survival suggests that the Bank has basically concluded that universal formal education is an impossible aspiration and is seeking to achieve EFA by any means necessary.

Leading from this, the Bank determines that just about anyone investing in some form of schooling and instruction should be considered as legitimate stakeholders in the EFA mission, along with states and elected governments. Faith based initiatives and private entrepreneurs in the education sector are welcomed as valuable partners in the new strategy to help achieve the EFA mission. To concede ground to private actors, whether faith based non-profit initiatives or profit oriented investors is to forfeit education as a human right (a value commitment the strategy paper mentions in passing).

As we already know, the growth of private education does not result simply in greater access as the Bank claims but also leads to highly stratified education markets, intensifies competition for access in which large swathes of young people are poorly served or not at all, and investors reap profits from the desperation of poor and middle class families. In absolving states from being the primary providers of education, and encouraging the growth of private actors the Bank institutionalizes inequality by guaranteeing unequal access and uneven quality of education. The growth of faith based initiatives in education has its own set of destabilizing effects on secularism, democracy and gender and sexuality rights, serious concerns that are shared by people in recipient and donor countries, yet ignored in the strategy paper.

Knowledge for all? For decades, the Bank has claimed that it represents the interests of the developing world in global policy forums. However, its governance structure, selective recruitment of staff, appointment of the President and veto power of its majority shareholder, the U.S. government, give lie to this claim (see Broad, 2006 for an excellent exposition of the Bank’s systematic bias). To reposition itself now as a Knowledge Bank is similarly a counterfactual claim.

As a Bank representing the interests of its majority shareholders, specifically its five permanent members all of which are developed countries, the institution is hardly in a position to develop a knowledge base that is genuinely evidence based and non partisan. Internal and independent evaluations of the World Bank’s research tell a damning story of a great deal of “bureaucratic conformity” (Ellerman cited in Wilks, 2004), burying evidence that is contrary to Bank prescriptions, very little scope to offer alternatives, and that public image matters more than germane research findings (Wilks, 2004; for a commissioned internal evaluation see World Bank, 2006).

To insist that the Bank can be a large-scale funder governed by rich and powerful countries and at the same time a committed advocate of global sustainable development sidesteps the conflict of interest issues that have been raised by scholars, activists and former Bank staff from the North and the South, and that without drastic reform of the Bank’s governing structures it is ludicrous for the Bank to present itself as a credible knowledge bank. Perhaps it is time the winds of democracy from the Arab spring blow in the direction of the Bank as well.

**Brief Comment on the World Bank Education Policy Paper of 2011**

By Stephen Heyneman

The World Bank has a lot of publications on education. Some are authored and are the responsibility of that author. These may be circulated in a journal as a product of research or as a discussion series to generate debate. A policy paper is different. It must be approved by the executive directors, and the World Bank is listed as the author.

From the beginning, policy papers have shared certain characteristics, this one included. None may contain a statement which would challenge long-standing convention. It may infer. It may suggest. But in the end, it must be approved by all the executive directors which represent the 185 members. No draft policy paper would be put to a vote of the executive directors if were to generate opposition or even controversy. Essentially a policy paper must represent a consensus.

Policy papers reiterate that it is the Bank which is the subject of their suggestions. Countries are autonomous and independent entities. If directives are included in the paper they are turned inward and suggest that the Bank will operate differently in one or another arena, or that the Bank will place new criteria for its operations, or respond warmly to new initiatives in the arenas under discussion.

In spite of these organizational restrictions, Education Strategy 2020 pioneers new arenas for the Bank. It redefines the term ‘education system’. The new definition includes learning wherever it occurs and can be organized. It places a heavy emphasis on early childhood education and adult literacy. It includes corporate training. It includes providers of all kinds—public, private, charitable and for-profit. It includes not only providers of education programs but providers of education products and services. In fact it leaves out very little and, other than early childhood education, it places no priority anywhere.

But will it do things differently? Rather than building schools this new strategy suggests that it will emphasize the efficiency of the education system and help reform its management, governance and finance. Rather than provide new curricula, it will try to lay the foundations of an education knowledge base by supporting the use of assessments of academic achievement, both local and cross-national. Countries are autonomous and independent entities. If directives are included in the paper they are turned inward and suggest that the Bank will operate differently in one or another arena, or that the Bank will place new criteria for its operations, or respond warmly to new initiatives in the arenas under discussion.

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**References**


Another past criticism of the World Bank has been its insular orientation—that is, it tended to cite only its own work and that of its staff members. This implied that it saw development in a narrow way, and ignored much of the analytic work done by the world outside itself. This was said to be parochial and counterproductive.

For instance in the 1995 policy paper, over 13% of the references were other policy papers and 32% of the references were to its own staff members. If one includes the references to the reports from other agencies, the Bank only used sources outside the development community about 50% of the time. In Education Strategy 2020 the sources of references have changed dramatically, but in the wrong direction. 26% of the references are derived from other policy papers; 16% from its own staff and 29% from other agencies. This latter figure is the result of James Wolfenson’s efforts. The official rationale was to collaborate with other agencies as though development should be a team effort. But it also serves the Bank’s needs for political coverage to protect itself from external criticism. It is more difficult to criticize the Bank when UNICEF and Save the Children and the Sierra Club are sitting on the podium. This is not an accident. The problem is that the portion of the cited references from other sources has declined. In 1995 it was 50%. Today it is 28%.

One might counter with the suggestion that this is an accurate reflection of the insight and knowledge in the field of education and development. To explore this I looked at the sources for the report on basic education published by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences in 2006. This report cites the World Bank policy papers 2.2% of the time; they cite academic other sources 89% of the time. This suggests to me that the insularity of the Bank has gotten worse, not better.

Another criticism of the Bank was that it did not consult enough; that it developed its policy papers in isolation from the opinions of stakeholders. This paper goes a long way to convince the reader that its consultations were extensive. It lists a total of 69 meetings held to discuss the content of this paper, meetings across all regions and with all donors. It even lists the most frequently asked questions. Here the first three questions (out of 16) in order of importance:

1. What is the ‘strategic’ component of ESS 2020?
2. How does ESS2020 address the Millennium Development Goals and support countries to reach the two education MDG’s?
3. How does ESS2020 relate to the Education for All Fast Track Initiative (EFA FTI)?

My reaction to this list of questions from the consultation meetings is one of horror. If anyone needed a sign as to whether the Bank was out of touch with the world of education and development, all they need to do is read through these questions. They constitute what the Soviets used to call a ‘langue de bois’, a wooden language. They have no importance to the scholars of development and they have no relationship to the real questions about the new policy paper. They reflect the fact that the World Bank continues to listen to itself and to those in similar agencies.

What might be a frequently asked question about this policy paper? I would ask: Is the Bank still recommending that public finances shift from higher to primary education? Is it able to work outside of government ministries of education to assist the development of the private sector? Is it prepared to confront the fact the greatest threat to the quality of education is from within the system itself in terms of corruption? Is it prepared to stop lending to a country which steals our assistance? Is it prepared to sanction staff who propose conditionalities (e.g., payment by results might apply to both borrower and lender) which later prove to be professionally incorrect? Is it prepared to equip low-income countries with policy advisors so they might negotiate loan contractualities with more equity? Is it willing to confront the fact that education constitutes only a tiny percent of the development agenda?

To these questions, and perhaps others, there is no response in this new policy paper.

References:

2011 George Bereday Award Winner

Drawing on a critical theoretical paradigm and critically engaging with the externalization thesis that Steiner-Khamsi and Schriewer have developed, this article examines the politics of "Finnish education" in the ongoing Japanese education reform debate. Situating the politics of externalization in the sociological discussion of reflexive modernity, the study demonstrates how progressive—and to a lesser extent neoliberal—observers appropriate the symbolic signifier "Finnish education" to construct a given truth about the state of Japanese education, authenticate their preferred definitions of its “crisis,” and then naturalize given “solutions.” In particular, the author focuses on how progressive observers refer to Finnish education to redefine the “crisis” and legitimize their dissenting voices against the ongoing conservative-led reform. The author identifies in the progressive articulation the same set of discursive strategies as used in the conservatives’ appropriation of U.S. and British education reform discourses. In conclusion, the author discusses the implications of the study for the conceptualization of externalization and the comparative studies of education in general.

CIES 2011 Joyce Cain Award Winner

This article examines the processes of building relationships between immigrant and long-time resident youth and explores the meaning and consequences of these processes for the individuals involved. The article suggests ways in which schools might adopt strategies to promote personal interaction, cooperative action, and collective identification to aid in the development of these relationships. Using the methodology of portraiture, this study examines the relationship between two students in Lewiston, Maine: a Somali immigrant, and a White longtime resident. The participants capitalized on the common space of their new immigrant destination school to transform casual personal interactions into a bridging relationship based on collective identification. The research identifies processes of personal interaction, cooperative action, and collective identification as central to the building of bridging relationships. Lessons for educators and schools seeking to foster relationships between immigrant and long-time resident youth include engaging students in direct dialogue about race and cultivating skills in empathetic storytelling and listening in order to “double-think,” or receive a counter-story.

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