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The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (2008).

Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design: Political Insulation in the United States Government Bureaucracy, 1946-1997. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press (2003). Issued in paperback 2004.


“Political Control and the Forms of Agency Independence,” (with Jennifer L. Selin) George Washington Law Review, forthcoming.

“Presidents and Patronage.” (with Gary E. Hollibaugh, Jr. and Gabe Horton), forthcoming, American Journal of Political Science. Supplementary Appendix

“Influencing the Bureaucracy: The Irony of Congressional Oversight.” (with Joshua d. Clinton and Jennifer L. Selin), forthcoming, American Journal of Political Science.

Government Reform, Political Ideology, and Administrative Burden: The Case of Performance Management in the Bush Administration.” (with Stephane Lavertu and Donald P. Moynihan) Public Administration Review 73 (60: 845-57 (2013)

“Policy Influence, Agency-Specific Expertise, and Exit in the Federal Service”(with Anthony M. Bertelli). Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 23(2):223-245 (2013). [Formerly, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions Working Paper # 02-13] CSDI Policy Brief 2013-05

“Politics Can Limit Policy Opportunism in Fiscal Institutions: Evidence from Official General Fund Revenue Forecasts in the American States,” (with George A. Krause and James Douglas). Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 32(2):271-95 (2013). [Formerly, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions Working Paper# 03-09]

“The Invisible Presidential Appointments: An Examination of Appointments to the Department of Labor, 2001-2011,” (with Richard W. Waterman). Presidential Studies Quarterly 43 (1): 35-57 (2013).

“The Personnel Process in the Modern Presidency.”Presidential Studies Quarterly 42(3):577-96 (2012).

“Separated Powers in the United States,” (with Joshua D. Clinton, Anthony Bertelli, Christian Grose, and David C. Nixon). American Journal of Political Science, 56(2):341-54 (2012) [Formerly, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions Working Paper # 05-09.]

The Consequences of Presidential Patronage for Agency Performance,” (with Nick Gallo). Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 22(2): 219-243 (2012). [Formerly, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions Working Paper # 01-10.] CSDI Policy Brief 2013-04

Presidential Appointments and Personnel.” Annual Review of Political Science 14 (June):47-66 (2011).

Measurement and Public Service Motivation: New Insights, Old Questions,” International Public Management Journal. 13(1):1-10 (2010).

“Modern Presidents and the Transformation of the Federal Personnel System,” The Forum, 7(4): Article 6 (2010). (

Revisiting the Administrative Presidency: Policy, Patronage, and Administrative Competence. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 39 (1):60-73 (2009)

Management and Leadership Performance in the Defense Department: Evidence from Surveys of Federal Employees.” (with Major Paul S. Oh, U.S. Army) Armed Forces and Society, 34(4):639-661 (2008). Policy Brief lewis_surveys.pdf

Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design,” (with Neal Devins) Boston University Law Review, 88(2):459-98 (2008).

Expert Opinion, Agency Characteristics, and Agency Preferences,” (with Joshua D. Clinton). Political Analysis, 16(1):3-16 (2008).

Toward a Broader Understanding of Presidential Power: A Re-Evaluation of the Two Presidencies Thesis,” (with Brandice Canes-Wrone and William G. Howell). Journal of Politics70(1):1-16 (2008).

Testing Pendleton’s Premise: Do Political Appointees Make Worse Bureaucrats?”Journal of Politics 69(4):1073-88 (2007). Policy brief (lewis_performance.pdf)

Does Performance Budgeting Work? An Examination of OMB’s PART Scores.” (with John B. Gilmour) Public Administration Review 66(5):742-52 (2006).

Political Appointments, Civil Service Systems, and Bureaucratic Competence: Organizational Balancing and Gubernatorial Revenue Forecasts in the American States.” (with George Krause and James Douglas) American Journal of Political Science 50(3):770-87 (2006).

Assessing Performance Assessment for Budgeting: The Influence of Politics, Performance, and Program Size in FY 2005.” (with John B. Gilmour) Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 16(2):169-86 (2006).

Political Appointees and the Competence of Federal Program Management.” (with John B. Gilmour) American Politics Research 34(1):22-50 (2006). Policy brief (lewis_appointees.pdf)

Staffing Alone: Unilateral Action and the Politicization of the Executive Office of the President, 1988-2004.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 35(3):496-514 (2005).

Political Learning from Rare Events: Poisson Inference, Fiscal Constraints and the Lifetime of Bureaus.” (with Daniel C. Carpenter) Political Analysis 12(3):201-32 (2004).

The Adverse Consequences of the Politics of Agency Design for Presidential Management in the United States: The Relative Durability of Insulated Agencies.” British Journal of Political Science 34:377-404 (2004).

The Irrational Escalation of Commitment and the Ironic Labor Politics of the Rust Belt.” (with Glenn Beamer). Enterprise and Society 4(4):676-306 (2003).

Agencies by Presidential Design.” (with William G. Howell). Journal of Politics 64(4):1095-1114 (2002).

The Politics of Agency Termination: Confronting the Myth of Agency Immortality.” Journal of Politics 64(1):89-107 (2002).

What Time Is It? The Use of Power in Four Different Types of Presidential Time.” (with James Michael Strine) Journal of Politics 58(3):682-706 (1996).