Articles
“Measuring the Impact of Appointee Vacancies on U.S. Federal Agency Performance,” (with Mark D. Richardson and Chris Piper), Journal of Politics, forthcoming.
“Presidential Investment in the Administrative State,” (with Nick Bednar) American Political Science Review, forthcoming [download paper]
“The Independent Agency Myth,” (with Neal Devins), Cornell Law review, forthcoming. [download paper]
“Do Vacancies Hurt Federal Agency Performance?” (with Christopher M. Piper), Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory 33(2):313-28 (2023). [download paper] [download supplementary appendix]
“Is the Failed Pandemic Response a Symptom of a Diseased Administrative State?” Daedalus 150(3):68-88 (Summer 2021). [download paper]
“Elections, Ideology, and Turnover in the U.S. Federal Government,” (with Alexander D. Bolton and John M. de Figueiredo), Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory 31(2):451-66 (2021). [download paper]
“The Very Best People: President Trump and the Management of Executive Personnel,” (with Mark D. Richardson) Presidential Studies Quarterly 51 (1):51-70 (2021). [download paper]
“Partisan Procurement: Contracting with the United States Federal Government, 2003-2015,” (with Carl Dahlstrom and Mihaly Fazekas), American Journal of Political Science 65(3):652-69. [download paper]
“Public-sector Personnel Economics: Wages, Promotions, and the Competence-Control Trade-Off,” (with Charles M. Cameron and John M. de Figueiredo) Advances in Strategic Management 41:111-48 (2020) [download paper]
“Presidents and Turnover in Regulatory Personnel,” (with Kathleen Doherty and Scott Limbocker) Administration & Society, 51:1-25 (2019). [download paper]
“Deconstructing the Administrative State,” Journal of Politics, 81(3):767-89 (2019). [download paper]
Executive Control and Turnover in the Senior Executive Service,” (with Kathleen Doherty and Scott Limbocker) Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory 29(2):159-74 (2019) [Download paper] [Online appendix].
“President Trump as Manager: Reflections on the First Year.” (with Patrick Bernhard and Emily H. You) Presidential Studies Quarterly 48 (3):480-501. [Download paper]
“Elite Perceptions of Agency Ideology and Workforce Skill.” (with Mark D. Richardson and Joshua D. Clinton) Journal of Politics 80(1):303-7 (2018). [Download paper] [Online Appendix]
“Agency Performance Challenges and Agency Politicization.” (with Abby K. Wood) Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 27(4):581-95 (2017). [Download paper] [Online Appendix]
“Political Control and the Forms of Agency Independence.” (with Jennifer L. Selin) George Washington Law Review 83(4/5):1487-1516 (2015). [Download paper]
“Presidents and Patronage.” (with Gary E. Hollibaugh, Jr. and Gabe Horton), American Journal of Political Science 58(4):1024-1042 (2014). [Download paper] [Online Appendix] [Policy brief]
“Influencing the Bureaucracy: The Irony of Congressional Oversight.” (with Joshua D. Clinton and Jennifer L. Selin), American Journal of Political Science 58(2):387-401 (2014). [Download paper] [Policy brief]
“Government Reform, Political Ideology, and Administrative Burden: The Case of Performance Management in the Bush Administration.” (with Stéphane Lavertu and Donald P. Moynihan) Public Administration Review 73(6):845-57 (2013). [Download paper] [Policy brief]
“Policy Influence, Agency-Specific Expertise, and Exit in the Federal Service.” (with Anthony M. Bertelli) Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 23(2):223-245 (2013). [Download paper] [Policy brief]
“Politics Can Limit Policy Opportunism in Fiscal Institutions: Evidence from Official General Fund Revenue Forecasts in the American States.” (with George A. Krause and James Douglas) Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 32(2):271-95 (2013). [Download paper] [Online Appendix]
“The Invisible Presidential Appointments: An Examination of Appointments to the Department of Labor, 2001-2011.” (with Richard W. Waterman) Presidential Studies Quarterly 43 (1): 35-57 (2013). [Download paper]
“The Personnel Process in the Modern Presidency.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 42(3):577-96 (2012). [Download paper]
“Separated Powers in the United States.” (with Joshua D. Clinton, Anthony M. Bertelli, Christian Grose, and David C. Nixon) American Journal of Political Science 56(2):341-54 (2012). [Download paper] [Online Appendix]
“The Consequences of Presidential Patronage for Agency Performance.” (with Nick Gallo) Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 22(2): 219-243 (2012). [Download paper] [Supplementary material] [Policy brief]
“Presidential Appointments and Personnel.” Annual Review of Political Science 14 (June):47-66 (2011). [Download paper]
“Measurement and Public Service Motivation: New Insights, Old Questions.” International Public Management Journal 13(1):1-10 (2010). [Download paper]
“Modern Presidents and the Transformation of the Federal Personnel System.” The Forum, 7(4): Article 6 (2010). [Download paper]
“Revisiting the Administrative Presidency: Policy, Patronage, and Administrative Competence.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 39 (1):60-73 (2009). [Download paper]
“Management and Leadership Performance in the Defense Department: Evidence from Surveys of Federal Employees.” (with Major Paul S. Oh, U.S. Army) Armed Forces and Society 34(4): 639-661 (2008). [Download paper] [Online appendix] [Policy brief]
“Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design.” (with Neal Devins) Boston University Law Review 88(2):459-98 (2008). [Download paper]
“Expert Opinion, Agency Characteristics, and Agency Preferences.” (with Joshua D. Clinton) Political Analysis 16(1):3-16 (2008). [Download paper]
“Toward a Broader Understanding of Presidential Power: A Re-Evaluation of the Two Presidencies Thesis.” (with Brandice Canes-Wrone and William G. Howell) Journal of Politics 70(1):1-16 (2008). [Download paper] [Online appendix]
“Testing Pendleton’s Premise: Do Political Appointees Make Worse Bureaucrats?” Journal of Politics 69(4):1073-88 (2007). [Download paper] [Online appendix]
“Does Performance Budgeting Work? An Examination of OMB’s PART Scores.” (with John B. Gilmour) Public Administration Review 66(5):742-52 (2006). [Download paper]
“Political Appointments, Civil Service Systems, and Bureaucratic Competence: Organizational Balancing and Gubernatorial Revenue Forecasts in the American States.” (with George Krause and James Douglas) American Journal of Political Science 50(3):770-87 (2006). [Download paper]
“Assessing Performance Budgeting at OMB: The Influence of Politics, Performance, and Program Size.” (with John B. Gilmour) Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 16(2):169-86 (2006). [Download paper]
“Political Appointees and the Competence of Federal Program Management.” (with John B. Gilmour) American Politics Research 34(1):22-50 (2006). [Download paper] [Policy brief]
“Staffing Alone: Unilateral Action and the Politicization of the Executive Office of the President, 1988-2004.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 35(3):496-514 (2005). [Download paper]
“Political Learning from Rare Events: Poisson Inference, Fiscal Constraints and the Lifetime of Bureaus.” (with Daniel C. Carpenter) Political Analysis 12(3):201-32 (2004). [Download paper]
“The Adverse Consequences of the Politics of Agency Design for Presidential Management in the United States: The Relative Durability of Insulated Agencies.” British Journal of Political Science 34:377-404 (2004). [Download paper]
“The Irrational Escalation of Commitment and the Ironic Labor Politics of the Rust Belt.” (with Glenn Beamer) Enterprise and Society 4(4):676-306 (2003). [Download paper]
“Agencies by Presidential Design.” (with William G. Howell) Journal of Politics 64(4):1095-1114 (2002). [Download paper]
“The Politics of Agency Termination: Confronting the Myth of Agency Immortality.” Journal of Politics 64(1):89-107 (2002). [Download paper]
“What Time Is It? The Use of Power in Four Different Types of Presidential Time.” (with James Michael Strine) Journal of Politics 58(3):682-706 (1996). [Download paper]