publication of an article by Enzo Faletto, a primary proponent of dependency theory, on the subject of political culture and democratization.23 It is worth noting that this advocate of the primary importance of economic factors in determining political outcomes is now arguing that “structural conditions are insufficient for democracy to arise and take effect.”24

No single factor is more directly responsible for this dramatic shift than the retreat of the military and the emergence of elected civilian regimes. The newly democratic regimes in Latin America are understandably more tolerant of political research than [were] their authoritarian predecessors. But far more important than the liberalized atmosphere is the fact that candidates for public office hope to enhance their chances of winning by making heavy use of public opinion polls to help guide their election campaign strategies. It is not at all uncommon in Latin America today to find political polling consultants from Washington, DC, planning campaign strategies for presidential candidates. Similarly, newspapers and magazines are conducting their own polls in an atmosphere of highly competitive elections; poll results sell newspapers.

Added to the stimulus of polling provided by election campaigns is the use of polls to support or refute key policy positions. There is no clearer case of this phenomenon than that of the United States Information Agency (USIA) polls conducted in Central America. President [Ronald] Reagan opened the debate in March 1986 by claiming that a Gallup poll conducted in Central America showed that Central Americans supported the U.S. policy of aiding the contras in Nicaragua. This announcement immediately generated a flurry of claims and counterclaims about the accuracy of what the president had reported and the quality of the polls themselves.25 U.S. congressmen began reading into the Congressional Record results of these polls to support their position on contra
aid. Hence, Central American public opinion polls were being used to help influence public opinion in the United States and, ultimately, to help determine a key aspect of U.S. foreign policy.

Within Latin America, elected officials and opposition parties cite polls supporting their position on numerous public policy issues. This is a phenomenon found not only in the newly established democracies but even in authoritarian Chile. In a country which at this writing is facing a national referendum in which there is only one candidate, General Augusto Pinochet, it is reported that "myriad research groups, consultants, and others are polling Chileans about their attitudes toward the coming presidential plebiscite." Even Paraguay is experiencing a miniboom in public opinion surveys.

In spite of the recent growth of survey research in Latin America, those interested in studying the political culture of the region still face a daunting task. There is no central archive like that found at the University of Michigan or the University of Essex in England, where Latin American surveys are stored. In the 1960s the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Florida maintained a Latin American Data Bank, but that operation was closed in the 1970s. The London-based Gallup International does not maintain an archive of the polls conducted by its many affiliates in Latin America. The University of Connecticut is reported to be planning an archive of Latin American survey data under the direction of Fred Turner, and one would hope that the effort will take root. At the moment, however, one is limited to studying a small portion of the extant survey data based upon an unsystematic process of contacting those who are known to possess such data.

In the following discussion, a preliminary effort is made to explore some facets of Latin American political culture with specific reference to attitudes related to democracy. The effort begins with a look at the paradigmatic case: Costa Rica. In a comprehensive review of the Fitzgibbon-Johnson-Kelly Survey of Scholarly Images of Democracy in Latin America, Baloyra concludes that despite its many acknowledged weaknesses, it is the best instrument available for comparisons over time of the levels of democratization in Latin America. Based upon the nine surveys that have been conducted every five years beginning in 1945, Costa Rica has been ranked fourth once (1950), second on four occasions, and since 1975 it has held first place in three consecutive surveys. If we are going to find a political culture of democracy anywhere in Latin America, we should find it in Costa Rica.

In 1978, Miguel Gómez and I conducted a small-scale survey of the metropolitan area of Costa Rica's capital city, San José, and the provincial capitals of the major cities in the surrounding central valley. The
sample size was 201. Some of the items in that survey were coordinated with two other surveys also conducted in 1978, one in New York and another in Mexico. Edward Muller and Tom Jukam conducted a survey in New York City (N = 618), and Edward Williams, John Booth, and I conducted a survey in selected urban areas of Mexico (N = 430). The survey data from New York provide benchmark data against which the Latin American cases can be measured. After all, The Civic Culture did find the U.S. case to be far and away more democratic than Mexico. Finally, Mexico, while presumably at the bottom of this trio in terms of level of democratization, is ranked quite high in the Scholarly Images study cited above; since 1965 it has ranked no lower than sixth, and in 1980, the year of the survey closest to the year in which our survey of Mexico was conducted, it ranked third.

While the surveys included a number of items on different aspects of democratic political culture, here I will focus on only one: tolerance for the rights of dissenters. Since the days of the pioneering research of Prothro and Grigg, it has been clear that while surveys of opinion often produce very high levels of support for general principles of democracy (e.g., freedom of speech, right to vote, etc.), mass publics are far less willing to extend those rights to groups that they do not like. Tolerance of dissent, therefore, has become a central focus of much public opinion research in the United States and abroad. Willingness to extend to opposition groups the right of free speech, the right to vote, and the right to run for office are three key indicators of support for democratic values.

Table 1 presents a comparison of the levels of tolerance for the rights of opposition in Costa Rica, Mexico, and New York. Three rather unremarkable conclusions can be drawn from an examination of this table. First, there is a hierarchy, in a Guttman-scale sense, of activities that are most highly tolerated and those that are least tolerated. In all three countries, there is more tolerance for freedom of speech (and hence opposition to censorship) than there is for the right to vote. The right of dissenters to run for office is the least well tolerated in these three samples. These results are predictable: dissenters can speak out with little effect, while their voting could change the outcome of an election and running for office could result in a dissenter's being elected. The respondents, then, seem to be making rational distinctions among these different aspects of tolerance. Moreover, there seems to be a certain universality in the ways in which these rights are perceived across these three cultures. Second, average opinion consistently falls on the supportive end of the continuum in all cases except in Mexico on the "run for office" item, where it falls slightly into the negative end. While support for the rights of dissenters is not very high in all three countries, it nonetheless averages out to be more
tolerant than intolerant. Third, predictably, New York City scores are consistently more tolerant than those in Costa Rica and Mexico. These three conclusions add to our confidence in the validity of the surveys and suggest that they may well be tapping attitudes that can be linked to regime type.

Table 1. Tolerance of Dissent in Costa Rica, Mexico, and New York (Mean Scores) ¹

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Costa Rica</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>New York</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Censorship</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Run for office</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See note 33.

¹Means based upon a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 indicating lowest tolerance and 10 highest. The items were:

Censorship: “To what extent would you approve or disapprove of the government censoring radio, TV, or newspaper ads that criticize the government?”

Vote: “To what extent would you approve or disapprove of people who only say bad things about the Costa Rican (Mexican, United States) form of government having the right to vote?”

Run for Office: “To what extent would you approve or disapprove of people who only say bad things about the Costa Rican (Mexican, United States) form of government having the right to run for office?”

What does come as a surprise, and therefore challenges our confidence in the reliability of the data, is that even though Mexico is widely viewed as a less democratic country than Costa Rica, on the voting and censorship items Mexican opinion is more tolerant. The differences on the censorship items are so small as to be entirely within the confidence intervals of the two samples. The differences in the vote item are wider and probably reflect a true difference in perspective. These findings suggest that a more authoritarian political system seems to be undergirded by a more democratic culture. If this were to prove to be the case, then it would go far in undermining our confidence that one can in fact find micro-macro linkages in political culture research.

Closer examination of the items reveals that the marginals reported in the table may be misleading. The items focus on the rights of critics of the system. Those who support the system of government and would nonetheless allow critics to enjoy full civil rights are considered tolerant and supportive of a political culture of democracy. But what of those who
oppose the system? These individuals might well support the rights of
dissenters not because they are tolerant but because they are critical of
the system. To test for this possibility, it is necessary to compare toler-
ance for critics only among those who support the system.

Along with Edward Mulder, I have developed a cross-culturally valid
and reliable set of items measuring system support.\(^{38}\) The items have been
tested in both Costa Rica and Mexico and have been shown to behave as
expected. To simplify this presentation, I use only one of those items in
this paper, one which asks, “To what degree are you proud of the Mexi-
can (Costa Rican) system of government?” The item has face validity and
is highly correlated with the other items in the larger set.\(^ {37}\) What we find
when comparing Mexico with Costa Rica in the 1978 surveys is that
whereas nearly half the Mexicans (46.4 percent) score in the bottom half
of the scale, only one in twenty (5.3 percent) Costa Ricans score in this
range.\(^ {38}\) So, the percentage of the sample population with low pride in
their nation is approximately nine times greater in Mexico than it is in
Costa Rica.

Table 2 divides the Mexican sample into two halves, those with low
pride in their political system and those with high pride in it, and then
compares the responses on the tolerance items. It is evident from this
table that tolerance for dissent is affected by one’s support for the system.
For each civil liberty, tolerance scores are lower among those with high
support than they are among those with low support. While a majority of
the sample is tolerant of the freedom of speech and right to vote of critics,
among those with high support for the system, a distinct majority would
oppose critics running for office. Among those who express low support,
a majority would favor the right of critics to run for office. Although the
Table does not display a similar comparison for Costa Rica because the
sample size of those with low support is so small as to place in doubt the
validity of percentages, among those with high support 44.2 percent would
allow critics of the system to run for office.

The primary conclusion we draw from this analysis is that less than a
third (29.9 percent) of Mexicans who express support for their system are
willing to allow critics of it to run for office. What seemed to be an anom-
alous situation of higher levels of democratic political culture in Mexico
than in Costa Rica really has turned out to be a spurious result of very
different levels of system support in the two nations. Extending this find-
ing to a more general level might provide some insight into the problem
of political instability in Latin America. Latin Americans may be tolerant
of protest marches, strikes, and the military coups that often follow them
not because they are politically tolerant (and democratic), but because
they oppose the government in power.
Table 2. Pride and Tolerance in Mexico

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Low pride</th>
<th>High pride</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>percent</td>
<td>percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tolerant</td>
<td>tolerant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Censorship</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>63.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>56.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Run for office</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See note 33.

1Low-pride responses are those in the range of 1 to 5 on the 10-point scale, while high-pride answers are those in the range of 6 to 10.

The evidence presented thus far shows some micro-macro relationship between the political culture of democracy, defined in terms of tolerance for opposition, and the democratic characteristics of the systems in which those cultures operate. But the three nations examined above remained politically stable for a long period before and after the gathering of the survey data. What about systems that experienced breakdown? Can we find evidence of a political culture unsupportive of democracy prior to such events?

Uruguay represents an ideal case for three reasons. First, from 1945 to 1960, Uruguay was ranked first on the Fitzgibbon-Johnson surveys of scholarly images of Latin America. It held on to second place in 1965 and in 1970 was ranked third. So, we are dealing with a case that was indisputably democratic from the point of view of expert observers. Second, Uruguay has long been highly developed economically and socially; therefore, until the breakdown of democracy (which occurred in 1973 with a full military takeover), it was a case that conformed precisely to the theories that link economic development to political democracy. Third, we are fortunate to have relevant data from Gallup Uruguay for the period prior to the breakdown.

In May 1968 a poll of Montevideo with a sample size of 804 was conducted. Since Montevideo contains the bulk of the population of the country, the opinions expressed by its citizens closely reflect those of the nation as a whole.40 A question asked of the respondents in that poll taps quite closely the tolerance items reported above for Costa Rica, Mexico, and New York City. The item read: “Freedom of speech and assembly should not be denied to anyone.” On this item, only 5 percent of the respondents disagreed. By this standard, Uruguayans seemed even more democratic than the New Yorkers. But, as we discovered with the Mexican data, underlying this opinion is another dimension, that of support.
for the system. Another item in the survey demonstrates this point: "The only road to overcome the problems of the country is social revolution." Only a minority (46 percent) were in disagreement. Hence, over half the adult residents of Montevideo were so lacking in support of their system that they believed that a social revolution was necessary. Even more startling is that fully 12 percent of those polled were willing to admit that they viewed an armed uprising as the way out of the country's economic problems. Since feelings of support for an armed uprising are something to which some individuals might fear to admit, the true level of such support may well have been higher. Finally, 21 percent admitted to preferring a military to a civilian government.

The strong support for freedom of speech and assembly during the late 1960s in Uruguay, in light of the other survey data just presented, may be a misleading indicator of a democratic political culture. Perhaps the best indication of that would be to compare the finding that 21 percent of Uruguayans were ready to support a military government as a solution to the country's problems with the responses of Costa Ricans to a 1987 national probability survey (N = 927) directed by the author, Edward Muller and Miguel Gómez. Costa Rica is unique in Latin America in that the national army was disbanded in 1948 and not reestablished. The turmoil in Nicaragua and, to a lesser extent, in Panama led some Costa Ricans to suggest that a national army is needed for national defense. In our survey we asked: "As things are now in Central America, do you think that Costa Rica should begin to start thinking about creating an army?" Fully 88 percent of the national sample answered in the negative. The contrast with the Uruguayan data is clear.

Further evidence of limitations in support for democracy in Uruguay comes from an August 1970 Gallup survey of Montevideo (N = 250). In that survey, 48 percent of the respondents agreed that executive power was justified in suspending individual guarantees and allowing arrest and detention without the right to an appearance before a judge. These individuals, no doubt, were concerned about the rising power of the Tupamaro guerrilla group, which was responsible for numerous terrorist attacks in Montevideo. On the other hand, demonstrating that the guerrillas had considerable popular support, 18 percent of those interviewed in August 1970 thought that the Tupamaro movement was justified. Hence, while 48 percent of the population supported antidemocratic actions against guerrilla groups, an additional 18 percent of the population expressed support for such groups. Although we do not have the raw data and therefore cannot determine if these two groups were entirely mutually exclusive as we suspect they largely were, if we add them up we can conclude that over two-thirds of Uruguayans supported the destruction of either
their country's entire democratic system or the democratic rights guaranteed by that system.

The Uruguayan data can be contrasted with the 1987 Costa Rican data. Uruguay in the late 1960s was undergoing a severe economic downturn coupled with a menacing guerrilla movement. Costa Rica had undergone its most serious economic crisis of the century in the period 1980–1982. In that two-year period alone, GNP per capita declined by 25 percent and the country racked up the largest per capita external debt in the world. Although Costa Rica was not also suffering from a serious internal guerrilla movement, terrorist cells had been established and armed attacks were occurring. In addition, crime had risen dramatically and fear of entanglement in a Central American war was present in nearly everyone's mind. Yet in an urban sample conducted in 1983 (N = 501), only 2.8 percent expressed approval of individuals belonging to groups that sought to overthrow the government and only 1.2 percent expressed negative system support (on the pride item cited above).44

We thus have further evidence of a micro-macro linkage between political culture and political regime type. Yet, one can challenge these findings by arguing that survey data is notoriously unstable; anyone who followed the polls in the 1988 U.S. presidential election would conclude that was: shifts of opinion can occur from such nonevents as conventions in which the outcome was predetermined. If opinion data can be so unstable, then what are we to make of the data summarized above? Inglehart responds to this question by stating, "Even when democracy has no reply to the question, 'What have you done for me lately?' it may be sustained by diffuse feelings that it is an inherently good thing."45 That is, attitudes toward democracy may be far more stable than attitudes toward incumbents and challengers in an election.

To test this hypothesis, we are fortunate to be able to examine the stability of the three tolerance items analyzed earlier in this paper for Costa Rican surveys that were taken in 1978, 1980, 1983, 1985, and 1987. If these are bedrock attitudes that support a political culture of democracy, then they should be relatively stable even when the system is subjected to severe shocks such as the economic crisis which began in Costa Rica in 1980. In 1987, 83 percent of the respondents believed that the economic crisis had been strong or very strong, and 95 percent of those who believed this thought that the crisis was still continuing, seven years after it had begun. Furthermore, 66 percent of those asked thought that the crisis would not be resolved in the coming years. Added to the crisis was the fear of Nicaragua: 88.5 percent of the respondents in 1987 believed that the Sandinista government of Nicaragua was a danger for Costa Rica. Hence, economic pessimism was deep and fear of foreign
intervention a reality, factors that might well have eroded tolerance. Yet the evidence presented in Table 3 shows otherwise.

Evidence of the stability of the tolerance items is clear from this table. One indication is that in each year that the survey was administered, the "run for office" item proved the most difficult and the only one in which a consistent minority of the population took the tolerant position. But a more general indication is the stability of the percentages across the years. For a simple random sample of 200 and a 50/50 split, a confidence interval of 7.1 percent is obtained, while for samples of 500 and this same split, the interval would be 4.5 percent. As shown in Table 3, the intersample variation is usually well within the confidence interval. Only in 1987, on the censorship item, does one see a notable decline in tolerance for censorship and some erosion in tolerance for dissidents running for office. Yet, in that same survey, tolerance for the dissidents' right to vote was at its all-time high.


<table>
<thead>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Censorship</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>60.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Run for office</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(201)</td>
<td>(280)</td>
<td>(501)</td>
<td>(566)</td>
<td>(388)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See note 33.

\(^1\) Item wording differed in 1978 from other years.

\(^2\) Includes only metropolitan area of San José and capitals of "Meseta Central" (Cartago, Heredia, and Alajuela) as in previous surveys. Entire sample in 1987 was 927.

The overall conclusion that one can draw from this table is that tolerance attitudes can be seen to be remarkably stable even under the impact of economic crisis and perceived foreign threats, at least in Costa Rica. Compare the stability of the Costa Rican data with Inglehart's finding that satisfaction with one's life as a whole, presumably an attitude subject to minor longitudinal variation, declined in Ireland from 53 percent satisfied in 1973 to 35 percent in 1980 and 30 percent in 1987. Belgium saw a decline on this attitude from 43 percent in 1973 to 20 percent in 1983. Denmark, in contrast, experienced an increase from 47 percent satisfied in 1983 to 65 percent in 1986. In Uruguay, the Gallup poll showed that between May 1968 and July 1970, the proportion of people saying that the country needed a "total change" increased from 20 per-
cent to 32 percent. This suggests that attitudes that are more deeply held than are presidential preferences are subject to considerable volatility. Yet, in systems with well-entrenched democracies, support for key civil liberties is largely invariant despite marked declines in macropolitical phenomena.

It has been shown, then, that civic culture may indeed matter after all as an important complement to socioeconomic determinants of regime type. Yet, there remains an important caveat in the literature on democratic attitudes that needs to be explored. Much of the literature has emphasized that while mass attitudes are not irrelevant, it is elite attitudes that are pivotal in influencing policy outcomes. Dahl's Polyarchy concerns itself with mass belief systems, but stresses that "it is difficult to see how a polyarchy could exist if a majority of the politically active strata of a country believe strongly that a hegemonic regime was more desirable and could be achieved by supporting antidemocratic leaders and organizations." This tolerance literature on the U.S. case conforms with Dahl's perspective, stressing that, in almost every area of democratic beliefs, elites are more democratic. McClosky and Zaller find that elites are carriers of a nation's creed, and McClosky and Brill report that "elites (as a whole) were more tolerant than the population-at-large even at the same levels of education." The direct link between elite attitudes and policy is provided by Gibson's study, cited earlier, which found that "elite opinion, not mass opinion, determines public policy."

Unfortunately, as limited as our opinion data are for Latin American mass publics, elite data are even harder to come by. Yet, we do have a few important indications that further emphasize the importance of democratic civic culture. In a 1987 sample conducted by the author, Edward Muller, and Miguel Gómez, among a sample of 219 Costa Rican political elites, it was found that elites were indeed more tolerant than the masses interviewed in the 1987 sample. Table 4 provides the relevant comparators.

Elite tolerance is dramatically higher than mass tolerance in Costa Rica, especially on the critical item of the right to run for office. The percentage of tolerant elites is nearly three times as high as tolerant masses. One can conclude from this that the Costa Rican pattern conforms to that found in the United States: if democratic elites are most directly responsible for democratic politics, then Costa Rican elites are responsible for Costa Rican democracy.

The problem raised by the Costa Rican elite data is that if elites elsewhere in Latin America follow the Costa Rican pattern, then they too may be highly supportive of democratic norms. In that case, it would be impossible to link the attitudes of elites who have a democratic political culture to an authoritarian political system.
Table 4. Mass versus Elite Tolerance in Costa Rica, 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Percent tolerant (range 6–10)†</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Censorship</td>
<td>56.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>60.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Run for office</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(927)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See note 33.

†Results for mass sample presented in this table are for the entire national sample, not just the urban areas utilized in Table 3.

There is limited evidence to show that, even at the elite level, there is congruence between political culture and political system. In 1962 and 1963, Daniel Goldrich conducted a survey of the political attitudes of elite youth in Costa Rica and Panama. Costa Rica's neighbor to the south. In 1960, Panama ranked eleventh on the Fitzgibbon-Johnson scale, and Costa Rica ranked second. Hence, one would expect more democratic attitudes among the Costa Ricans than among the Panamanians. Goldrich asked the following item: "More than legislation, more than politicians, what this country needs is a leader in whom the people can place their confidence." In the early 1960s, 46 percent of Costa Rican elite youth agreed with this item, with agreement presumably indicating an antidemocratic proclivity. The Panamanian students, however, were far more antidemocratic as a group: 74 percent preferred a strong leader to legislation and politicians. We included the same item in our elite Costa Rica survey of 1987 and found that only 26 percent of the respondents took the antidemocratic position. This means that either Costa Ricans become more democratic as they mature or that the country as a whole moved in the direction of greater support for democratic norms between the early 1960s and the late 1980s. Since the sample was not a panel design, we really cannot know if either one or both of these explanations have validity. What we do know is that the political system of Costa Rica was supported by an elite political culture far more democratic than its less democratic neighbor, Panama.

Additional items in the Goldrich survey are of interest to the subjects addressed in this paper. Goldrich asked if the students agreed or disagreed with the following assertion: "Freedom of speech and assembly should be unlimited." He found that 61 percent of the Costa Rican elite youth agreed, compared with 45 percent of the Panamanian youth. He also asked
for agreement/disagreement with the following item: “If a government is doing a good job, it should be allowed to continue in office even if it means postponing elections.” Only 29 percent of Costa Rican elite youth agreed, compared with 54 percent of the Panamanians.

While we do not have the original Goldrich data and cannot investigate them directly, it is quite possible that as in Mexico, those who took democratic positions were more prevalent among those who opposed the political system. One piece of evidence pointing in that direction is responses to an item asked by Goldrich in 1962–63 in Panama and Costa Rica, and which was included in both the mass and elite 1987 surveys in Costa Rica. He asked for agreement/disagreement with this item: “In general, our system of government and politics is good for the country.” In Panama, 40 percent of the youth agreed with the item, compared with 91 percent of the Costa Ricans. In 1987, 90 percent of the elites and 93 percent of the masses agreed, indicating virtually no change in support over the twenty-five-year period.

There are additional elite data to support the contention that elite opinion, while generally more democratic than mass opinion, is not supportive of democratic norms everywhere in Latin America. In Brazil, Peter McDonough surveyed 269 elites in 1972–73. In 1970, Brazil ranked seventeenth out of twenty nations on the Fitzgibbon-Johnson scale. He asked for approval/disapproval of censorship of the media based on a 100-point scale, with the higher number indicating the more democratic end of the continuum. The average among all elites was 57, just barely falling on the democratic end of the continuum. The only strong opposition to censorship emerged among the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) (i.e., opposition) party politicians, who averaged 96 on the 100-point scale. These scores, if they can be related directly to those presented in Table 1 of this essay in which a ten-point scale was employed, show that Brazilian elites expressed greater support of censorship than did masses in either Costa Rica or Mexico.

The final pieces of evidence supporting the micro-macro linkage argument made in this paper comes from the recent USIA polls conducted in Central America. In January 1988 comparatively large national samples were drawn in all of the Central American countries except Nicaragua. The following question was asked in each country: “The people of Central America are best off when they live in a democracy. Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or disagree strongly?” Strong agreement was expressed by 80 percent of Costa Ricans and 71 percent of Hondurans, the two most democratic countries in Central America. Only 41 percent of Guatemalans and 38 percent of Salvadorean
agreed. These responses conform quite well to our perceptions of the
levels of democracy in these countries.54

The central implicit question raised by this review of public opinion
data in Latin America is that of the direction of causality. Do democratic
attitudes cause democratic systems or vice versa? Inglehart argues, based
upon his longitudinal analysis of opinion data, that it is attitudes that pro-
duce democracies.55 But the problem is quite complex and not likely to be
answered in the near future.

This discussion has attempted to demonstrate that the study of politi-
cultural change is returning to the forefront of political analysis on Latin
America. The inability of economic theories of democratization to pre-
dict successfully regime change in the region, coupled with the rapid trans-
ition to democratic regimes throughout Latin America, are largely
responsible for this shift. While the flaws in earlier efforts to study politi-
cultural culture have become evident, newer approaches may lead to a deeper
understanding of the relationship between political culture and regime
type, as can be seen in studies of Costa Rica, Mexico, Brazil, and Ur-
uguay. Additional research along these lines may help us better bridge the
micro-macro gap that has plagued the analysis to date.

Notes

5. As a group, the nations of Central America were the last in Latin America to achieve the requisite levels of GNP per capita. In the 1980s these nations all have elected regimes. For details see Mitchell A. Seligson, "Development, Democratization, and Decay: Central America at the Crossroads," in Authoritarians and Democrats.
10. These include the Bahama Islands, Barbados, Botswana, Fiji, Nauru, Gambia, and Mauritius.
13. Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Panama, and Uruguay.
17. Some would include Colombia in this list, but the restricted nature of party competition and the frequent suspension of constitutional guarantees militate against this view.
23. Ibid., 7.


27. Enzo Faletto, “Cultura política,” 77. Author’s translation of the Spanish.


30. According to Norman Webb, Secretary General of Gallup International, as of April 1988 affiliates have been established in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Bolivia, and Uruguay.


32. This included the capital cities of Alajuela, Cartago, and Heredia, the three major cities outside of San José in the meseta central of Costa Rica.


35. Herbert McClosky and Aida Brill, Dimensions of Tolerance: What Americans Believe about Civil Liberties (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1983); John L. Sullivan, James Pireson, and George E. Marcus, Political Tolerance and

36. Muller, Seligson, and Jukam, “Diffuse Political Support.”

37. We have generally used six to eight items in the series. See Muller, Seligson, and Jukam, “Diffuse Political Support,” and Seligson, “On the Measurement of Diffuse Support,” for full discussions of these items.

38. The two surveys used a different metric for this item. The Mexican survey used a metric ranging from a low of 1 to a high of 10. The bottom half is considered the scores ranging from 1 to 5. The Costa Rican metric ranged from 1 to 7. Hence, there is a neutral point (4) in this scale, but not in the Mexican administration. If the neutral point is included in the bottom half calculation, the percentage with low pride increases from 5.3 percent to 8.5 percent.

39. Gallup Uruguay, various poll reports, 1968–1971. Gallup Uruguay was probably the first Gallup affiliate established in Latin America and has a reputation for producing surveys of exceptionally high quality.

40. In actual fact, comparisons of Gallup’s Montevideo data with national data in other studies that they have conducted show very little variation.

41. The actual item read: “Personally, do you believe that armed revolution is the only way to resolve the economic problems of our country, or can the solutions be encountered within the bounds of law and order?”

42. The item read: “Which do you prefer: a democracy like ours, with all of its disorder and crises, or a military government such as exist in other countries in our continent?”


44. This study, too, was conducted by Seligson, Muller, and Gómez.

45. Inglehart, “The Renaissance of Political Culture.”

46. Ibid., 7a.

47. Dahl, Polyarchy, 126.


50. The sample consisted of current and sitting presidents, vice presidents, congressmen, ministers, party leaders, university students, political leaders, party youth leaders, and leaders of the mass media.


53. Sample Ns were: Costa Rica, 1,197; Honduras, 1,190; El Salvador, 1,204; and Guatemala, 1,150.

54. Booth and Seligson, Elections and Democracy in Central America.

55. Inglehart, “The Renaissance of Political Culture.”