(Scroll over underlined titles to reveal available links to publications)
Group formation in economics; Networks, clubs and coalitions, (with Gabrielle Demange), eds., January 2005, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge/New York/Port Melbourne/Madrid/Cape Town.
Topics in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory; Essays in Honor of Robert J. Aumann, American Mathematical Society Fields Institute Communication (1999).
Cartwright, Edward & Wooders, Myrna, 2020. “Own experience bias in evaluating the efforts of others,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 164-178.
Subgame-perfect Cooperation in an Extensive Game (with P. Chander). Journal of Economic Theory Volume 187, May 2020, 105017, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105017
Introduction to the JPET special issues commemorating works of James Andreoni, Theodore Bergstrom, Larry Blume and Hal Varian, (with O. Bochet, N. Nikiforakis, E. Reuben, J. Wooders), Journal of Public Economic Theory. Vol. 21, 799-803.
“On approximate cores of NTU games,” (with N. Allouch), Economic Theory January 2017, Vol. 63, Issue 1, p.191-209.
“Existence of share equilibrium in symmetric local public good economies,” Mathematical Social Sciences, September 2017, Vol. 89, p. 50-60.
“Dynamic club formation with coordination” (with T. Arnold), Journal of Dynamics and Games, Vol.2, Issue 3-4, (2015) p.341-361. doi: 10.3934/jdg
“Neutrality with multiple public and private goods,” (with M. Faias and E. Moreno) Math. Social Sciences, Vol. 76, (2015) p.103-1
A Strategic Market Game Approach for the Private Provision of Public Goods (with M. Faias and E. Moreno), Journal of Dynamics and Games 1.2 (2014): 283 – 298.
“Small improving coalitions and small group effectiveness,” International Journal of Economic Theory 9 (2013), 11-21.
“Macroeconomic dynamics and its micro foundations: A special issue in honor of Cuong Le Van,” (with K. Nishimura and M. Yano), International Journal of Economic Theory 9. 1-9.
“Subgame perfect cooperation in an extensive game,” (with P. Chander), under review.
“A Strategic Market Game Approach for the Private Provision of Public Goods,” (with M. Faias and E. Moreno, Dynamics Games and Applications (to appear).
“The partnered core of a game with side payments” (with P. Reny and E. Winter), Social Choice and Welfare: Volume 39, Issue 2 (2012), 521-536.
“Correlated equilibrium, conformity and stereotyping in social groups” (with E. Cartwright), Journal of Public Economic Theory (to appear) DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12078.
“The theory of clubs and competitive coalitions,” Annual Review of Economics, edited by K. Arrow and T. Bresnahan, September 2012, Vol 4595-627.
“Introduction to the coalition theory network special issue,” (with F. Bloch, J-J Herings, and B. Klaus), Journal of Public Economic Theory 13 (6), 2011, pp. 883–884.
“Share equilibrium in economies with local public goods,” (with A. van den Nouweland), Journal of Mathematical Economics, Volume 47 (3) May 2011, pp. 376-381.
“Decentralized job matching,” (with G. Haeringer), International Journal of Game Theory, (in press), DOI: 10.1007/s00182-009-0218-x.
“Cores of many player games; nonemptiness and equal treatment,” Review of Economic Design (in press) DOI: 10.1007/s10058-009-0095-6.
“Club networks with multiple memberships and noncooperative stability” (with F. Page) Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 70, Issue 1, September 2010, Pages 12-20.
“Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games,” (with F. Page), Games and Economic Behavior Volume 66, Issue 1 (May 2009), Pages 462-487.
“Networks and stability,” (with F. Page), Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science, Springer Publishing Co., (2009) pages 6024-48.
“Markets Games and Clubs,” Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science, Springer Publishing Co., (2009) pages 5359-77.
“But what have you done for me lately? Commercial publishing, scholarly communication and open access,” Economic Analysis and Policy 39 (March 2009), 71-87.
“On ex-post purification of equilibrium,” (with E. Cartwright), International Journal of Game Theory 38, (2009), 127-136.
“On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players“ (with E. Cartwright) International Journal of Game Theory 38, (2009), 137-153.
“Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes,” (with N. Allouch), Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 140, Issue 1, May 2008, Pages 246-278.
“Anonymous price taking equilibrium in Tiebout Economies with a continuum of agents; Existence and characterization” (with N. Allouch and J. Conley) Journal of Mathematical Economics, Volume 45, Issues 9-10, 20 September 2009, Pages 492-510
“Public good differentiation and the intensity of tax competition,” (with B. Zissimos), Journal of Public Economics, Volume 92, Issues 5-6, June 2008, Pages 1105-1121.
“Small Group Effectiveness, Per Capita Boundedness and Nonemptiness of Approximate Cores.“ Journal of Mathematical Economics
“On Large Games With Bounded Essential Coalitions“ (with Eyal Winter) in International Journal of Economic Theory, in a special issue in honor of Takashi Negishi.
“Coalitions” (with F. Page)in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, eds. S. Durlauf and L. Blume, Palgrave McMillan: Basingstoke and New York, 2008.
“Olga Bonderva,” in in The New Palgrave.Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, eds. S. Durlauf and L. Blume, Palgrave McMillan: Basingstoke and New York, 2008.
“Networks and Clubs” (with F. Page), Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 64, Issues 3-4, November-December 2007, 406-425.
“Protests and reputation” (with L. Buenrostro and A. Dhillon), International Journal of Game Theory 35, 2007.
“Mimetics and voting: How nature makes us public spirited” (with J. Conley and A. Toosi), International Journal of Game Theory 35, 2006.
“Risky arbitrage, asset prices and externalities,” ,” (with C. Le Van and F. Page, Economic Theory 33,
#3, December 2007, 475-491.
“Tax competition revisited,” (with A. Dhillon and B. Zissimos) Journal of Public Economic Theory Volume 9, Issue 3, Page 391-423, Jun 2007, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00312.
“Behavioral conformity in games with many players,”(with E. Cartwright and R. Selten), Games and
Economic Behavior, Volume 57, Issue 2, November 2006, Pages 347-360.
“The Law of Demand in Tiebout economies,” (with E. Cartwright and J. Conley), in The Tiebout Model at Fifty, William A. Fischel (ed), Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Cambride, Massachusetts (2006).
“Comparative statics and laws of scarcity for games,” Essays in Honor of Marcel K. Richter, Daniel McFadden and Rosa Matzkin eds. (2006).
“Games and economies with near exhaustion of gains to scale,” Group formation in economics; Networks, clubs and coalitions, G. Demange and M. Wooders, eds., Cambridge University Press (2005).
“Networks and Farsighted Stability,” (with F. Page and S. Kamut), Journal of Economic Theory” (2005).
“Laws of scarcity for a finite game; Exact bounds on estimation,” (with A. Kovalenkov) Economic Theory 26, Number 2 (August 2005); 383 – 396.
“Advances in the theory of large cooperative games and applications to club theory; the side payments case,” (2004) (with A. Kovalenkov) in The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions, Carlo Carraro ed., Edward Elgar Cheltenham, UK/Northampton, MA, USA.
“Hedonic Independence and Taste Homogeneity of Organizations with Crowding Types,” (with John Conley), Les Annales d’Economie et de Statistique (2004).
“Utility theory in cooperative game theory“ (with Mamoru Kaneko) Handbook of Utility Theory, eds. P. Hammond and C. Siedel (2004).
“Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs“ (with A. Kovalenkov) Journal of Economic Theory 110 (2003) 87-120.
“Elections and strategic position games“ (with F. H. Page Jr.) Review of Economic Design ,April 2003, 63-84.
“Axiomatizations of Ratio Equilibria in public good economies,“ (with A. Van den Nouweland and S. Tijs) Social Choice and Welfare, 2002.
“Epsilon cores of games with limited side payments; Nonemptiness and equal treatment” (with A. Kovalenkov) Games and Economic Behavior, August 2001, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 193-218.
“Tiebout Economics with differential genetic types and endogenously chosen crowding characteristics,” (with J. Conley) Journal of Economic Theory (2001) 98, 261-294.
“The efficiency, equity and politics of emissions permit trading“ (2001) (with B. Zissimos) University of Warwick Department of Economics Working Paper No 586, in Environmental Policy and the International Economy, eds. Laura Marsiliani, Michael Rauscher and Cees Withagen.
“Some corrections to claims about the literature in England Scotchmer“ (1996) Journal of Mathematical Economics, 36, 2001, pp. 295-309.
“The battle of the sexes over the distribution of male surplus,“ (with H. van den Berg) Economics Bulletin, Vol. 3, no. 17 pp. 1-9.
“On the theory of equalizing differences: Increasing abundances of types of workers may increase their earnings,“ (with E. Cartwright), Economics Bulletin, Vol. 4 no. 4 (2001), pp. 1-10.
“Arbitrage and equilibrium in economies with externalities,” (with C. Le Van and F. H. Page Jr), Journal of Global Optimization (2000) 20, 309-321.
“Cyclic games; An introduction and some examples,” (with R. Selten), Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 34, no. 1, January (2001) pp. 138-152 (15).
“Arbitrage with price-dependent preferences: Equilibrium and market stability,“ (1999), (with F. H. Page, Jr.) in Topics in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics; Essays in Honor of Robert J. Aumann, Fields Institute Communication Volume, American Mathematical Society.
“Inconsequential arbitrage,” (with F. H. Page Jr. and P. Monteiro), Journal of Mathematical Economics 34, (2000), 439-469.
“Increasing cones, recession cones and global cones,” (with P. Monteiro and F. Page) Optimization (2000).
“An exact bound on epsilon for non-emptiness of the epsilon-cores of games,” (with A. Kovalenkov) Mathematics of Operations Research, Vol 26, No 4, Nov 2001, pp 654.678.
“A further extension of the KKMS Theorem,” (with Y. Kannai) Mathematics of Operations Research, Vol 25, No. 4, (November 2000), 539-551.
“Multijurisdictional economies, the Tiebout Hypothesis, and sorting,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Vol. 96, Issue 19, 10585-10587, September 14, 1999.
“Arbitrage and global cones; Another counterexample,“ (with P. Monteiro and F. Page) Social Choice and Welfare 16 (1999), 337-346.
“Clubs, markets, and near-market games,” (with M. Shubik) in Topics in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics; Essays in Honor of Robert J. Aumann, ed. M.H. Wooders, Field Institute Communication Volume, American Mathematical Society.
“First and second welfare theorems for economies with collective goods” (with V. Barham) (Refereed) in Topics in Public Finance, D. Pines, E. Sadka and I. Zilcha, eds. Cambrige University Press (1998),57-88.
“Anonymous pricing in public goods economies,“ (with J. Conley) (Refereed) in Topics in Public Finance, D. Pines, E. Sadka and I. Zilcha, eds. Cambrige University Press (1998), 89-120.
“Anonymous Lindahl pricing in a Tiebout economy with crowding types,“ (with J. Conley), Canadian Journal of Economics 31 (1998), 952-974.
“An extension of the KKMS Theorem,” (with P. Reny) Journal of Mathematical Economics 29 (1998), 125-134.
“Arbitrage, equilibrium and gains from trade; A counterexample,” (with P.K. Monteiro and F. H. Page Jr.) Journal of Mathematical Economics 28 (1997) 481-501.
“Credible threats of secession, partnership, and commonwealths,” (with P.J. Reny) in Understanding Strategic Interaction; Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten, W. Albers, W. Guth, P. Hammersteing, B. Moldovanu, and E. van Damme (eds), Springer-Verlag: Berlin/ Heidelberg/New York/Tokyo, 305-312.
“On the Growth-Maximising distribution of income,” (with A. Robson), International Economic Review 38 (1997) 511-526.
“Equivalence of the core and competitive equilibrium in a Tiebout Economy with crowding types,” (with J. Conley) Journal of Urban Economics 41 (1997) 421-440.
“Equivalence of Lindahl Equilibria with participation prices and the core,“ Economic Theory 9 (1997), 115-128.
“Taste-homogeneity of optimal jurisdictions in a Tiebout Economy with crowding types and endogenous educational investment choices“ (with J. Conley) Ricerche Economiche (1996) 50,367-387.
“The partnered core of an Economy and the partnered competitive equilibrium,“ (with F. Page) Economics Letters 52 (1996) 143-152.
“A necessary and sufficient condition for compactness of individually rational and feasible outcomes and existence of an equilibrium“ (with F. Page) Economics Letters 52 (1996) 153-162.
“The partnered core of a game without side payments“ (with P. Reny), Journal of Economic Theory 70 (1996), 298-311.
“The nonemptiness of the f-core of a game without side payments“ (with M. Kaneko) International Journal of Game Theory 25 (1996), 245-258.
“Equivalence of games and markets,” Econometrica 62 (1994), 1141-1160.
“An axiomatization of the core of finite games and continuum games with finite coalitions“ (with E. Winter), Social Choice and Welfare, (1994) 11:165-175.
“Large games and economies with effective small groups,“ in Game Theoretic Approaches to General Equilibrium Theory, eds. J-F. Mertens and S. Sorin, Kluwer Academic Press, Dordrecht/Boston/London (1994), 145-206.
“Widespread externalities and perfectly competitive markets,” (1994) (with M. Kaneko), in Economic Behavior in an Imperfect Environment, ed. R. Gilles, P. Ruys, and D. Talman
“Inessentiality of large groups and the approximate core property; An equivalence theorem,” Economic Theory 2, (1992), 129-147.
“A game equilibrium model with thin markets,” (1991) (with R. Selten), in Game Equilibrium Models: Volume III, Strategic Bargaining ed. R. Selten, Springer – Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg/New York/London/ Paris/ Tokyo/ Hong Kong/Barcelona/Budapest (1991). (Refereed), 242-282.
“A Tiebout Theorem,” Mathematical Social Sciences 18 (1989) 33-55.
“Continuum economies with finite coalitions; Core, equilibria, and widespread externalities,“ (with P. Hammond, and M. Kaneko), Journal of Economic Theory 49 (1989) 113-134
“The core of a continuum economy with widespread externalities and finite coalitions; from finite to continuum economies“ (with M. Kaneko), Journal of Economic Theory 49 (1989), 135-168.
“Stability of jurisdiction structures in economics with local public goods“, Mathematical Social Sciences (1987), 29-49.
“Competitive equilibrium and the core in club economies with anonymous crowding,” (with S. Scotchmer), Journal of Public Economics (1987).
“Large games: Fair and stable outcomes“ (with W.R. Zame), Journal of Economic Theory 42 (1987), 59.
“Values of large finite games” (with W. Zame), The Shapley Value, ed. A. Roth, (1987) 195-206.
“The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: The model and some results” (with M. Kaneko), Mathematical Social Sciences 2 (1986), 105-137.
“Sophisticated entry in a model of spatial competition” (with B.C. Eaton), The Rand Journal 16 (1985), 282-297 (Reprinted in The Economics of Product Differentiation ed. J. Thisse and G.Norman, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham).
“Near-markets and market games“ (with M. Shubik), The Economic Studies Quarterly 37 (1986), 289-299.
“Approximate cores of large games“ (with W.R. Zame), Econometrica 52 (1984), 1327-1350.
“Approximate cores of replica games and economies; Part 1. Replica games, externalities, andapproximate cores” (with M. Shubik), Mathematical Social Sciences 6 (1983), 27-48.
“Approximate cores of replica games and economies: Part II, Set-up costs and firm formation in coalition production economies“ (with M. Shubik), Mathematical Social Sciences 6 (1983), 285-306.
“The epsilon core of a large replica game,” Journal of Mathematical Economics 11 (1983), 277-300.
“Cores of partitioning games“ (with M. Kaneko), Mathematical Social Sciences 3 (1982), 313-327.
“The Tiebout Hypothesis; Near optimality in local public good economies“, Econometrica 48 (1980), 1467-1485.
“Income distribution and firm formation“ (with E. Bennett), Journal of Comparative Economics 3 (1979), 304-311.
“Equilibria, the core, and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good”, Journal of Economic Theory 18 (1978), 328-348 with “A Correction”, Journal of Economic Theory 25 (1981), 144-51.