“Presidential Investment in the Administrative State,” (with Nick Bednar) American Political Science Review, forthcoming.
“The Independent Agency Myth,” (with Neal Devins), Cornell Law Review, forthcoming. [readme-independent_agency_myth_.docx] [Analysis_Supporting_Calculations] [2000_Nominations_Codebook_070720] [agency_structure_quorum_110118] [agendach_2020agency_avg_081321] [Appendix A] [GPO_PLUMBOOK_2020_020422] [infl_ratings_devins_lewis_120221] [PAS_2008_Dataset_Codebook_070720] [plum_combined_000816_021921] [Presidentially_Approved_Positions_Dataset_2020_020422] [Presidentially_Approved_Positions_Dataset_2016_115th_Congress_07_26_21] [sfgs_2020_methods_sample_construction] [ sfgs_2020_survey_method] [SFGSII_full_instrument_2014] [skills_rating_2020_2014] [statutory_characteristics_and_current_configurations_of_independent_commissions] [whinfluence_2020_agency_avg_181321] [devins_lewis_nominations_analysis_020222] [devins_lewis_skills_012122] [devins_lewis_influence_012122] [devins_lewis_timetomaj_021222]
“Do Vacancies Hurt Federal Agency Performance?” (with Christopher M. Piper), Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory 33(2):313-28 (2023). [Data] [Codebook] [STATA batch file for all analysis] [R code for figures] [Readme for replication]
“Executive Control and Turnover in the Senior Executive Service,” (with Kathleen Doherty and Scott Limbocker) Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory [Data request—IRB restrictions]
“President Trump as Manager: Reflections on the First Year.” (with Patrick Bernhard and Emily H. You) Presidential Studies Quarterly 48(3):480-501. [Data for Figure 2 and Appendix A]
“Elite Perceptions of Agency Ideology and Workforce Skill.” (with Mark D. Richardson and Joshua D. Clinton) Journal of Politics 80(1):303-7 (2018). [Ideology estimates] [Ideology estimates codebook] [Skills estimates] [Skills estimates codebook] [Dataverse page link]
“Agency Performance Challenges and Agency Politicization.” (with Abby K. Wood) Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 27(4):581-95 (2017). [Data] [Codebook] [STATA batch file for replication]
“Presidents and Patronage.” (with Gary E. Hollibaugh, Jr. and Gabe Horton), American Journal of Political Science 58(4):1024-1042 (2014). [Dataverse page link]
“Influencing the Bureaucracy: The Irony of Congressional Oversight.” (with Joshua D. Clinton and Jennifer L. Selin), American Journal of Political Science 58(2):387-401 (2014). [Replication files]
“Government Reform, Political Ideology, and Administrative Burden: The Case of Performance Management in the Bush Administration.” (with Stéphane Lavertu and Donald P. Moynihan) Public Administration Review 73(6):845-57 (2013).
“Policy Influence, Agency-Specific Expertise, and Exit in the Federal Service.” (with Anthony M. Bertelli) Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 23(2):223-245 (2013). [Data request—IRB restrictions]
“Politics Can Limit Policy Opportunism in Fiscal Institutions: Evidence from Official General Fund Revenue Forecasts in the American States.” (with George A. Krause and James Douglas) Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 32(2):271-95 (2013). [Data] [Codebook] [Output] [STATA batch files]
“The Invisible Presidential Appointments: An Examination of Appointments to the Department of Labor, 2001-2011.” (with Richard W. Waterman) Presidential Studies Quarterly 43 (1): 35-57 (2013). [Data] [STATA batch file] [Output] [Resumes] [Coding instructions]
“Separated Powers in the United States.” (with Joshua D. Clinton, Anthony M. Bertelli, Christian Grose, and David C. Nixon) American Journal of Political Science 56(2):341-54 (2012). [Estimates]
“Presidential Appointments and Personnel.” Annual Review of Political Science 14 (June):47-66 (2011).
“Measurement and Public Service Motivation: New Insights, Old Questions.” International Public Management Journal 13(1):1-10 (2010).
“Modern Presidents and the Transformation of the Federal Personnel System.” TheForum, 7(4): Article 6 (2010). [Data for Figure 1] [Data for Figure 2]
“Revisiting the Administrative Presidency: Policy, Patronage, and Administrative Competence.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 39 (1):60-73 (2009).
“Management and Leadership Performance in the Defense Department: Evidence from Surveys of Federal Employees.” (with Major Paul S. Oh, U.S. Army) Armed Forces and Society 34(4): 639-661 (2008). [Data] [STATA batch file] [STATA output]
“Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design.” (with Neal Devins) Boston University Law Review 88(2):459-98 (2008). [Data]
“Toward a Broader Understanding of Presidential Power: A Re-Evaluation of the Two Presidencies Thesis.” (with Brandice Canes-Wrone and William G. Howell) Journal of Politics 70(1):1-16 (2008). [Data]
“Testing Pendleton’s Premise: Do Political Appointees Make Worse Bureaucrats?” Journal of Politics 69(4):1073-88 (2007). [PART Data-STATA][PART Data-Excel] [codebook][Time-varying covariates] [STATA batch file]
“Does Performance Budgeting Work? An Examination of OMB’s PART Scores.” (with John B. Gilmour) Public Administration Review 66(5):742-52 (2006). [Data][Managers data] [STATA batch file][Budget and performance data]
“Political Appointments, Civil Service Systems, and Bureaucratic Competence: Organizational Balancing and Gubernatorial Revenue Forecasts in the American States.” (with George Krause and James Douglas) American Journal of Political Science 50(3):770-87 (2006). [Data] [Codebook] [STATA batch file] [Stata output][Additional data – excluding certain cases][Auxiliary output][Auxiliary analyses]
“Assessing Performance Budgeting at OMB: The Influence of Politics, Performance, and Program Size.” (with John B. Gilmour) Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 16(2):169-86 (2006). [Note] [Data—cohort 1] [Data –cohort 2]
“Staffing Alone: Unilateral Action and the Politicization of the Executive Office of the President, 1988-2004.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 35(3):496-514 (2005). [Data] [Data-time-varying covariates] [STATA batch file]
“Political Learning from Rare Events: Poisson Inference, Fiscal Constraints and the Lifetime of Bureaus.” (with Daniel C. Carpenter) Political Analysis 12(3):201-32 (2004). [Data—Excel] [Data—STATA] [STATA batch file] [Note]
“The Adverse Consequences of the Politics of Agency Design for Presidential Management in the United States: The Relative Durability of Insulated Agencies.” British Journal of Political Science 34:377-404 (2004). [Data—Excel] [Data—STATA] [STATA batch file] [Note]
“The Irrational Escalation of Commitment and the Ironic Labor Politics of the Rust Belt.” (with Glenn Beamer) Enterprise and Society 4(4):676-306 (2003). [Data—Mills] [Data—Companies][STATA batch file]
“What Time Is It? The Use of Power in Four Different Types of Presidential Time.” (with James Michael Strine) Journal of Politics 58(3):682-706 (1996). [Data]